China pide paso... II
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dick jones
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SHIBOR: Papaito al rescate.
¿quien necesita el canal de Suez?
Acuerdo de libre comercio China-Suiza
Funds withdrawal halted to ease rates - Headlines, antiestéticatures, photo and videos from ecns.cn|china|news|chinanews|ecns|cns
¿quien necesita el canal de Suez?
Israel's railway plan set to boost China's trade in Middle East, Europe - Channel NewsAsia
Acuerdo de libre comercio China-Suiza
BBC News - China seals first free-trade deal with Switzerland
Serpiente_Plyskeen
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Eso ya lo han estado haciendo desde el congreso del partido del anho pasado. Y se esta notando:
German GDP rose slightly in Q1 of 2013; France returned to recession
Por cierto, como ya comentamos en el otro hilo, el proteccionismo que piden las empresas de solares alemanas empieza a amenazar a las exportaciones de vino (entre otras) francesas y espanholas:
Amenaza a la exportación de los Rías Baixas a China
En cuanto a lo que comenta Ricardom acerca del sentido del hilo, pues yo empece a anhadir cosas al respecto de China cuando ya se habia convertido en el hilo oficial... :|
En cuanto a la "superioridad" del modelo chino, pues escapar de una burbuja metiendose en otra todavia mayor y haciendose trampas al solitario no lo veo como un modelo a seguir. Y eso lo han hecho tanto China como EEUU , no tiene mucho que ver con la dicotomia economia planificada o no. Vamos a ver, que yo hace anhos ponia a China como un ejemplo de como hacer las cosas bien (economia planificada pero bottom-up; no top-down como hicieron los rusos), pero ahora no veo nada claro que sea sostenible ni en el medio plazo.
Lo de siempre, el tiempo dara o quitara razon (y me va a encantar equivocarme pero sigo creyendo que China va a tener grandes problemas en el futuro; hasta el punto de que muy probablemente acabe escindida en varios paises); hasta entonces, continuaremos observando los acontecimientos...
Serpiente_Plyskeen
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Fitch says China credit bubble unprecedented in modern world history - Telegraph
Fitch says China credit bubble unprecedented in modern world history
China's shadow banking system is out of control and under mounting stress as borrowers struggle to roll over short-term debts, Fitch Ratings has warned.
By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, International Business Editor
4:12PM BST 16 Jun 2013
China's shadow banking system is out of control and under mounting stress as borrowers struggle to roll over short-term debts, Fitch Ratings has warned.
Fitch warned that wealth products worth $2 trillion of lending are in reality a "h1den second balance sheet" for banks, allowing them to circumvent loan curbs and dodge efforts by regulators to halt the excesses. Photo: Alamy
The agency said the scale of credit was so extreme that the country would find it very hard to grow its way out of the excesses as in past episodes, implying tougher times ahead.
"The credit-driven growth model is clearly falling apart. This could feed into a massive over-capacity problem, and potentially into a Japanese-style deflation," said Charlene Chu, the agency's senior director in Beijing.
"There is no transparency in the shadow banking system, and systemic risk is rising. We have no idea who the borrowers are, who the lenders are, and what the quality of assets is, and this undermines signalling," she told The Daily Telegraph.
While the non-performing loan rate of the banks may look benign at just 1pc, this has become irrelevant as trusts, wealth-management funds, offshore vehicles and other forms of irregular lending make up over half of all new credit. "It means nothing if you can off-load any bad asset you want. A lot of the banking exposure to property is not booked as property," she said.
Concerns are rising after a string of upsets in Quingdao, Ordos, Jilin and elsewhere, in so-called trust products, a $1.4 trillion (£0.9 trillion) segment of the shadow banking system.
Bank Everbright defaulted on an interbank loan 10 days ago amid wild spikes in short-term "Shibor" borrowing rates, a sign that liquidity has suddenly dried up. "Typically stress starts in the periphery and moves to the core, and that is what we are already seeing with defaults in trust products," she said.
Fitch warned that wealth products worth $2 trillion of lending are in reality a "h1den second balance sheet" for banks, allowing them to circumvent loan curbs and dodge efforts by regulators to halt the excesses.
This niche is the epicentre of risk. Half the loans must be rolled over every three months, and another 25pc in less than six months. This has echoes of Northern Rock, Lehman Brothers and others that came to grief in the West on short-term liabilities when the wholesale capital markets froze.
Mrs Chu said the banks had been forced to park over $3 trillion in reserves at the central bank, giving them a "massive savings account that can be drawn down" in a crisis, but this may not be enough to avert trouble given the sheer scale of the lending boom.
Overall credit has jumped from $9 trillion to $23 trillion since the Lehman crisis. "They have replicated the entire US commercial banking system in five years," she said.
The ratio of credit to GDP has jumped by 75 percentage points to 200pc of GDP, compared to roughly 40 points in the US over five years leading up to the subprime bubble, or in Japan before the Nikkei bubble burst in 1990. "This is beyond anything we have ever seen before in a large economy. We don't know how this will play out. The next six months will be crucial," she said.
The agency downgraded China's long-term currency rating to AA- debt in April but still thinks the government can handle any banking crisis, however bad. "The Chinese state has a lot of firepower. It is very able and very willing to support the banking sector. The real question is what this means for growth, and therefore for social and political risk," said Mrs Chu.
"There is no way they can grow out of their asset problems as they did in the past. We think this will be very different from the banking crisis in the late 1990s. With credit at 200pc of GDP, the numerator is growing twice as fast as the denominator. You can't grow out of that."
The authorities have been trying to manage a soft-landing, deploying loan curbs and a high reserve ratio requirement (RRR) for banks to halt property speculation. The home price to income ratio has reached 16 to 18 in many cities, shutting workers out of the market. Shadow banking has plugged the gap for much of the last two years.
However, a new problem has emerged as the economic efficiency of credit collapses. The extra GDP growth generated by each extra yuan of loans has dropped from 0.85 to 0.15 over the last four years, a sign of exhaustion.
Wei Yao from Societe Generale says the debt service ratio of Chinese companies has reached 30pc of GDP – the typical threshold for financial crises -- and many will not be able to pay interest or repay principal. She warned that the country could be on the verge of a "Minsky Moment", when the debt pyramid collapses under its own weight. "The debt snowball is getting bigger and bigger, without contributing to real activity," she said.
The latest twist is sudden stress in the overnight lending markets. "We believe the series of policy tightening measures in the past three months have reached critical mass, such that deleveraging in the banking sector is happening. Liquidity tightening can be very damaging to a highly leveraged economy," said Zhiwei Zhang from Nomura.
"There is room to cut interest rates and the reserve ratio in the second half," wrote a front-page editorial today in China Securities Journal on Friday. The article is the first sign that the authorities are preparing to change tack, shifting to a looser stance after a drizzle of bad data over recent weeks.
The journal said total credit in China's financial system may be as high as 221pc of GDP, jumping almost eightfold over the last decade, and warned that companies will have to fork out $1 trillion in interest payments alone this year. "Chinese corporate debt burdens are much higher than those of other economies. Much of the liquidity is being used to repay debt and not to finance output," it said.
It also flagged worries over an exodus of hot money once the US Federal Reserve starts tightening. "China will face large-scale capital outflows if there is an exit from quantitative easing and the dollar strengthens," it wrote.
The journal said foreign withdrawals from Chinese equity funds were the highest since early 2008 in the week up to June 5, and withdrawals from Hong Kong funds were the most in a decade.
dick jones
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Allow me to demonstrate the skill of Shaolin. The special technique of shadow banking.
China
Tenia mas cosas que comentar pero creo que este ladrillo es mas que suficiente (por hoy)
Bueno no, os dejo el enlace al apocalipsis en tiempo real
Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate
China
:|:|:|:|:|China’s shadow banks
The credit kulaks
AS THE grandson of a “rich farmer”, a stigmatised class in communist China, Joe Zhang grew up on the wrong side of the ideological tracks. At school he envied the town-kids who could look forward to a cushy job minding grain-stores or writing propaganda. But after winning a spot at university, he eventually escaped into central banking in Beijing and, later, investment banking in Hong Kong. By pleading, petitioning and playing a lot of ping pong (a sport he hates) he was even admitted into the Communist Party in 1985.
Then, in 2011, his social climb suffered an abrupt reversal. He took on a role that remains stigmatised and discriminated against in today’s China: he became a shadow banker. His new book, “Inside China’s Shadow Banking: the Next Subprime Crisis?”, recounts his trials as the head of a microlender in Guangdong. Elsewhere in the world, microcredit is a respectable, even canonised, endeavour. In China, Mr Zhang complains in his book, it is “only slightly more respectable than perhaps massage parlours or nightclubs.”
He describes the variety of institutions and instruments that operate and innovate in the shadow of China’s mammoth banks, where they are hard for the authorities to see. They include the informal lenders, kerbside capitalists and back-alley bankers for which China is famous. But the most important institutions are China’s 67 trust companies, lightly regulated finance firms that make loans and other investments but cannot collect deposits. And the most significant instruments are the uncountable wealth-management products (WMPs), which raise money from better-off investors, in large increments (at least 50,000 yuan, about $8,160) and for short periods (typically less than six months, sometimes much less).
Like banks, shadow banks are middlemen, issuing liabilities and holding assets. Another point of resemblance is that their assets are often less liquid, longer-term and riskier than their liabilities purport to be. Yet unlike banks they lack an official safety net, such as a lender of last resort, should these mismatches ever be exposed.
That makes shadow banking a bit scary. The International Monetary Fund frets that “a fast-growing share of credit is flowing through the less-well-supervised parts of the financial system.” Mr Zhang’s book is marketed to people who suspect that systemic dangers lurk in these shadows. But the tale it goes on to tell is more interesting. Shadow banking, he argues, is “more a symptom than the disease itself.”
The disease itself is financial repression. China imposes a ceiling on the interest rate that banks can pay to depositors. This keeps banks’ cost of funding low, making them eager to lend. To curb their enthusiasm, the regulators must impose offsetting limits on their lending, as Dong He and Honglin Wang of the Hong Kong Institute of Monetary Research have pointed out. These limits range from conservative loan-to-deposit ratios to heavy reserve requirements and blacklists of overexposed borrowers, such as property developers or local governments.
Where there is regulation, there is evasion, notes Mr Zhang. Much of China’s shadow-banking system serves merely to help banks evade deposit ceilings and lending guardrails. It would be less pervasive if China’s lending limits were less strict. But then those limits would not need to be so tight if banks’ funding costs were not repressed.
Neglected by the banks, small firms are willing to pay the 20-24% interest rates charged by China’s 6,080 microlenders. But micro-loans amounted to only 592 billion yuan ($97 billion) at the end of last year, equivalent to less than 1% of bank credit (see table). A far bigger source of finance for illiquid firms is other more liquid ones. Non-financial companies are barred from lending directly to each other, but they can make “entrusted” loans via a bank or trust company. This lending is sizeable, but also relatively safe, according to Standard & Poor’s. Most of the loans are made by big firms to their sister companies.
WMP! There it is
As well as midwifing loans from one firm to another, trust companies also raise pools of money from investors by issuing their own WMPs. These products amounted to 1.9 trillion yuan at the end of 2012. Most mature within 1-3 years, according to Jason Bedford of KPMG, an auditing firm. The money is often invested in loans to credit-starved enterprises. Some products are, however, more imaginative, speculating on tea, spirits, or even graveyards. In at least one case, a product was not just imaginative but entirely imaginary: raising money for a non-existent project dreamed up by a rogue trust-company manager.
These products are, then, risky. But potential losses are cushioned by collateral and unmagnified by leverage, Mr Bedford points out. In principle these losses are also borne by investors. The buyers of two faltering products issued by CITIC Trust, China’s largest trust company, have been told not to expect a bail-out. In practice, however, many trusts are less stiff-spined. They are tempted to rescue investors to maintain their good name.
Often, these trust products are sold through banks, which distribute them, without guaranteeing them. The public, however, “pretends not to understand the distinction”, Mr Zhang says. By feigning ignorance, aggrieved investors hope to browbeat the government into holding the banks liable, he argues. In Hong Kong banks had to ease the pain of losses on Lehman minibonds sold through their branches. It is notable that one of the banks involved, Bank of China, has been unusually reluctant to sell WMPs in the mainland, points out Mike Werner of Sanford C. Bernstein, a research firm.
Trust products sold by banks tend to be confused with a less risky kind of WMP: bank products packaged by trusts. In the first case, Mr Bedford explains, the bank provides a service to the trust companies, offering its staff and branches as a distribution channel. In the second case, the roles are reversed: trust companies and, increasingly, securities companies, provide a service to the bank, helping it to package assets in its WMPs.
Unlike trust products sold by banks, bank products packaged by trusts are fairly conservative. They are mostly “deposits in disguise”, as Standard & Poor’s put it, offering yields one or two percentage points higher than the deposit-rate ceiling. As well as helping banks to breach this ceiling, these products allow banks to window-dress their balance-sheets, points out Mr Werner. The WMPs are typically timed to mature just before the end of each quarter. As the money is returned to the WMP-buyers, it is paid into their deposits at the bank, just in time to bring the bank’s loan-deposit ratio below the regulatory limit of 75%.
If enough of the riskier WMPs fail, it might prompt investors to stop buying fresh products. Since WMPs usually mature long before the underlying assets do, that could inflict a nasty credit crunch on otherwise solvent ventures. But the impact on the banking system would be less obvious. If investors lose confidence in WMPs, they are likely to switch to deposits instead. The result would be a run to the banks, not a run on them. The only worry is that investors may not run to the same banks that issued most of the WMPs. China’s smaller joint-stock banks, which have led WMPs issuance, could therefore face a funding squeeze.
One answer would be to introduce formal deposit insurance. That would force banks to pay for the implicit backing they enjoy from the state. It would instil confidence in the smaller banks, as well as the ones that are obviously too big to fail. It would also draw a clearer distinction between safety (insured deposits) and risk (uninsured investments).
Critics of China’s shadow banking like to compare WMPs to the collateralised debt obligations at the heart of the global financial crisis. But according to Ting Lu of Merrill Lynch, the banks’ WMPs bear a closer resemblance to American money-market funds, investing mostly in safe, liquid, short-term paper. Those funds, which first arrived in America in 1971, competed successfully with bank deposits, forcing legislators to phase out America’s caps on deposit interest rates in the 1980s. Perhaps the banks’ WMPs will prove a similar spur to reform in China.
Mr Zhang is impatient for that day. He graduated from the central bank’s academy back in 1986 with a thesis entitled “The Path to Interest-Rate Liberalisation”. Then, he thought the removal of interest-rate controls was only five years away. Over a quarter of a century later, students are still writing the same thesis, he says. “Those five years have never ended.
Tenia mas cosas que comentar pero creo que este ladrillo es mas que suficiente (por hoy)
Bueno no, os dejo el enlace al apocalipsis en tiempo real
Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate
Ircapo
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La Carta de la Bolsa - La crisis de liquidez China
El aumento de los tipos del mercado monetario da a entender la delicada situación que atraviesa el sector financiero chino. El tipo aplicado a los préstamos a un día en los mercados monetarios de China aumentó la semana pasada hasta el 9,6%, un récord histórico, y el viernes seguía en el 7%. El Ministerio de Finanzas sintió el impacto con una crisis de liquidez que quedó patente en el primer fracaso de una subasta de deuda pública en casi dos años. El rápido incremento refleja los problemas de gestión de liquidez provocados por los bancos chinos, prácticamente desbordados, y por el crecimiento del sector de gestión del patrimonio.
El aumento de los tipos del mercado monetario da a entender la delicada situación que atraviesa el sector financiero chino. El tipo aplicado a los préstamos a un día en los mercados monetarios de China aumentó la semana pasada hasta el 9,6%, un récord histórico, y el viernes seguía en el 7%. El Ministerio de Finanzas sintió el impacto con una crisis de liquidez que quedó patente en el primer fracaso de una subasta de deuda pública en casi dos años. El rápido incremento refleja los problemas de gestión de liquidez provocados por los bancos chinos, prácticamente desbordados, y por el crecimiento del sector de gestión del patrimonio.
Serpiente_Plyskeen
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Mucha gente no entiende muy bien la situación de China...
Muchos piensan que China sólo tiene que devaluar su moneda para vender más y con ello conseguir recuperarse de su burbuja...
Ya hemos advertido muchos que el problema de China se llama PRODUCTIVIDAD... este es el motivo por el cual Japón puede DEVALUAR lo que quiera dentro de unas pautas y sin embargo China no tiene esa posibilidad...
Alguien puede pensar que China ya lo hizo y le funcionó...
China lo hizo, es cierto y funcionó, es cierto... pero ya no... ¿por qué?...
Por la financiación...
China financió todo esto a través de las grandes subvenciones que aportaba a la producción, ya a través de la mano de obra (dumping laboral), como a través de las subvenciones a la exportación vía devaluación... estas cosas China podía hacerlas debido principalmente a una causa, SU DEUDA era inexistente mayormente, con lo cual podía permitirse dedicar casi todos sus ingresos a costear el aumento de producción y dado que su economía estaba totalmente bloqueada su puesta en funcionamiento mejoró todo el sistema... funcionó como una burbuja, la burbuja de la producción y como cualquier TIMO PONZI, siempre era interesante ingresar en China pues las rentabilidades prometidas eran siempre de orden superior; si además comparamos estas rentas con las que daban otras economías, en fin, era menso no invertir, se pensaba...
Ahora, sin embargo, la situación es muy diferente...
Financieramente China ya no tiene un nivel bajo de deuda... su economía no está parada, aún al contrario, está excesivamente sobredimensionada y a ello se une un consumo interno excesivo para sus posibilidades... el problema, aquí viene el meollo de la cuestión es que por un lado tiene que pagar el servicio de una deuda sobredimensionada y por otro su consumo es muy poco eficiente para su productividad... el resultado es que PRODUCIR es muy sancionador y el margen de beneficios es muy pequeño para poder pagar los gastos... en esa tesitura China tiene además un problema con la inflación y una población enormemente desprotegida; lo cual augura en cualquier circunstancia conflictividad social, pero además en el caso de China puede ser todavía más bestial, pues esa población es inmensa y está excesivamente concentrada...
China tiene un INMENSO PROBLEMA... y sus dirigentes tienen ya que ser conscientes de lo que se avecina... lo que ha hecho Japón con su "abenomics" es algo muy peligroso para la COMPETITIVIDAD China, que más temprano que tarde no podrá optar a pelear en mercados en contracción y más exigentes...
Falta de mercados y con una economía interna paralizada, China será un polvorín... todo va muy rápido, es de esperar alguna caída muy subida de peso de alguna entidad financiera, pero China es muy dada a manipularlo todo, con lo cual veremos si se ve desde fuera o como se ve lo que va a acontecer INEVITABLEMENTE... a partir de ahí, el miedo hará el resto... las calificadoras en poco tiempo (un par de años a lo sumo) van a tener que bajar la calificación crediticia a China y en esas circunstancias...
En fin... China es muy poco permeable, pero lo que no va a poder hacer es evitar las consecuencias de su parón... eso se verá en los productores de materias primas...
Va a ser un verano complejo... este año en general pinta muy mal... pero que muy mal...
Muchos piensan que China sólo tiene que devaluar su moneda para vender más y con ello conseguir recuperarse de su burbuja...
Ya hemos advertido muchos que el problema de China se llama PRODUCTIVIDAD... este es el motivo por el cual Japón puede DEVALUAR lo que quiera dentro de unas pautas y sin embargo China no tiene esa posibilidad...
Alguien puede pensar que China ya lo hizo y le funcionó...
China lo hizo, es cierto y funcionó, es cierto... pero ya no... ¿por qué?...
Por la financiación...
China financió todo esto a través de las grandes subvenciones que aportaba a la producción, ya a través de la mano de obra (dumping laboral), como a través de las subvenciones a la exportación vía devaluación... estas cosas China podía hacerlas debido principalmente a una causa, SU DEUDA era inexistente mayormente, con lo cual podía permitirse dedicar casi todos sus ingresos a costear el aumento de producción y dado que su economía estaba totalmente bloqueada su puesta en funcionamiento mejoró todo el sistema... funcionó como una burbuja, la burbuja de la producción y como cualquier TIMO PONZI, siempre era interesante ingresar en China pues las rentabilidades prometidas eran siempre de orden superior; si además comparamos estas rentas con las que daban otras economías, en fin, era menso no invertir, se pensaba...
Ahora, sin embargo, la situación es muy diferente...
Financieramente China ya no tiene un nivel bajo de deuda... su economía no está parada, aún al contrario, está excesivamente sobredimensionada y a ello se une un consumo interno excesivo para sus posibilidades... el problema, aquí viene el meollo de la cuestión es que por un lado tiene que pagar el servicio de una deuda sobredimensionada y por otro su consumo es muy poco eficiente para su productividad... el resultado es que PRODUCIR es muy sancionador y el margen de beneficios es muy pequeño para poder pagar los gastos... en esa tesitura China tiene además un problema con la inflación y una población enormemente desprotegida; lo cual augura en cualquier circunstancia conflictividad social, pero además en el caso de China puede ser todavía más bestial, pues esa población es inmensa y está excesivamente concentrada...
China tiene un INMENSO PROBLEMA... y sus dirigentes tienen ya que ser conscientes de lo que se avecina... lo que ha hecho Japón con su "abenomics" es algo muy peligroso para la COMPETITIVIDAD China, que más temprano que tarde no podrá optar a pelear en mercados en contracción y más exigentes...
Falta de mercados y con una economía interna paralizada, China será un polvorín... todo va muy rápido, es de esperar alguna caída muy subida de peso de alguna entidad financiera, pero China es muy dada a manipularlo todo, con lo cual veremos si se ve desde fuera o como se ve lo que va a acontecer INEVITABLEMENTE... a partir de ahí, el miedo hará el resto... las calificadoras en poco tiempo (un par de años a lo sumo) van a tener que bajar la calificación crediticia a China y en esas circunstancias...
En fin... China es muy poco permeable, pero lo que no va a poder hacer es evitar las consecuencias de su parón... eso se verá en los productores de materias primas...
Va a ser un verano complejo... este año en general pinta muy mal... pero que muy mal...
dick jones
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Ahora mismo
Shibor overnight 13,44% a una semana 11% a un mes 9,39%
WSJ habla en un articulo de ayer (cuando el on estaba repuntando al 7%) que todo esto podria no ser mas que un stress test a las bravas por parte de Beijing, si es cierto, los tienen como balas de cañon.
Shibor overnight 13,44% a una semana 11% a un mes 9,39%
WSJ habla en un articulo de ayer (cuando el on estaba repuntando al 7%) que todo esto podria no ser mas que un stress test a las bravas por parte de Beijing, si es cierto, los tienen como balas de cañon.
damepacome
Madmaxista
China Interbank Market Freezes As Overnight Repo Explodes To 25%
China Interbank Market Freezes As Overnight Repo Explodes To 25% | Zero Hedge
It seems liquidity (or counterparty mistrust) is beginning to reach extreme levels in China as the nation's banking system is now quoting overnight repo transactions at 25%. The explosion in funding costs echoes the collapse in trust (and surge in TED spread) among US banks in the run-up to the Lehman bankruptcy. MSCI Asia-Pac stocks are down over 3% with China's Shanghai Composite -2.5% at seven-month lows.
China’s 1-day Repo Rate Climbs to Highest Since at Least 2006
MNI - CHINA OVERNIGHT REPO FIXING AT RECORD HIGH
China's bond market is also collapsing:
Yield on 3.1% govt bonds due January 2016 jumps 39 bps to 3.749%, biggest rise since notes were issued in January
China this week...
US in the run-up to Lehman...
China Interbank Market Freezes As Overnight Repo Explodes To 25% | Zero Hedge
It seems liquidity (or counterparty mistrust) is beginning to reach extreme levels in China as the nation's banking system is now quoting overnight repo transactions at 25%. The explosion in funding costs echoes the collapse in trust (and surge in TED spread) among US banks in the run-up to the Lehman bankruptcy. MSCI Asia-Pac stocks are down over 3% with China's Shanghai Composite -2.5% at seven-month lows.
China’s 1-day Repo Rate Climbs to Highest Since at Least 2006
MNI - CHINA OVERNIGHT REPO FIXING AT RECORD HIGH
China's bond market is also collapsing:
Yield on 3.1% govt bonds due January 2016 jumps 39 bps to 3.749%, biggest rise since notes were issued in January
China this week...
US in the run-up to Lehman...
Serpiente_Plyskeen
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Aquí un vídeo de la productividad china:China Interbank Market Freezes As Overnight Repo Explodes To 25% | Zero Hedge
It seems liquidity (or counterparty mistrust) is beginning to reach extreme levels in China as the nation's banking system is now quoting overnight repo transactions at 25%. The explosion in funding costs echoes the collapse in trust (and surge in TED spread) among US banks in the run-up to the Lehman bankruptcy. MSCI Asia-Pac stocks are down over 3% with China's Shanghai Composite -2.5% at seven-month lows.
China’s 1-day Repo Rate Climbs to Highest Since at Least 2006
MNI - CHINA OVERNIGHT REPO FIXING AT RECORD HIGH
China's bond market is also collapsing:
Yield on 3.1% govt bonds due January 2016 jumps 39 bps to 3.749%, biggest rise since notes were issued in January
China this week...
US in the run-up to Lehman...
[YOUTUBE]tPzRPga6uDg[/YOUTUBE]
ienso: Apunta maneras el chavalote este. Este va para director del banco central, como poco.A ver un poco de participación de los habituales del hilo...
Puede que estemos ante un momento histórico, de unos niveles que no hayamos visto... ni siquiera con LEHMAN...
Alguien ha dicho por ahí que esto es una especie de stress-test... YO creo sinceramente que esto no puede ser posible, pues me parece inaudito que entidad alguna se financie a tal nivel para hacer una prueba, me imagino que los gobiernos, especialmente el chino tienen formas mucho más sanas y mejores...
Pero es que también me cuesta creer que estos aumentos sean algo repentino...
Suenan a pánico y desesperación... pero esto es China... tiene normalmente mucha capacidad de manipulación e intervención... y no da la impresión de que estén haciendo nada... o sí lo están haciendo...
No sé todo es un tanto extraño... va todo muy rápido, DEMASIADO rápido para creer que esto pueda suceder... yo al menos estoy bastante confuso...
OPINIONES...
Puede que estemos ante un momento histórico, de unos niveles que no hayamos visto... ni siquiera con LEHMAN...
Alguien ha dicho por ahí que esto es una especie de stress-test... YO creo sinceramente que esto no puede ser posible, pues me parece inaudito que entidad alguna se financie a tal nivel para hacer una prueba, me imagino que los gobiernos, especialmente el chino tienen formas mucho más sanas y mejores...
Pero es que también me cuesta creer que estos aumentos sean algo repentino...
Suenan a pánico y desesperación... pero esto es China... tiene normalmente mucha capacidad de manipulación e intervención... y no da la impresión de que estén haciendo nada... o sí lo están haciendo...
No sé todo es un tanto extraño... va todo muy rápido, DEMASIADO rápido para creer que esto pueda suceder... yo al menos estoy bastante confuso...
OPINIONES...
Serpiente_Plyskeen
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Hay que reconocer que las cosas parecen estarse saliendo de progenitora muy rápidamente en el último mes.. y los datos macro, aún manipulados, no ayudan - el PMI de manufacturas chino de HSBC baja a 48.3 :
Survey shows China manufacturing shrinks in June | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
Y por cierto, Hong Kong cada vez más anti-China mainland:
HK netizens call for anniversary concert boycott | Asia News – Politics, Media, Education | Asian Correspondent
El gran problema de China es que tiene tantos frentes abiertos, que es imposible que tarde o temprano al menos uno no explote.. la cuestión es cuál y cuando. ¿Podría sufrir un Lehman ahora? Sí, pero seguramente el chiringuito chino sobreviva a ello... (Con esto quiero decir que al igual que EEUU, acabará petando, pero más tarde).HK netizens call for anniversary concert boycott
By Asian Correspondent Jun 20, 2013 3:54PM UTC
By Nicholas Olczak
Plans for music concerts and retail promotions in Hong Kong on the July 1 anniversary of its handover to China are being criticised for diverting attention away from the large pro-democracy demonstration held on this date each year.
Since Hong Kong was handed back to China on July 1, 1997, the anniversary day each year has become the date of a march in support of democracy and civil rights. The 2003 march saw a huge leap in participation to around 500,000 people and each year since then the demonstration has drawn crowds numbering several hundred thousand to march through the centre of the city.
Korean boy band Shinee, left, have come under pressure to boycott the Dome Festival in Hong Kong on July 1. Activists say the concert is a government ploy to draw attention away from the democracy march, right. Pics: AP.
This year the Performance Industry Association is planning to hold The Hong Kong Dome Festival, a music festival antiestéticaturing Korean and Hong Kong pop bands that is expected to draw 18,000 people, on the same day as the march.
Hong Kong netizens have set up a Facebook group called ‘Boycott HK Dome Festival’ attacking the event and accusing it of attempting to draw attention away from the march.
“This year, a new program ‘HK Dome Festival’ popped up at exactly the same time of the protest,” a statement on the page says. “It has come to our concern that the reason behind the festival might not be as simple as it seems to be. Music should never be used for sugar-coating politics.”
The group has called for members of the Hong Kong public as well as participating artists to boycott the festival, posting messages and comments on the musicians’ Facebook profiles. The page has gathered over 5,500 likes on Facebook and scores of other Hong Kong citizens have echoed their calls to boycott the event.
Hong Kong netizens voiced their concerns on Korean boy band Shinee's Facebook page, calling on the group to boycott the event. Pic: Facebook.
The Performance Industry Association (PIA) said the conflict with the protest march did not occur to them when they planned the festival. They said they also intended the festival to be a protest. “July 1 has become a day for Hongkongers to express their demands to the government,” PIA chairwoman Florence Chan told the South China Morning Post. “We picked this day because we wanted to show the government that we need a mega venue in Hong Kong.”
Over 1,000 Hong Kong shops and restaurants are also planning to offer special promotions, including discounts of up to 50 percent, in order to help people celebrate the anniversary. Organisers of the pro-democracy march have accused these organisations of collaborating with supporters of the government and trying to divert people’s attention from the protest.
“The pro-establishment camp’s motive is very clear,” Civil Human Rights Front convenor Jackie Hung Ling-yu told the South China Morning Post. “They want to get more people shopping so that less people join the march.”
President of the Hong Kong Commerce and Industry Association, Lee Yuk-lun said that there were attempts being made to change people’s perspective of the anniversary. “People have been viewing July 1 as a demonstration day… We want to change this and make it a shopping day,” he told the South China Morning Post.
Organisers of the July 1demonstration have said the fact such efforts are being made reflects a antiestéticar amongst pro-Beijing groups that there will be a large turnout for this year’s rally.
Me preocuparía más una posible transmisión al resto del sistema financiero global
ienso::Peta una banco en China -> Petan las inversiones "Dim Sum" vía HK -> Susto en Asia -> Pesadilla a nivel mundia.
Veremos a ver...
Estaba viendo el programa de Max Keiser y... minuto 00:40; compradores de oro en China... atención a las colas...
Keiser Report en español. Los falsos escaparates de la economía (E459)
¡¡¡¡¿Cual será la inflación real en China?!!!!!!
Esas colas no auguran nada, pero que nada bueno...
Pero la inflación no llega de un día para otro...
Keiser Report en español. Los falsos escaparates de la economía (E459)
¡¡¡¡¿Cual será la inflación real en China?!!!!!!
Esas colas no auguran nada, pero que nada bueno...
Pero la inflación no llega de un día para otro...
Serpiente_Plyskeen
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Lo de las colas para comprar oro lo posteó ZH hace unos días (no suelo copy-pastear artículos de ZH porque sino no hago otra cosa en todo el día). Pero sí, los chinos que tienen algo de pasta hace años ya que están sacando el dinero del país o comprando oro, porque saben (frente a suponen) que china va a pegar un petardazo (Krakatoa style) en algún momento (también hay que reconocer que el gobierno Chino les da pocas opciones de ahorro rentable / inversión a los ciudadanos - los depósitos estan capados y dan muy poco, la bolsa apenas ha subido, etc). De hecho, la mayor parte de los compradores de vivienda de lujo en Londres ahora mismo son chinos (con mucha pasta). Y hace dos-tres años, eran la mayoría de compradores de vivienda en Japón también. Esto ya nos dice todo lo que necesitamos saber. Los chinos serán muchas cosas, pero estúpidos no es una ellas.
