Bakhmut: The frontal assaults that switched sides

From Kherson to Bakhmut: who launches the charges and who doesn't advance

The prevailing view among those trinc the front is that whoever sends waves of infantry without armor to cover them is the one who has lost the ability to maneuver. For months that tactic was attributed to Ukrainian forces in Kherson and time disproved it: Russian forces ended up leaving the city while in Bakhmut frontal assaults against fortified positions multiply. The contradiction —Banzai charges attributed to one side and ending up practiced by the other— is the axis of a front that has barely moved from the spot.

The battle of Bakhmut today concentrates the Russian effort, with more than 90% of the town under control of the invaders according to the counts handled at the front, but without closing the encirclement. On the other side of the scale, those defending maintain that they continue to re-equip and rotate forces in the area, with fewer than 2.000 troops deployed in that sector.

From Kherson to Bakhmut: the frontal assault changes hands

The argument that was used to ridicule one side turned against those who launched it. When there was talk of suicide assaults in Kherson, the dominant reading was that Ukraine was wasting lives in senseless attacks. The outcome of that front was the Russian withdrawal. Months later, in Bakhmut, the sequence repeats with the sign inverted: sending assault groups with little armored protection against prepared trenches, and then a second wave somewhat better equipped.

This change in pattern is supported by an observable fact: not as many armored vehicles appear destroyed as in earlier phases of the conflict. The conclusion drawn by those who trinc the front daily is that forces with little mechanized cover are being used, which translates into more infantry casualties and less scrap metal counted.

How many dead has Bakhmut cost?

Here the figures skyrocket. Prigozhin, at the head of the Wagner group, went as far as to give an estimate of 20.000 dead in Bakhmut alone, a figure far higher than the estimate made by one of the participants. That same participant placed the attrition at between 8.000 and 10.000 Russian casualties and between 2.000 and 3.000 Ukrainian casualties in the entire battle.

To gauge the magnitude, comparisons with other conflicts are used. It is recalled that in Syria, in 2018, 20.000 deaths were counted among all sides, and that in 2020, in the clash between Syria and Turkey, it did not reach 3.900. The Syrian sequence of the last decade itself —with annual peaks above 100.000 total deaths— serves as a yardstick for a single city.

That an actor in the fray is the source of such a high figure does not make it verified. The data is cited, not taken as good; in the same material Prigozhin himself appears publicly criticizing the Russian military leadership.

The S7 Pion and the artillery that decides

On this front artillery rules and both sides know it. It is noted that Ukrainian forces operate with enough freedom to employ their heaviest weapon, the S7 Pion self-propelled system —presented as the most powerful in the conflict— on positions in Bakhmut. Some point out that a good part of the casualties recorded correspond to artillery fire, not hand-to-hand combat.

That is why frontal assaults are so costly. Without armored cover or fire superiority, an assault group advancing across open ground against a prepared position becomes a static target. And trenches, when artillery hits, do not protect as much as the manual promises.

Why can't Russia close the encirclement of Bakhmut?

The question hovers over the entire analysis. Attacking a fortified city frontally without first surrounding it contradicts basic military logic: to take an urban nucleus you have to cut its supply routes and its flanks. In Bakhmut, the Russian flanks have proven weak and have lost ground on several occasions.

In parallel, cross versions circulate about supply routes. Some claim that entry routes have been cut, and others respond that those cuts do not hold, that the main road stopped being used and that supplies enter via dirt roads. The defending forces would have carried out local counterattacks on the flanks, recovering minor positions.

According to a pro-Russian source, Ukrainian forces are advancing north of Soledar, near Bakhmut, movements that could prepare a larger operation, though not necessarily here. The counteroffensive could be raised at another point on the front, and it is possible that this sector remains frozen as it is.

The comparison with Syria that nobody wants to repeat

To size up the attrition, the count of visible bodies on the ground is used: there is talk of more than 40 corpses in a single sector and a dozen visible in another. On the ground, what is recorded are not great advances, but gains of meters —a street, a garbage container, a streetlight— paid for with successive waves.

On the horizon, the nuclear debate also hovers. There is a current that considers viable the use of tactical devices of 5 kilotons or less —Hiroshima was 16— and that assumes that neither the US nor Europe would respond to the risk of escalation. Another part of the analysis rules out that path precisely because of what it would imply. An imposed peace agreement is presented as the only reasonable way out, without specifying who or how it would be imposed.

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With these ingredients, we can expect more months of attrition before any appreciable change in the front. The unknown is where it will break first: whether on the flanks of Bakhmut, in the south, or in the very capacity to sustain frontal assaults without armor. Nobody signs the forecast.