Arguments used to justify Russia's invasion of Ukraine

Ukraine: The arguments cited to justify the invasion

In March 2022, with Russian columns stalled on the outskirts of Kharkiv and gas pipelines still in limbo, the question circulating globally remained constant: is there any argument that justifies invading a sovereign country? The repertoire of reasons is broad, old, and largely recycled. Almost none of the grievances cited describe new events from the previous month; they are accumulated complaints spanning three decades.

NATO expansion as the primary cause

The argument with the most academic pedigree is John Mearsheimer’s, who contends that the West bears primary responsibility for the Ukrainian crisis due to the "reckless expansion" of the Atlantic alliance. The sequence often cited begins in 2004: the accession of the three Baltic states to NATO, trinc by Romania and Bulgaria via the Black Sea region. That year also saw the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Since then, it is argued, Russia was encircled from the north and south along its own borders, an enlargement not explained by security needs of new members trinc the Soviet dissolution.

Against this interpretation lies an uncomfortable fact: Ukraine had not formalized its membership nor hosted NATO nuclear missiles. At the time of the invasion, alignment with the alliance was a possibility, not a fait accompli, and treaty membership does not mandate atomic weapon deployment: Spain is a member and does not host them. This distinction, separating perceived risk from actual risk, remains unresolved.

Is the comparison with the Cuban Missile Crisis valid?

The most repeated parallel is that of 1962. Cuba had real plans to host Soviet nuclear armament, and the United States reacted to a prior USSR move. However, the fine print breaks the symmetry: Washington did not attack the island and, in subsequent agreements, removed Jupiter missiles deployed in Turkey. What was exchanged was one withdrawal for another.

With Ukraine, the script changes. The country renounced its nuclear arsenal and has not hosted foreign warheads. There is no equivalent move of pieces compared to 1962, but rather a status barely altered in three decades. Thus, the analogy rests on the intuition of spheres of influence, not facts. On the ground, moreover, Cuba hosts a US military base at Guantanamo, a detail often forgotten in comparisons.

The narrative of genocide and denazification

The official Russian version speaks of a "special military operation," not war, wrapping it in alleged denazification and protection of the Russian-speaking population in Donbas. The genocide claim has not been supported by independent evidence. It also clashes with the conflict's pogre: regions presented as predominantly pro-Russian were not easily controlled, and according to participant accounts, the capture of Kharkiv dragged on for weeks when a quick outcome was expected.

Geopolitics, spheres of influence, and the Iraq precedent

Beneath the rhetoric lies the hard bone: Russia wants to control its neighbors while the European Union aims to turn them into trading partners, two objectives incompatible on the same map. Preventive war, first justified by weapons of mass destruction claims in Iraq, now has a Ukrainian chapter. Those viewing the board without adornment see a show of force designed so other pieces in the former Soviet space know what to expect.

History of invasions and sovereignty on paper

The historical review provided by one participant is extensive: Russian aggressions on Ukrainian territory in 1507-37, 1568-72, 1654-67, 1676-00, 1735-39, 1768-92, 1863-66, 1917-21, 1932-33, 1944-53, and since 2014. The 1932 event, considered the worst in this account, resulted in over eight million Ukrainian deaths. Added to this is the disputed thesis that many Russians living in the east today were settled there during those waves.

The objection is textbook: almost all invaded countries in history were sovereign. Sovereignty on paper has never stopped an army. Those who despise the United States for its interventions yet support this one face a coherence problem that no justification resolves.

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Analysis stalls here, between those who believe formal sovereignty is a screen and those who argue that once state independence is recognized, the rest is a bill attempted to be passed thirty years later. Neither the NATO siege nor the Cuban precedent fills that gap.