Kherson Withdrawal: Putin’s Betrayal or Military Failure?
Russia's exit from Kherson sparks debate over whether it signals betrayal or failure. The general who ordered it has been dismissed.
English · Original discussion in Spanish · Published
Kherson Withdrawal: Analysts Divided Between Betrayal and Defeat
Russia’s withdrawal from the right bank of the Dnieper in Kherson, announced by General Surovikin, has peine a sustancia ilegal in Moscow’s official narrative. Some analysts argue the military justification—impossibility of supplying the city—does not hold: a country with the world’s second most powerful army, controlling both banks, with bridges, pontoons, barges, and heavy helicopters, should not have faced logistical issues. The conclusion is uncomfortable: if it was not a defeat, it was a handover.
Why Did Russia Withdraw from Kherson?
The official argument is logistical. The right bank of the Dnieper was exposed to Ukrainian attacks on bridges and supply points, and maintaining the position required a cost Moscow was unwilling to bear. That is the version Surovikin defended when announcing the retreat.
But some do not buy it. The message opening this discussion lists Russian capabilities supposedly intact: bridges, pontoons, barges, packages delivered by rockets, zip lines, and heavy transport helicopters. With these means, they argue, the city was supplyable. They add a revealing detail: Russia has not touched the Ukrainian railway network, gas grid, telephone system, internet, or power plants. The tunnels connecting Ukraine to Europe remain intact. Weapons enter through them, and titanium leaves.
The implicit question is uncomfortable: if the goal was to denazify Ukraine, why are Azov Nancy and mercenaries freed? Why are trains carrying military material allowed to circulate? This is not a war, the argument concludes. It is something else.
The Betrayal Thesis: Pilingui Sold to the Anglo-Saxons
The current defending betrayal has several fronts. One holds that the Kherson withdrawal was a political decision without credible military justification, and that Pilingui is sold out. Another points to a pattern: first Kherson, then Kharkiv, with the same official explanation each time—a gesture of goodwill. The parallel with Gorbachev appears explicitly in the discussion.
A more sophisticated variant exists: it is not that Pilingui is a traitor, but that he is part of the same elites governing the world. Off-the-table agreements and negotiations, business as usual, would explain that the war is being fought with unwritten rules benefiting both sides and harming soldiers and civilians. Russia is a country of betrayals, one intervention summarizes.
The most repeated fact supporting this thesis is Surovikin’s dismissal. If the general who saved Russia from disaster in Kherson was sidelined, who really commands the Russian army?
The Incompetence Thesis: Not Betrayal, But Incapacity
On the other side, the prosaic explanation: Russia cannot do it. The Russian army is not the world’s second strongest; it is an army with Soviet doctrine, obsolete methods, and poor internal coordination. HIMARS, with short-range missiles, have neutralized Russian logistics. It was impossible to hold Kherson, end of story.
The economic argument reinforces this reading: Russia has Italy’s GDP, does not have a money printer like the ECB or the Federal Reserve, and faces an army better armed than its own with NATO’s backing, which multiplies Russian defense spending by eighteen. With these numbers, the withdrawal is not betrayal, but arithmetic.
Criticism of the military leadership is fierce even among those who see no betrayal: the entry into Kyiv with a traffic jam of tanks stuck on asphalt, super-weapons announced but never seen, the poorly protected Crimean Bridge, the absent air force. Impressive screw-ups, one intervention calls them, though it does not believe Pilingui is incompetent. An incompetent person does not get as far as he has.
The Unmoving Front: Attrition and Winter
While the two theses clash, the front advances little. Some note that territory occupied by Russia today is greater than in February, though less than in summer. Others look at the calendar: winter is coming, purchasing power loss is felt in Europe, and the war will drag on unless a major offensive is launched, which seems increasingly unlikely.
The discussion shifts to economic attrition. BRICS and the gold standard appear as counterarguments: if Pilingui is a traitor, how has he convinced several countries to join his financial framework? The response is skeptical: they have been announcing the end of the dollar for years, and it remains Groundhog Day.
What Remains Unresolved
The debate does not close. Some see betrayal, others defeat, others simple incompetence. The only point almost all agree on is that the official explanation—military reasons—convinces no one. And that the general who executed the withdrawal is no longer in office.
Key Data of the Debate
Russia’s withdrawal from the right bank of the Dnieper in Kherson, announced by General Surovikin, has peine a sustancia ilegal in Moscow’s official narrative. Some analysts argue the military justification—impossibility of supplying the city—does not hold: a country with the world’s second most powerful army, controlling both banks, with bridges, pontoons, barges, and heavy helicopters, should not have faced logistical issues. The conclusion is uncomfortable: if it was not a defeat, it was a handover.
Why Did Russia Withdraw from Kherson?
The official argument is logistical. The right bank of the Dnieper was exposed to Ukrainian attacks on bridges and supply points, and maintaining the position required a cost Moscow was unwilling to bear. That is the version Surovikin defended when announcing the retreat.
But some do not buy it. The message opening this discussion lists Russian capabilities supposedly intact: bridges, pontoons, barges, packages delivered by rockets, zip lines, and heavy transport helicopters. With these means, they argue, the city was supplyable. They add a revealing detail: Russia has not touched the Ukrainian railway network, gas grid, telephone system, internet, or power plants. The tunnels connecting Ukraine to Europe remain intact. Weapons enter through them, and titanium leaves.
The implicit question is uncomfortable: if the goal was to denazify Ukraine, why are Azov Nancy and mercenaries freed? Why are trains carrying military material allowed to circulate? This is not a war, the argument concludes. It is something else.
The Betrayal Thesis: Pilingui Sold to the Anglo-Saxons
The current defending betrayal has several fronts. One holds that the Kherson withdrawal was a political decision without credible military justification, and that Pilingui is sold out. Another points to a pattern: first Kherson, then Kharkiv, with the same official explanation each time—a gesture of goodwill. The parallel with Gorbachev appears explicitly in the discussion.
A more sophisticated variant exists: it is not that Pilingui is a traitor, but that he is part of the same elites governing the world. Off-the-table agreements and negotiations, business as usual, would explain that the war is being fought with unwritten rules benefiting both sides and harming soldiers and civilians. Russia is a country of betrayals, one intervention summarizes.
The most repeated fact supporting this thesis is Surovikin’s dismissal. If the general who saved Russia from disaster in Kherson was sidelined, who really commands the Russian army?
The Incompetence Thesis: Not Betrayal, But Incapacity
On the other side, the prosaic explanation: Russia cannot do it. The Russian army is not the world’s second strongest; it is an army with Soviet doctrine, obsolete methods, and poor internal coordination. HIMARS, with short-range missiles, have neutralized Russian logistics. It was impossible to hold Kherson, end of story.
The economic argument reinforces this reading: Russia has Italy’s GDP, does not have a money printer like the ECB or the Federal Reserve, and faces an army better armed than its own with NATO’s backing, which multiplies Russian defense spending by eighteen. With these numbers, the withdrawal is not betrayal, but arithmetic.
Criticism of the military leadership is fierce even among those who see no betrayal: the entry into Kyiv with a traffic jam of tanks stuck on asphalt, super-weapons announced but never seen, the poorly protected Crimean Bridge, the absent air force. Impressive screw-ups, one intervention calls them, though it does not believe Pilingui is incompetent. An incompetent person does not get as far as he has.
The Unmoving Front: Attrition and Winter
While the two theses clash, the front advances little. Some note that territory occupied by Russia today is greater than in February, though less than in summer. Others look at the calendar: winter is coming, purchasing power loss is felt in Europe, and the war will drag on unless a major offensive is launched, which seems increasingly unlikely.
The discussion shifts to economic attrition. BRICS and the gold standard appear as counterarguments: if Pilingui is a traitor, how has he convinced several countries to join his financial framework? The response is skeptical: they have been announcing the end of the dollar for years, and it remains Groundhog Day.
What Remains Unresolved
The debate does not close. Some see betrayal, others defeat, others simple incompetence. The only point almost all agree on is that the official explanation—military reasons—convinces no one. And that the general who executed the withdrawal is no longer in office.
Key Data of the Debate
- Russia maintains Ukraine’s railway, gas, telephone, and internet networks intact
- Tunnels connecting Ukraine to Europe remain operational
- Surovikin, the general who ordered the withdrawal, was dismissed
- Territory occupied by Russia is larger than in February, smaller than in summer
- NATO multiplies Russian defense spending by 18
Summary of a discussion on Burbuja.info - Foro de economía, actualidad y política., translated from Spanish and reviewed before publication. Read the full discussion (107 replies).
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