The forecast that the right will not return to power in Spain
A narrative has taken hold in much of the Spanish left's discourse: that the right will not return to La Moncloa for a couple of decades. This argument is not based on polls, but on demographics and the alleged metamorphosis of political parties. Supporters state without nuance that the nostalgic base for Francoism is dying out, the PP fights to appear more pogre than the PSOE, and Vox is reduced to a party of romantics wasting their vote. The picture, however, does not fully align with the numbers.
What sustains the forecast that the right will not return to power
The central argument is generational: according to this forecast, nostalgic voters for Francoism are dying off, and what remains is insufficient to sustain a majority. The second pillar is the alleged dissolution of the People's Party (Partido Popular): it no longer fights to represent the hard right, but to prove it is more pogre than the PSOE. The third is Vox as a kind of Left Union of the right: a minor party for those who vote out of romanticism, even if the vote doesn't lead to governing. With this cocktail, the forecast is presented as irreversible.
Against it, an uncomfortable observation: the majority supporting the Government is not an ideological block, but a heterogeneous sum. Some summarize it thus: more than twenty parties united by their rejection of the other half of the country and by specific perks. If the glue is the you do this for me, and I give you the votes, the building lasts only as long as each negotiation.
The arithmetic cooling the optimism: 4 seats short of absolute majority
The most repeated counterargument is not ideological, but numerical. The right-wing block fell just 4 deputies short of an absolute majority, according to the calculation repeated in the thread. From there, the optimistic conclusion—two decades without the right in power—stumbles: it takes only one deputy changing their mind for the entire calculation to go awry. The probability of a specific transfer, of an unexpected abstention in the final minute, is small, but not null. And in politics, the improbable occurs more frequently than one likes to admit.
Catalonia and the Basque Country: the arithmetic supporting left-wing votes
Underlying the issue is a territorial question that almost no one wants to put in writing. It is argued that as long as Catalonia remains in Spain, there will be a left-wing Government at La Moncloa, because the demographic weight of Catalonia and the Basque Country tips the balance. The Basque Country, with less population, would not be enough on its own. From this springs the question facing half the country: if the Government's support comes from votes of those who do not feel Spanish, what legitimacy is there in speaking on behalf of Spain?
The officialist version responds that amnesty and the referendum are being normalized in the media and that there is a president willing to risk his office to recognize plurinationality. The critical version warns otherwise: that without constitutional reform, there will be no consultation, and forcing it without the entire Spanish population would open a conflict with difficult-to-calculate consequences.
"There is no right in Spain": Feijóo as socialist and Vox as syndicalist
Another axis runs through the conversation and is not signed only by the left. It is maintained that liberal right simply does not exist. That Feijóo declared himself a tempered socialist and voted for Felipe González, and that Vox, far from liberalism, is a national-syndicalist residue, i.e., socialist. If this is true, the forecast becomes tricky: the right will not return to power because, strictly speaking, it never governed. Franco, it is said, applied socialist policies, and the right only reached power by force or through misunderstanding.
The economic axis: debt, public spending, and who pays the bill
Here the optimistic tone breaks completely. The economic criticism points to the financing model: a twenty-year budget spent in a single legislature, based on credit and debt issuance, with the bill passed on to whoever comes next. The support for all of this, it is alleged, is the purchase of public debt by the European Central Bank. The party lasts as long as the ECB supports the setup.
This is not a thesis exclusive to right-wing voters. There are socialists who admit that the party representing them is not the one governing, and that their support responds to defending their right to exist in Spain, not to economic enthusiasm. The conclusion repeated in the thread, and therefore uncomfortable, is that no party, from either side, truly concerns itself with the average citizen.
In the end, the data that best summarizes all this is not a projection over twenty years, but a small, stubborn number: four seats. The forecast on who will not return to power fits entirely within that margin. With that distance, speaking of decades seems more like a wish than a calculation.
Summary of a discussion on Burbuja.info - Foro de economía, actualidad y política., translated from Spanish and reviewed before publication.
Read the full discussion (226 replies).
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