Forum proposal urges cutting Ukraine aid to lift sanctions

Strangling Ukraine to restore 2021 gas prices

There is a current of opinion arguing that the quickest way out of Europe's energy crisis is to cut all support for Ukraine and force its surrender. The plan, stated bluntly by a participant in a geopolitical analysis forum, proposes that Western European countries inform Kyiv of a total closure of exports and access by land, sea, and air. The declared objective: precipitate the end of the war and have Ukraine sign off on territorial losses considered acceptable.

The package would include a 180-degree turn in sanctions policy. Restrictions on Russia would be lifted, the annexation of occupied territories recognized, and oil and gas flows resumed. In return, a cascade of macroeconomic consequences is expected: fuel at €1.40, mild deflation, gas at 2021 prices, a strong euro against the dollar, Euribor at lows, and Nord Stream pipelines operating at full capacity. Within two months, the argument goes, Europe would enter winter with an expanding economy while the United States deteriorates.

What exactly does the strangulation plan propose?

The core of the proposal is a unilateral break with the status quo. Western European countries would stop sending weapons and supplies to Ukraine and block its trade routes. This is not about negotiating peace, but economically suffocating the country until it accepts a deal on Moscow's terms. The premise is that Russia will not withdraw and any attempt to force its exit would trigger a nuclear escalation no one wants.

The second pillar is dismantling the sanctions regime. Restrictions would be lifted, annexation recognized as definitive, and the energy tap peine. The argument is purely transactional: Russia keeps its share of territory and Europe recovers cheap supply. The plan includes an explicit gesture of contempt toward Washington, which would be left without support in its standoff with Moscow.

The impact attributed to the return of Russian gas

Proponents of this path project a scenario of rapid normalization. With Russian oil and gas back, fuel would drop to €1.40, gas would return to 2021 prices, and inflation would give way to mild deflation. The euro would appreciate against the dollar and Euribor would fall, easing variable-rate mortgages. Nord Stream would operate at full capacity again.

Political calculations are also part of the package. European governments would save face and, possibly, elections. The text summarizes this with an ironic concession: "I feel bad for Pedro [Spanish PM], but it's for the common good." The underlying idea is that the average voter punishes energy bills at the polls, not Ukraine's borders.

Rebuttals: feigned neutrality and broken treaties

The proposal quickly received frontal responses. Several participants pointed out the contradiction of declaring neutrality while proposing to strangle an invaded country. "I have another alternative plan, how about if the Muscovite empire dismembers itself so we can lift sanctions?" one replied. Another went further: "You don't get rid of a bully by giving him what he asks for. You'll just make him ask for more, and harder."

Legal arguments also came into play. It was recalled that Russia signed a treaty in 1994 committing to respect Ukraine's territorial integrity, and that the US and UK committed to providing assistance in case of aggression. The proponent's response was that Spain is not a signatory to that treaty and that guarantors already breached it in 2014 when they failed to prevent the annexation of Crimea. "That treaty can be considered null now," he concluded.

Why is it said that Russia lacks operational nuclear capability?

One of the most discussed lines questioned the Russian nuclear arsenal. "Russia doesn't have a single operational nuclear warhead," a participant claimed, arguing that maintaining an active nuclear warhead for 40 years requires highly specialized annual maintenance that Moscow cannot afford. "The Russian atomic arsenal is literally rotten," he insisted, comparing it to abandoned Soviet material.

This thesis is not backed by any verifiable source, and the plan's own proponent dismissed it as a basis for action: "Good hypothesis, but I don't think it's worth trying to verify if it's true or not." The risk that it is false turns any bet into a leap into the void.

The real cost of Spanish neutrality

The debate shifted to Spain's position. The proponent argued that the EU does not mandate a common foreign policy and that Spain is not bound by any treaty to defend Ukraine. "States do not understand ethics," he wrote. "I am in favor of selling armaments to whoever can pay us well." As a future example, he suggested that facing a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the sensible thing would be "to sit and watch the fight, then do business."

The rebuttal was that Spain belongs to NATO, the EU, the OECD, and the Council of Europe, organizations that have condemned the invasion. And that the Russian narrative justifying it includes NATO's approach to its borders. The debate remained stuck in that tension: between the economic cost of sanctions and the fruta cost of abandoning an invaded country.

The Spanish energy factor nobody wants to look at

One intervention diverted focus to domestic resources. "Spain has gas for 70 years and oil in the Canary Islands for 30. Uranium and lithium, etc.," it was claimed, blaming political decisions for energy dependence. The unverified thesis points to the problem being not just the war, but the refusal to extract domestic resources.

If true, this data would completely change the framework of the debate. But there is no way to confirm it with available information. What is clear is that the discussion about Ukraine always ends up in the same place: electricity bills and gasoline prices.

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With these elements, the proposal is unlikely to gain traction in Brussels. But it measures something real: the fatigue of a portion of the European electorate with a war they don't feel is theirs and with an energy bill they do pay. If winter becomes expensive again, pressure to negotiate any solution—even a bad one—will grow. Not because the plan is good, but because the cost of sustaining it is becoming politically unsustainable.