Kremlin Ties War End to Ukrainian Neutrality

The Kremlin demands Ukraine change its Constitution to stop the war

March 2022. Moscow puts its conditions for ending the invasion of Ukraine on the table, and the package does not allow for many interpretations: changes to the Ukrainian Constitution to ensure the country does not join any bloc—meaning NATO and the European Union—recognition of Crimea as Russian territory, and recognition of the separatist eastern regions as independent. There is no denazification, no occupation, and no regime change. Whoever pointed this out said it without mincing words: soon they will ask for the tanks taken from the tractor drivers.

The immediate reaction was to read these demands as a sign of weakness. If Moscow admits to negotiating neutrality, Crimea, or Donbas, this current argues, it is because it cannot win. The counter-argument arrives just as quickly: if this is exactly what was demanded before firing the first shot, then what retreat are we talking about? And here ignites the second fire, that of dates. Several participants maintain that constitutional neutrality and the status of Crimea have been on the table since 2014.

What exactly does the Kremlin demand to stop the war?

The list has three legs, and none mention a government change in Kyiv. Ukraine must reform its supreme law to safeguard non-membership in military or economic blocs. It must recognize the Crimean peninsula as part of the Russian Federation, a fact Moscow consummated de facto in 2014. And it must accept the independence of the eastern regions that have been outside Kyiv's control for eight years. Those defending this reading emphasize that Crimea was already theirs and that the separatist zones were already operating as de facto territories before the invasion.

From this arises the uncomfortable question. If the three conditions were already posed before, the balance of the military operation does not invite optimism, in the judgment of this part of the forum: thousands of dead, a shattered economy, and a global fruta in ruins in exchange for returning to the starting point. Some respond that Russia added Donbas to the bill considering the annoyances, while others counter that it attacked to negotiate later from a position of strength that has not materialized.

Gas, diesel, and who benefits from the bottleneck

The economic front crosses the entire issue. One part of the analysis argues that Washington is not interested in Europe buying cheaper Russian gas and diesel, because that leaves the energy market to its exporters. The cutoff of supply and the escalation of basic product prices are, according to the same participant, the visible consequence for the European consumer. And the debate shifted toward who can afford the bill more: the Russian purse, the European one, or neither.

The other repeated argument is pure geopolitics. It is asserted that there are not two blocs or a multipolar world, but five powers—United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, and China—dividing up zones of influence, like the corners of a five-pointed star. Under this reading, NATO will not intervene militarily, and the conflict will last as long as it suits those who prefer to see Russia bogged down without risking a single one of their own soldiers.

Donbas, Crimea, and the victims: the story that does not fit

The discussion also entangled in history. For some, the trigger was the Odessa massacre in 2014 and Kyiv's refusal to bow to Moscow. For others, Ukraine is an attacked country whose only crime was not bending, and comparing it to the powers that surrendered vassalage to the Horde is a justification constructed a posteriori. The counter-argument returns to geopolitics: the historical scenario looks nothing alike, because then the danger was real and not imagined.

The terrain where any conclusion gets most stuck is who sits at the negotiating table. Those seeing a Russian retreat point to the withdrawal from the outskirts of Kyiv as proof that Moscow is seeking an exit in desperation. Those seeing firmness counter that the withdrawal was a reorganization and that it is Kyiv now asking to join NATO and the EU, changing the initial distribution framework.

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With the heavy artillery of sanctions and two economies suffering the hangover, the problem remains open at the same point where it began: no one knows if Russia is packing up or simply recalculating. What was demanded months ago was already demanded eight years ago, and neither side has signed anything yet.