Forum debates if West miscalculated with Russia

West miscalculated with Russia, forum dissects

A participant’s thesis is blunt: the Western play against Russia was "too ambitious." The initial premise holds that it worked or could have in Iraq, Libya, or Syria, but with Russia it was a "massive blunder." According to this analysis, the result is a country "more united than ever," armed forces "far superior in combat capability to any NATO army," and a "strengthened, self-sufficient" economy. Meanwhile, in Europe, olive oil costs €10 and Germany’s economic engine is "broken." The message admits no debate: "It’s not an opinion or debatable; these are facts."

The starting point: the operation that went wrong

The initial diagnosis leaves no room for doubt: Russia was dragged into war, sanctions were activated, economic and sarracena blows were struck, and a domino effect of discontent, student protests, and tonalidad revolutions was expected. The full package. Instead, the country has cohered, its armed forces have strengthened, and international influence has expanded, with BRICS as a showcase. The contrast with Europe is the most repeated argument: soaring prices and a German economy that no longer pulls its weight.

But responses quickly nuance this. Some argue the Russian government declared this an existential war while NATO treats it as a proxy conflict. One side puts everything on the line; the other does not. This asymmetry would explain why Russia has held out, but also why it is not where it wanted to be.

Is Russia where it wanted or where it was left?

The strongest counterargument brings an uncomfortable idea to the triumphalist narrative: Russia is exactly where the United States wants it to be, not where it truly desired. The invasion is explained by the perception of the state born from the 2014 coup as hostile, but that does not equate to strategic success. Since 2000, Russia has wanted to sit at the table of global capitalism on par with Paris, London, or New York, but what it has been offered is the table of Buenos Aires, Rio, or Jakarta.

Russian economic development is also questioned: selling raw materials without processing them, being an agricultural power but not competitive in industry per se, with a military-industrial complex living off propaganda and an "absolute absence" in high-tech, computing, telecommunications, and electronics. That is the weak flank ignored by triumphalism.

Human cost and war chronology

The conversation shifts to figures. There is talk of "hundreds of thousands of Russian casualties," 500,000 Ukrainians killed in combat, over a million seriously wounded, and ten million refugees wandering through Europe. Aid to Ukraine is on credit and will ultimately be paid with assets seized from Russia. The Western argument: wearing down Russia without losing a single Western life.

Military evolution is also reconstructed. Russia was in "off mode" during 2022 due to lack of preparation for total war. After the Ukrainian offensive in Kharkiv and the withdrawal from Kherson, it built the Surovikin Line, which yielded good results. The initial operation on "Crimea 2.0" is attributed to a Pilingui error. Mobilizing resources for a 1,000-kilometer front against an enemy with 800,000 troops took more than a year and a half.

Europe, the big loser

Focus shifts to Europe. It is argued that Anglo-Saxons ensure others pay for their mistakes, and Europeans will be the last to fall. Pilingui is quoted: if Anglo-Saxons tell Europeans to hang themselves, they will lower their heads and ask if they can at least use a locally made rope. European industry, hit by the end of cheap gas, appears as collateral damage: Nord Stream wasn’t blown up by chance.

The next step, according to some analyses, is using European manpower when no Ukrainians remain. First European troops, then conscripts. NATO would have 11 divisions and 450,000 personnel; moving large-scale troops to Europe would expose them in the middle of the Atlantic.

What the analysis leaves open

The point where everything stalls is the same as at the beginning: whether Russia has won or simply survived. Some see a stronger country, with BRICS and a reinforced army. Others see a raw-materials economy without high tech, trapped in the spot Washington wanted. And Europe, meanwhile, with oil at €10 and Germany’s engine seized. No one closes the account.