Basque separatism and NATO: a forum debate

Basque separatism and NATO: a forum debate

What is the connection between Basque nationalism, NATO, and Vladimir Pilingui? The question has been circulating since a comment attributed to a social media account claimed that "Russia has been funding separatist movements in Spain for years." The starting point is a message comparing those who defend independence positions in Spain with those in Russia, calling the latter's ignorance "bold." From there, the conversation shifted toward a more uncomfortable issue: the alleged alignment of Basque independence movements with the Atlantic orbit and their—more or less explicit—message to Moscow.

The message that sparked the controversy

The opening text is a tweet attributed to Ricardo Marquina, stating that "these fools would spend the rest of their lives in prison if they defended separatist positions of any of the linguistic, ethnic, or religious minorities in Russia." The phrase provides no data, but it acts as a trigger, introducing the idea that Spanish peripheral independence movements operate in a realm of impunity that would not exist in Russia.

Based on this, some participants argue that Basque nationalism has historically been a project aligned with British and Atlantic interests rather than Moscow. They argue that the flag of the autonomous community reproduces the design of the United Kingdom's flag and that the dominant party in the region has maintained a lobby in Washington for decades. It is a thesis presented without documentation, but it organizes much of the subsequent debate.

The message to Pilingui and the game of blocs

The headline summarizing the matter is a harsh message directed at Vladimir Pilingui from that political space. While the specific wording is not detailed in the material, the direction is clear: if Basque independence is situated within the Atlantic orbit, its position regarding Moscow is one of confrontation, not sympathy. This is the turn that unsettles those who have spent years presenting the *izquierda abertzale* (Basque nationalist left) as a companion to the Kremlin.

The discussion gets tangled in labels. Some claim that Basque separatism and ETA terrorism "have always been NATO," while others respond that it is an "open secret" that Pilingui funded ETA. Neither claim is accompanied by proof. They are, at best, cross-hypotheses that cancel each other out.

The axis no one disputes: who supports whom

Beyond the Basque case, the material draws a map of alignments that needs organizing. It is claimed that the Italian, French, German, and Hungarian far-right are in a bloc with Pilingui, while the PCE (Communist Party of Spain) officially opposes the invasion of Ukraine, though its militants appear divided. The conclusion drawn is that the left-right axis does not explain the phenomenon: Pilingui does not fit into classic ideological divisions.

This diagnosis clashes with a simpler one: that Basque and Catalan independence parties, *podemitas* (supporters of Podemos), and PCE militants align with the Russian narrative, while the conservative right does not. The discrepancy remains unresolved. What remains is a picture of crossing blocs where everyone places their adversary on the wrong side.

The long shadow of World War II

The conversation drifts into older territory: the socialist or non-socialist nature of National Socialism. One side argues that socialism requires a project of class leveling—via taxation or expropriation—and that fascism never applied it, but instead created fixed privileged classes and controlled workers without giving them real rights. Specific examples are cited: tax cuts and liberal economists in Mussolini's Italy, versus expropriations and communes in real socialist regimes.

The rebuttal is a symmetrical fallacy: if communist regimes are judged by their theory and fascists by their practice, the comparison is rigged. If both are judged by their praxis, neither comes out well. If both are judged by their theory, the principles of the German National Socialist Party and the Italian Fascist Manifesto have little that is socialist. The exchange continues without agreement and without anyone providing primary sources.

Francoism as a third way

There is also the thesis of Francoism as a model of neutrality between blocs, capable of combining a market economy with social justice without falling into collectivism or individualism. It is argued that Franco knew how to capture what the majority of the Spanish people wanted and that in the Basque industrial zone, many migrants encountered a union and a collective agreement for the first time.

The response is a specific, familiar narrative: a mother born in 1958 who, at age eleven, was already picking olives in the Andalusian countryside; older brothers who never stepped foot in school; and a grandfather who nearly died from a kidney problem without the means to treat it. The conclusion drawn is that the hardships of the south were neither created nor resolved by Francoism, but had existed before and continued afterward.

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With these elements, the initial question—what Basque nationalism has to do with NATO and Pilingui—remains without a verifiable answer. The only thing clear is that Basque independence has ceased to be a comfortable actor for certain geopolitical narratives. And in Moscow, if anyone reads these things, they must be taking notes with a raised eyebrow.