Japan is fading: 700,000 births and a flat GDP for 30 years
Japan is crumbling. This is stated by a Japanese citizen in a video he warns was recorded "before it gets deleted," backed by data frequently cited in debates:
births have fallen from two million annually in 1970 to fewer than 700,000. The workforce is shrinking, GDP has remained static for three decades, and wages have been stagnant for years. This is not a sudden crisis. It is a countdown.
The country that invented the Walkman, just-in-time manufacturing, and robotics faces the same problem as half of Europe, but with two differences that make it more uncomfortable:
it cannot import workers without breaking its own social contract, and its population has a capacity for endurance that turns every adjustment into silence. The result is an aging, impoverishing society that does not protest.
Why Japanese people are stopping having children
The argument running through the analysis is simple and brutal: if a country does not guarantee a minimum quality of life for its population and squeezes them to the limit, people face a binary dilemma.
Have children and struggle to survive, or don't have them and maintain quality of life. Most choose the latter. It is not an ideological decision. It is household arithmetic.
Added to this is a cost structure that offers no mercy. In Tokyo, a watermelon can cost over $30. Fruit, rent, education: everything competes with the possibility of starting a family. And when salaries have been stagnant for decades while the cost of living rises, the decision makes itself.
Some argue the problem is about incentives: the State treats citizens with a minimum of decency, and when it raises taxes and spikes the cost of living while keeping the same salary, the surprise is massive. In Spain, the argument continues, the reaction would be different: here nobody protests anymore because fiscal and political mistreatment has become normalized.
The pension Ponzi scheme and the immigration trap
According to the most repeated analysis, the Japanese pension system works like the Spanish one: a pyramid scheme that needs an increasingly wide base of workers to support an increasingly numerous apex of retirees. When the base narrows, the pyramid wobbles.
Japan has had the same GDP for 30 years while China has multiplied by 30. The picture admits few interpretations.
The temptation, then, is the same as in Europe: import population to sustain GDP. The problem is that Japan is historically isolationist, with a culture of homogeneity that cannot be broken by decree. Unqualified immigration does not solve the pyramid: it patches it. And the patch has a social cost.
The repeated warning is clear:
Japan will completely collapse when someone convinces it that the solution to the inverted pyramid is importing unqualified immigration. The argument is not sarracena, it is accounting: if the active population falls, GDP decreases, and no migratory flow changes the underlying demographic equation.
The flip side: a repressed society sweeping things under the rug
Not all analyses buy into the narrative of Japanese efficiency. There is a current arguing that
Japan has always been sick, it just hid it better before. The culture of endurance, of not complaining, of fitting into rigid standards, produces a society with severely neglected mental health issues, people withdrawn from life and locked in their homes, and hospital management that can reject a patient right from the ambulance.
The most cited case is that of elderly women committing crimes to enter prison. They commit minor thefts with an explicit goal:
to be sent to prison, where they find care and companionship they do not have outside. It is not an anecdote. It is a social indicator.
However, the facade remains. Japan projects to the world an image of order, cleanliness, and safety that does not always correspond to daily reality. A Spaniard criticizes his country without issue. A Japanese person, even if fed up, will not. That difference explains why the video opening this conversation is recorded in Spanish and not in Japanese.
The Spanish mirror: same parallels, different starting point
The comparison with Spain appears in almost all sections of the analysis. Japan had its golden age after World War II, with families, children, and optimism. Spain had its own, shorter and later. Now both share the same ethos:
a model alien to productive capitalism, with similar historical evolution despite cultural differences.
The difference is in degree. Japan remains afloat; Spain is, according to the harshest diagnosis, in absolute misery. But the direction is the same: a population that does not reproduce, scarce qualified workers, absent entrepreneurs, and a declining standard of living. The repeated conclusion is uncomfortable:
swap Japan for Spain and the content of the video is totally valid.
There remains a prediction with reservations. Japan is not going to disappear tomorrow, nor will its society collapse overnight. But if birth rates remain below 700,000 annual births and GDP stays flat, the adjustment will come via the silent route: fewer people, less activity, less country. And nobody will have voted for any of this.
Key data from the analysis:
- Births in Japan in 1970: 2 million
- Births in Japan in 2024: fewer than 700,000
- Japanese GDP: 30 years without growth
- Price of a watermelon in Tokyo: over $30
- Population Japan loses each year: nearly one million people