Abascal floats Latin American immigration to tackle birth rate

Abascal offers Latin America for birth rate and his base revolts

Santiago Abascal addressed the birth rate problem and responded with immigration. The Vox leader argued at the Iberosphere Summit, held in Madrid and organized by the European Conservatives and Reformists group under the slogan "United for Freedom", that Spain has an "opportunity" in the arrival of people from "brother countries of Latin America" with whom it shares "values, language and essential things".

The formula was not a closed plan, but a transition: "While we don't solve it by our own means and betting on a national birth rate", he said, that immigration would serve to address the demographic collapse. In the same speech he distanced himself from those who believe that "borders must be peine" and people imported "from all parts of the world". The nuance did not please a good part of the audience he addresses: if the problem is the birth rate, the answer cannot be bringing in population from outside.

Encouraging birth rate or replacing it: the rift in Vox's electorate

The dominant reproach is one of simple logic. "The birth rate in Spain is solved by stimulating the birth rate of Spaniards, not replacing them", summarizes a stance repeated in a thousand ways. Others go further and argue that the problem is not that few are born, but that there are too many inhabitants: they even estimate at 11 million the population that Spain could sustain without degrading its standard of living. Most do not ask for a number, they ask for conditions.

There appears the argument that generates the most consensus: housing, wages and stability. "Fostering decent living conditions so that young people can have children... no. Bringing them from elsewhere, yes", is the ironic summary that circulates. The underlying criticism is that no party, not even Vox, puts on the table a package of child-rearing aid. A patriotic party, it is argued, would not support immigration even if it alleges cultural affinity.

There are even those who relate the case of a migrant family that originally had eleven members and in which the fourth child was enough to cut the chain: the generation born here is not willing to repeat the distribution of care that sustained the previous one.

Pensions, precariousness and the jobs nobody wants to fill

When the debate moves to the economic terrain, the diagnosis becomes more bitter. The public pension system is described as a pyramid scheme "doomed to burst" that needs constant entries of contributors to avoid bankruptcy. Under that prism, bringing workers fixes nothing: it delays the collapse. It warns of more unemployment, more people without resources, more precariousness and more populism.

Opposite is the labor market argument that nobody completely disputes: there are hundreds of thousands of unfilled positions because salary conditions scare off local workers. The conclusion of that current is uncomfortable for insiders and outsiders. As long as a salary does not allow one to become independent, have children or simply live, the problem is not solved by either closing or opening borders.

Is migrating from Latin America the same as from Africa?

The cultural affinity that Abascal invokes is not free either. Part of the public replies that language and religion do not guarantee integration or behaviors, and maintains that arrival from Latin America can be as conflictive as any other. The underlying suspicion is electoral: it is pointed out that this population, more religious and conservative, would end up voting for the right once naturalized.

Another sector draws lines within the region itself. It distinguishes between the Southern Cone —Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil— and the Andean countries, and defends that only the former fit without cultural friction. It is a distinction that Abascal did not make and that, on paper, is difficult to translate into a migration policy.

The vote as lesser evil and the flight to other parties

Despite the discomfort, a segment of the electorate maintains support for Vox by calculation: they vote for the lesser evil until an alternative appears, and meanwhile better a party that at least names the problem than another that denies it. That pragmatism coexists with distrust. It is recalled that the liberal right was the first to facilitate the massive arrival of workers and it is suspected that the identity discourse is a layer over an economic policy that needs cheap labor.

The real threat is on the right flank. Some argue that Vox is pushing votes towards harder formations in Catalonia or towards emerging parties. That a leader speaks of opportunity where his base sees replacement is the kind of phrase that is not forgotten in the next electoral appointment.

One question remains unanswered: if no one proposes a serious birth rate plan —neither aid, nor housing, nor work-life balance— and at the same time everyone rules out curbing immigration, who is willing to pay the demographic bill of the next two decades?