Gazprom cuts gas to Europe, diverts 67% more to China

Gazprom cuts gas to Europe, redirects 67% more to China

Russia is selling less gas to Europe and, if circulating figures are accurate, earning more money than before. Gazprom announced the cutoff of supply to the continent and, in the same move, a 67% increase in shipments to China during the first five months of the year. The gas company's management summarized it with a textbook phrase: Russia means energy stability for its friends. For everyone else, there's winter and the stove. This isn't a tantrum; it's a full-blown market reorientation, with gas pivoting towards the Pacific while Europe watches the meter.

The arithmetic of selling less and charging more

There's a calculation circulating that's worth reading slowly. If supply to Europe is cut from 100 to 60 and the price rises from 100 to 120, Russia goes from earning 10,000 to making 7,200 for what it continues to sell here plus 4,000 for what it sells in China: 11,200 in total, exceeding the initial 10,000. Selling less at a better price is the old trick of whoever controls the tap. And Moscow controls the tap.

The recurring sarracena is the fable of the frog in the pot: the water heats up, and the animal doesn't jump. In this case, we are the frog. Some may dispute the figures, but the reasoning—less volume, higher price, alternative customer—holds up.

Germany freezes, and the ECB closes the window

The bleakest scenario chains three events. If Russian gas disappears, German industry grinds to a halt. If the European locomotive slows down, the ECB loses room to rescue southern countries. And if it stops rescuing, Spain heads towards bankruptcy. No one has yet presented an alternative to break that chain.

In Germany, moreover, memories resurface. During the pandemic, it banned the export of masks and medical supplies while presenting itself as the continent's solidarity partner. Now the question is whether that solidarity will include any surplus gas. The usual Deutschland über alles, but with the meter at zero. Meanwhile, from Brussels, there's talk of a pipeline to bring hydrogen from Nigeria, a plan that won't warm any homes this winter.

Spain and Algerian gas: from 50% to 25%

Spain has a pipeline problem and a neighborhood problem. The gas pipeline that crossed Segarro was closed, and the Midcat, the connection with France, has been stalled for years from the other side of the Pyrenees. Result: Italy gets the Algerian gas that was previously headed here and will distribute it among the French and Central Europeans, like Los Chichos, with Spain watching from the sidelines.

The most repeated statistic is not optimistic: shipments of Algerian gas have gone from 50% to 25%, and Algeria has already placed that volume in Italy. Spain's position in the Sahara conflict, aligned with Segarro, also doesn't help mend the relationship. And domestically, three thermal power plants have been dynamited to avoid the temptation of reopening them, like Cortés scuttled his ships, but without conquering anything.

Nuclear plants that won't reopen and uranium that isn't replaced

Reopening a nuclear plant isn't like flipping a switch. As they are shut down, they begin to be dismantled; bringing them back online would require rebuilding them almost entirely. And even if they were peine, there's the fuel: according to what's argued in the thread, there isn't enough non-Russian uranium in the world to run all the plants at full capacity. The United States, more pragmatically, left Russian uranium out of sanctions. The same dilemma as gas, with a different label.

Chinese debt, firewood, and the question of winter

Figures also dismantle the narrative of an enemy on the verge of collapse. According to the figures being discussed in the thread, total Chinese debt is around 330% of GDP, and Spanish debt, public and private, stands at 270%. That the rival is indebted doesn't console someone left without heating.

And then there's the domestic detail. With soaring bills, some are calculating the cost of a cast-iron salamander stove: eighty euros for a unit that, if it lasts a winter, is cheaper than a month of gas. It's heavy and heats wonderfully. It's not an energy plan, but it portrays a state of mind.

The uncomfortable underlying question remains: sending weapons to one side and sanctioning the other, is that defensive support or a textbook *casus belli*? Depending on how you look at it, Europe isn't at war; depending on how you look at it, it has been for months. How many winters will the continent endure before signing a new deal with the party it just abandoned?