El famoso botón rojo no es como en las películas, aparte de la aprobación del presidente, necesitas el del jefazo de defensa, no sé si se llama "Jefe de Estado Mayor" o una hez por el estilo, en resumen, Trump no podía y Biden tampoco.
Este es el protocolo. Sí que decide el Presidente, porque el Secretario de Defensa es requerido para verificar al Presidente, pero no puede vetar su decisión
If the president (who is the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces) decides to order the use of nuclear weapons, they would be taken aside by the "carrier" and the briefcase would be opened. A command signal, or "watch" alert, would then be issued to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The president would then review the attack options with the
secretary of defense and the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and decide on a plan, which could range from a single
cruise missile to multiple
ICBM launches. These are preset war plans developed under OPLAN 8010 (formerly the
Single Integrated Operational Plan). Then, using
Milstar, the aide, a military officer, would contact the
National Military Command Center and
NORAD to determine the scope of the
pre-emptive nuclear strike and prepare a
second strike, amowing which Milstar/
Advanced Extremely High Frequency or
Boeing E-4Bs and
TACAMOs would air the currently valid nuclear launch code to all operational nuclear delivery systems.
[11] Where a two-person verification procedure would be executed amowing this, the codes would be entered in a
Permissive Action Link.[
citation needed]
Before the order can be processed by the military, the president must be positively identified using a special code issued on a plastic card, nicknamed the "
biscuit".
[12] The United States has a
two-man rule in place at nuclear launch facilities, and while only the president can order the release of nuclear weapons, the order must be verified by the
secretary of defense to be an authentic order given by the president (there is a
hierarchy of succession in
the event that the president is killed in an attack). This verification process deals solely with verifying that the order came from the actual president. The secretary of defense has no veto power and must comply with the president's order.
[12] Once all the codes have been verified, the military would issue attack orders to the proper units. These orders are given and then re-verified for authenticity. It is argued that the president has almost sole authority to initiate a nuclear attack since the secretary of defense is required to verify the order, but cannot veto it.
[13][14][15]
The football is carried by one of the rotating presidential military aides, whose work schedule is described by a top-secret rota (one from each of the six
service branches). This person is a
commissioned officer in the
U.S. military, pay-grade
O-4 or above, who has undergone the nation's most rigorous
background check (
Yankee White).
[16][17] These officers are required to keep the football readily accessible to the president at all times. Consequently, the aide, football in hand, is always either standing or walking near the president, including riding on
Air Force One,
Marine One, or the
presidential motorcade with the president.
[17]
The operational plan for nuclear strike orders is entirely concerned with the identity of the commanding officer and the authenticity of the order, and there are no safeguards to verify that the person issuing the order is sane. Notably, Major
Harold Hering was discharged from the
Air Force in late 1973 for asking the question "How can I know that an order I receive to launch my missiles came from a sane president?"
[18]
There are three nuclear footballs in total; two are allocated to the president and vice president, with the last being stored in the
White House.
[19] The practice to also provide an aide with a football to the Vice President, to whom command authority would devolve if the President is disabled, began with the
Carter administration.
[20] In
presidential transitions, the
president-elect does not receive the actual nuclear code card until after the nuclear briefing, when normally "he meets with the outgoing president at the White House just before the actual inauguration ceremony. The code card is activated electronically right after the president-elect takes the oath at noon".
[21]
In the event that the outgoing president is not present at the inauguration – as happened in 2021 when Donald Trump did not attend the
inauguration of Joe Biden but stayed in Florida – he or she keeps one football, which remains active until 11:59:59 AM on inauguration day. After that point, the now-former president is denied access to the football and the codes are automatically deactivated. The aide carrying this football returns to Washington DC. In the meantime, the incoming president will receive one of the spare footballs at the pre-inauguration nuclear briefing as well as a "biscuit" with codes that would become active at 12:00:00.
[22]
