Japan Reclaims the Kurils as Pilingui Already Has Enough with Ukraine
According to a comparison circulating on the forum, Japan has a GDP five times larger than Russia's and a fleet of 20 submarines and 53 frigates and destroyers. With this attributed advantage, it reclaims four frozen islands that Moscow took at the end of World War II: the Southern Kurils. On paper, there's no contest. On the ground, the islands remain Russian, and no one lifts a finger.
The claim is not new: it's a diplomatic ritual Tokyo has repeated for decades. What has changed is the timing. It's being revived just as Russia is mired in Ukraine, and the Pacific front is once again being scrutinized.
What are the Kurils and Why Hasn't There Been a Peace Treaty Since 1945
Japan and Russia never signed a peace treaty after World War II. The obstacle is the sovereignty of the Southern Kurils, occupied by the Soviet Union and inherited by Moscow. Tokyo claims these islands and, in more expansive versions of the claim, also the southern half of Sakhalin, the former Karafuto.
Some argue, on the thread, that Japan has a larger population than Russia and a territory fifty times smaller. That would be, according to this argument, the real basis for the claim: space. The islands are volcanic rock and hostile climate, but they are where they are, and whoever controls them dominates access to the Pacific.
Gibraltar, the Falklands, and the Golan Heights: The Club of Unmoving Claims
The most frequent parallel drawn is with Spain's claim to Gibraltar, Argentina's to the Falklands, or Syria's to the Golan Heights. Claims based on reasonable historical arguments and a correlation of forces that doesn't support them.
Without a peace treaty and without the military muscle to back the demand, the claimant has the right but it serves no purpose. The claim becomes an annual formality that the occupier elegantly ignores. The case of the Dokdo islands, disputed between South Korea and Japan, also emerges: Tokyo not only claims what isn't theirs, but also loses what is theirs in their own neighborhood.
The Shadow of Washington and the Seventh Fleet in Yokosuka
One part of the analysis suggests that Japan doesn't lift a finger without U.S. approval. The U.S. Seventh Fleet is based in Yokosuka, and Japanese foreign policy would be part of the same package. If that's true, the question changes: it's not what Tokyo wants, but what Washington wants.
On the other side of the scale is China. A Japan with nuclear capability is a scenario that Beijing, according to this analysis, would never tolerate. That counterbalance would be enough to explain why the claim remains an annual diplomatic note and a three-day headline.
The Unverified Data Circulating: 1,200 Nuclear Warheads to Confirm
In a more speculative section, a figure appears that should be treated with caution: that Japan could possess a nuclear arsenal exceeding a thousand, according to a casually cited encyclopedia entry. There is no independent confirmation, and the source is not reliable. It's cited, not credited.
The conventional arithmetic cited in the thread also lacks sources: around 200 operational F-15 fighters, 150 F-35s ordered, and about 40 already in service.
Can Russia Open a Second Front in Asia?
The most repeated argument is common military sense. If Russia hasn't been able to take Kyiv, imagining a landing on Pacific islands with the required logistics is an exercise in fiction. The Japanese claim itself is seen, against all odds, as proof of Russian weakness: taking advantage of a distracted bear.
The counterargument is just as simple. Japan also lacks the offensive force that the claim would require, and its constitution imposes limits. Reclaiming is not invading.
With these pieces in play, the question isn't whether Japan will recover the Kurils. It's how many identical communiqués it will take for someone to take it seriously.
Summary of a discussion on Burbuja.info - Foro de economía, actualidad y política., translated from Spanish and reviewed before publication.
Read the full discussion (169 replies).
Russia's offensive stalls due to logistical and tactical bottlenecks, turning a swift conquest into a prolonged war of attrition and constant countermeasures.