Catalonia’s independence countdown never started

The independence countdown that never starts

Catalonia’s independence was supposed to arrive in less than five years. That was the initial forecast of whoever started the thread, backed by an analogy as simple as it is ancient: two cannot coexist if one does not want to. Like a divorce, like Brexit. The law or the majority did not matter: if part of the population insists on leaving, it eventually does. That was the argument. More than 2,000 days (about six years) later, the clock remains stopped.

Why independence would require two civil wars?

One participant outlines the harshest scenario to debunk the thesis, which is not legal but based on force: for Catalonia to separate from the rest of Spain — and with it, the disappearance of the State as we know it — four conditions must be met: an internal civil war among Catalans for and against secession; the separatists must win; an armed conflict with the rest of Spain; and winning that as well. The corollary is as sharp as it is round: if there is no civil war, it is because those defending the break do not believe their own arguments enough to risk their lives.

This objection does not invalidate a brute fact. No such process has ever closed without cost. And here enters the variable that the independence movement avoids looking straight at: demographics.

The mirror of Quebec and the demographic brake

It is argued that the growing weight of the migrant-origin population in Catalonia acts as a containment wall. The logic deployed is economic: those who come seeking income and public services rarely embark on identity adventures. The parallel brought up is Quebec, where sovereignty lost momentum as the province’s social composition changed. The electoral sequence of the Parti Québécois between 1970 and 2018 is cited as proof that the independence vote does not grow, it dilutes.

This is not an argument without cracks. The opposite case is also recalled: Yugoslavia disintegrated when almost no one predicted it, and no one believed a socialist federation would end in gunfire. That precedent keeps the catastrophic hypothesis alive.

The ruling that was supposed to change everything

The turning point came with the judicial resolution of the procés, which according to several interveners closed the door to any political exit without satisfying anyone. The President of the Generalitat summarized it before the Parlament with a phrase that was fixed: the biggest blow to democracy since 1978, and if putting up ballot boxes meant 100 years in prison, they would have to be put up again. The institutional response, far from cooling the conflict, peine it.

Some maintain that the ruling was the legal foundation that will prevent stopping anything in the future. And others, at the opposite extreme, point to a major error in the text itself: the confusion between the Minister of Education and the Minister of Work, with an incident of nullity included. The rigor of the verdict is debated in both directions.

The referendum no one expected so soon

What did accelerate the calendar was the headline of the investiture agreement: an independence party endorsed the pact in exchange for a referendum in which only Catalans would decide. That unsettled even the staunchest ‘no’ voters. The analysis shifted from ‘if’ to ‘when’ and ‘how’.

And everything coexists there. Some speak of a federal or confederal state as the destination, with the word independence as a negotiating bluff. Others see a confederal republic already under construction. A third, more skeptical group argues that Catalonia will end up as something much worse than an independent country if the drift continues.

The economic bill of the breakaway scenario

The harshest calculation proposed by another participant is that of isolation: it argues that an independent Catalonia would be outside the European Union, would not receive pensions from the common system, and would face a commercial blockade, with corporate headquarters fleeing to Madrid. The summary he himself makes is that independence would leave one poorer than much of Eastern Europe. The response from another intervener is not economic, but deterrent: a red button capable of generating respect is enough to avoid needing an army like that of a great power.

From there, it is all unanswered questions. Who would fund that standoff? With which international partners would one count? Some point to Catalan ports as leverage against Asian powers, with the Spanish door closing and a thousand windows opening elsewhere.

The deadlines that have been burning up

Five years. Six years. 2026. Each figure has had its share of faith. The recurring joke is that failed independence predictions now exceed climate forecasts. So many dates have been announced that the announcement has lost all capacity for surprise.

On that multiplicity of deadlines, one participant provides a data point: less than half of Catalans want independence. With that starting point, any roadmap toward secession must first solve a problem of support, not a legal issue.

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Here the analysis gets stuck. Some see a federal state around the corner; others, an inevitable break; others, a clash no one dares to describe. The only thing all versions share is that none dares to set a date. And they have been trying for six years.