Lobster Generation: Worked Without Education, Now Demands Degrees

From Illiteracy to Mandatory Degrees: The Lobster Generation's Double Standard

It has been generating responses for over a year, and the controversy shows no sign of abating. The uncomfortable question is simple: how is it possible that the generation that entered the labor market in the 1950s, 60s, and early 70s without passing through classrooms — many without even completing primary school — now demands qualifications for the same positions they occupied? The answer, drawn from testimonies, data, and some surreal anecdotes, reveals a double standard difficult to hide.

When Not Knowing How to Form an 'O' Wasn't a Problem

The starting point is ugly to recount, but the numbers do not lie: in the post-war period, most Spanish workers could barely sign their names. It was not an impediment. The economy of those times demanded arms, not credentials. At 14 years old — the minimum legal age set by the regime — one entered the factory, the fields, or the workshop without anyone asking for a graduate certificate. One of the cases that circulates insistently is that of a father born in 1925 who got rich "simply by working": agriculture, livestock, and months at sea. He couldn't swim and shipwrecked twice. In his early 50s, he took early retirement and left his children's lives "half-solved." Harsh, yes. But without papers.

The mechanization of the 60s and the industrial takeoff allowed that unskilled workforce to climb to supervisor, even middle manager positions. The social elevator did not function with degrees, but with connections and the scarcity of a Spain starting from zero.

The Blank Exam That Won a Position

The juiciest paradox is protagonistized by a municipal caretaker. The man, a resident of a village, could not read or write. He was notified for a civil service exam and showed up just in case: he left the exam blank and left crying. Days later, he received congratulations from the board: he had obtained a position. They filled it in for him, of course. The system needed to place him. This story, told by a direct witness, is not an isolated case; it responds to a clientelist logic that coexisted with the economic miracle.

And not only in administration. In the private sector, the apprentice figure functioned as the natural path to advancement. A young boy entered without training and learned "on the job"; after a few years, he was a journeyman. Until Felipe González, in the 80s, abolished this figure under the argument of youth exploitation. The result is known: to access the same position previously covered by willingness, today one asks for a certificate, a module, or a degree.

From Early Retirement to Nepotism: The Comparative Grievance

The grievance is completed by the industrial restructuring of the 80s. Far from retraining, much of that generation was let out through regulation files with golden early retirements or generously recognized disabilities. Meanwhile, subsequent generations were demanded exactly the opposite: permanent training, flexibility, and competitiveness in a globalized market. The same worker who entered without education and retired at 50 has no problem pointing out that young people lack a culture of effort.

The same narrative repeats with disparagement towards those who cannot find work today. And then selective memory emerges: the struggle against the grays, the sacrifice, high interest rates are remembered; it is forgotten that with five years of work and a salary, one could buy a home. "They paid off the apartment in three or four years," admits an analysis that has become a catalog of grievances.

Detroit as a Mirror: The Industrial Paradise That Will Not Return

There is a moment in the analysis worth highlighting: the comparison with Detroit. The symbol of the North American automobile industry supported an working class that earned well, had health insurance, and pensions seen in perspective. Success was sold on installments and there was no unemployment. But the model collapsed when the industry could no longer sustain that structure. The uncomfortable lesson is that post-war economic growth was a historical anomaly, a scenario of growing demand that will not be repeated. What for some was merit, for others was simply being in the right place at the right time.

And there the analysis remains, stuck in the question that no data fully resolves: how much was personal merit and how much was tailwind? The generation that worked without knowing how to form an 'O' with a straw was not smarter or more hardworking than the current one; they simply arrived earlier to a country that was yet to be built. The problem is that now, from the other side of the barrier, some insist on explaining their success as an exclusive triumph of character. And that, at minimum, is an interested narrative.