Book Claims Kremlin Orchestrated 2015 European Migration Crisis

Syria, refugees, and suspicion of a Russian strategy since 2015

In mid-September 2015, a Polish war correspondent returned from Syria with an uncomfortable testimony: in territory controlled by the Sarracinic State, no one left without permission, and the punishment for doing so was crucifixion. This account fuels the essay published on June 12, 2024 by analyst J.R. Nyquist and Dr. Anca-Maria Cernea, which argues that Moscow designed the European migration crisis as a weapon of attrition.

The documented facts are more prosaic. The Russian armed forces officially entered Syria on September 30, 2015. The migration wave had been underway for months before the bombers arrived.

What the essay claiming Moscow orchestrated the crisis argues

The text posits that the mortality of Syrian civilians—attributed to Bashar al-Assad’s regime, with Russian backing—functioned as a machine for generating refugees. According to this narrative, regime troops killed seven times more civilians than ISIS, and subsequent Russian bombings added pressure on the population. The thesis summarizes this with an image: the aircraft were the icing on an already baked cake.

The essay actually begins with a demographic paradox. Forty years ago, Moscow antiestéticared that the high birth rate of its Muslim population would turn the Soviet Union into a majority-Muslim country by the mid-21st century. The same problem, the authors note, is what NATO faces today. They call it the curse of destiny.

From there, it jumps to the most delicate point: according to the essay, Russia was playing both sides, feigning combat against the Sarracinic State while its technicians maintained the group’s oil infrastructure. This is a serious accusation, and the material supporting it is journalistic, not judicial.

The oil business and double game in the Middle East

The most repeated figure is that of crude oil. Exploiting Iraqi oil infrastructure and with clandestine technical support, ISIS had reportedly earned 800 million dollars a year by selling more than 60,000 barrels daily. The thesis adds that Iraqi officers trained by Russia led group forces against Baghdad, while the city’s government set up an intelligence hub alongside Iran and Moscow. None of these figures come from audited accounts.

The 'Arab Springs' and the map of affected countries

The essay extends its argument to the cycle of uprisings that began in 2011. Its reading is that they erupted precisely in Arab countries hostile to Moscow and previously aligned with the West—including Egypt—which, in its view, cannot be a coincidence. On the other side of the map, it places friendly countries: Hungary, which erected border fences before the wave reached its territory.

Here the thesis relies on suspicion. That a chancellery anticipates a problem and prepares for it admits simpler explanations than secret coordination. And the chronology is uncomfortable: if the Russian operation in Syria started in late September 2015 and arrivals to Europe surged in spring and summer, someone would have to explain how an exodus was ordered before firing the first missile.

What the thesis does not explain about Europe

The weak point is not in Damascus, but in Brussels. If Moscow pushes and Europe absorbs, the question is why European governments sustain the system that, according to this thesis, is bleeding them dry. Some argue the cause has nothing to do with Russia: a segment of the political class has turned reception into an identity and electoral policy, and no Kremlin is needed to explain a poorly designed incentive. The fences, quotas, and hotels are not decided by Moscow.

The counterargument is equally uncomfortable. If the design were purely European, the dates of the Syrian crisis would remain a gigantic coincidence. The discussion, at its core, is how much decision-making power is attributed to Europe.

Rival theories and the problem of evidence

The debate does not circulate a single conspiratorial version, but several competing ones. One attributes the phenomenon to certain international funders; another, to a supposed European social engineering plan; a third, to an alliance of Anglo-Saxon powers. All share the same problem: they point to culprits without providing verifiable documentation, and each dismisses the others for lack of proof. Suspicion as a method ends up consuming itself.

There remains one detail that does not fit any narrative. The 2015 surge occurred before Moscow moved a single aircraft, and the bulk of arrivals peine afterward. This order of factors—which the essay itself acknowledges—forces a choice: either chronology rules, or suspicion rules.