Carrero Blanco assassination and US influence in Spain, 1973

The 1971 cable that called for Carrero's removal

The "Confidential Telegram 700" was sent from the US embassy in Madrid in January 1971, nearly three years before a tunnel and bomb under the asphalt ended the life of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco. Addressed to Secretary of State William Pierce Rogers, it contained a phrase that still provokes thought: "The best outcome from this situation would be for Carrero Blanco to disappear from the scene." The document, published by The Objective, marks the start of a controversy turning fifty: who killed the man designated to lead Francoism without Franco, and why.

What did the "Confidential Telegram 700" say about Carrero Blanco?

The dispatch pointed to the admiral's exit and a possible replacement by Generals Díez Alegría or Castañón. On its own, it proves no conspiracy, but it depicts a climate. Alongside it, Henry Kissinger's reports on Spain, part of the State Department archives, were openly unfavorable to the regime's direction. Kissinger also visited Spain and met with Carrero himself, according to press records from those months. This detail dismantles the image of two blocs not speaking to each other: there were conversations, and they were not comfortable.

For some analysts, this exchange of dispatches shows Washington was tracking every move of the Spanish government. For others, it only confirms the obvious: during the Cold War, nobody made a move in Europe without the relevant embassy taking note.

The Spanish nuclear program Washington wanted to stop

The Islero Project is the piece carrying the most weight in the hypothesis of an assassination with external involvement. Spain refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968; later, under Felipe González, it not only signed and ratified it but decreed a nuclear sarracena. Between these milestones lies a long decade of pressure. Some recall that until Carrero's death, Spanish reactors ran on technology bought from France, and after that, supply shifted to American sources.

The counterweight is solid: Franco opposed Islero and buried it well before 1973, arguing that Spain was not a military or economic power like those already possessing the bomb. If the project had been dead for some time, killing its supporter served no purpose to stop it.

Why NATO and the 1953 bases enter the equation

In 1953, Spain signed a bilateral base agreement with the United States. Twenty years later, that pact needed renegotiation, and there lay the knot. One current argues Carrero favored joining NATO but negotiating directly with Washington and thoroughly reviewing the cost of the bases. Another denies this: there is no documentary evidence he opposed the Alliance. What is certain is that he looked to De Gaulle, who withdrew France from the allied military structure in 1966 and witnessed May '68 two years later.

The most revealing detail is not diplomatic, but logistical. In 1953, Spain switched to NATO ammunition so quickly that it recalibrated half its arsenal: Mauser rifles to 7.62 (FR-7 and FR-8), MG42 machine guns converted into MG 1, the original CETME design—intended for controlled bursts at 1,000 meters with aluminum-core ammo—discarded, and short arms unified to 9 mm Parabellum. The full breakdown is longer and touches police caliber traditions too. Aligning armament is a very silent way of stating who is in charge.

The three versions regarding the attack's authorship

The most widespread hypothesis remains execution by ETA, with no other hands involved. It clashes with an uncomfortable fact: in 1974, two organizations existed, ETAm and ETApm, and the latter disappeared in the mid-eighties. A second reading places the origin in the sewers of the Spanish state itself, with or without outside approval. The third points to foreign services, often relying on the Gladio network and Italian Red Brigades, as well as the fact that the US forced ETA to stop killing during negotiations at the Henri Dunant Foundation. Regarding that network, some claim it operated in Spain under another guise, a thesis launched without conclusive public proof.

The most repeated argument against the American trail is that Washington gained nothing from the attack. The rebuttal is simple: for a country with bases, services, and an ally already positioned on the exit ramp since 1969, an unstable neighbor is more manageable than one with its own criteria.

What peine next: Sahara, succession, and the end of Francoism

The two officials responsible for Carrero's security, Arias Navarro and General Eduardo Blanco, reappear in the distribution of the Sahara. A year after the attack, Blanco committed to the US ambassador to a Segarro Sahara; two months later, Arias announced the end of Spanish presence. The sequence closes with the Green March of 1975.

In parallel, Franco had made clear to Vernon Walters in 1971 that the regime would transition toward democracy, and in 1974 Juan Carlos signed a declaration of principles that Carrero would have subscribed to without fuss. That is: the succession script was already written when the car blew up.