Mazón arrived 2.5 hours late to Valencia DANA command center

Five hours in the dark: Mazón arrived at the Cecopi with water rising

Five hours separate the first hydrological warning for the Barranco del Poyo from the arrival of the President of the Generalitat Valenciana at the emergency command center. At 12:09, Civil Protection already had a flow of 264 m³/s on the table for the ravine. At 19:30, Carlos Mazón entered the Cecopi in l'Eliana, about 20 kilometers from the Palau, when the key meeting had been underway for two and a half hours and the autonomous television station À Punt was already broadcasting live footage of the flood's devastation. Between these two moments lies an agenda that was not canceled, a private lunch, and an unanswered question: what was done with those five hours.

The agenda for October 29: three events, a lunch, and an arrival at 19:30

That Tuesday morning antiestéticatured three events unrelated to the DANA. The last, involving business leaders and unions to discuss the 2025 budget, ended at 14:30. According to reports by elDiario.es, after this event, the president attended a private lunch. The Councilor for Justice and Interior, Salomé Pradas, had convened the Cecopi for 17:00, a time one source involved in the operation considered too late: "it should have been convened by 15:00" at the latest.

The Presidency of the Generalitat maintains another version: that Mazón was "working and informed periodically" and joined "immediately" when he was notified of the risk of the Forata dam breaking. What various sources confirm is the result: he arrived around 19:30 and, according to these same accounts, he had to be briefed on topics already discussed. The Presidency also shifts responsibility for crisis management to Pradas, who "was directing the Cecopi" from 15:00 "as regional law dictates."

Barranco del Poyo: from 28.70 to 1,686 m³/s in three hours

The chronology of hydrological warnings is the crux of the matter. At 12:20, the Generalitat's Emergency Coordination Center activated a hydrological alert for municipalities along the rambla. At 13:20, communications mentioned a flow of 120 m³/s; at 14:35, 55.86; at 15:50, 28.70 with a downward trend. At 17:26, scenario 0 was declared, meaning no apparent risk. Fifty minutes later, scenario 2. At 18:43, the ravine was flowing at 1,686 m³/s, and at 18:55, the measurement station ceased to exist, swept away by the water.

This final segment of the record supports the main defense of the Valencian Executive: the information arriving was erratic and, at one point, reassuring. The full breakdown of these measurements, hour by hour, has become the most debated document of the entire episode, as it determines whether the failure lay in measuring or reacting to what was measured.

Why were schools and businesses not closed with a red alert?

Because the AEMET red alert had been issued since early morning, and with this warning on the table, several municipalities closed schools, businesses, and facilities and warned the population. The most cited case is that of the mayor of Elche, from the PP, who activated these measures without waiting for instructions. This comparison troubles the Valencian Government: if the meteorological warning was public and sufficient for councils of different political stripes to apply it, the question shifts to why the Generalitat did not do the same.

Here, the blame is shared. Some argue that emergency competence was poorly covered after VOX left the regional executive; others respond that the Júcar Hydrographic Confederation, dependent on the central government, failed in its measurements and communications, and that without these updated data, no municipal alert would have arrived in time. Both can be true simultaneously, and that is precisely the problem.

The emergency director appointed hours before the catastrophe

The administrative detail that has generated the most noise: the position of Director General of Interior was vacant for three months, with responsibilities for Civil Protection and autonomous police delegated. Mazón personally chose the candidate to fill it, and the appointment was signed by decree just hours before the catastrophe. The profile of the appointee, according to these reports, is that of a bullfighting expert. Councilor Pradas also faces the argument that she "has no experience in managing" emergencies, according to sources within the operation.

VOX blocks the censure and the streets move

In the Valencian Courts, the censure and request for Mazón's resignation were voted on and did not pass: VOX voted against in a secret ballot. The reproach from various quarters was the usual one: the same dogs with different collars. By then, there was already a call for a demonstration in Valencia on November 9, with people from the right and left coinciding for the first time at the same point.

---

The image summarizing the episode is not political, but domestic: a video circulated on social media in which a neighbor affected by the flood pointed directly at the President of the Generalitat as responsible. With a red alert issued in the morning, municipalities that closed in time, a flow that jumps from 28.70 to 1,686 m³/s in less than three hours, and five hours of an intact agenda, the question is no longer who warned first, but how many of those blank hours might have changed something in the streets.