G
GREGG .
Guest
Why Hugo Chávez is an illegitimate President
By Gustavo Coronel
June 10, 2005 | Many world governments, even democratic ones, still
consider the Venezuelan regime of Hugo Chávez to be legitimate.
Although they are increasingly aware of the authoritarian and
repressive nature of the regime, they justify their diplomatic
accommodation by claiming that Chávez came into power through
elections. For too many years now, the definition of political
legitimacy has rested exclusively on the manner in which political
power was obtained. Transparent elections seem to be all that was
needed for a government to be classified as legitimate. Political
scientists now tell us that such a definition is highly inadequate.
Legitimacy requires much more than elections. A document published by
the United Nations Development Program ( Democracy in Latin America,
UNDP, 2004) argues that countries need to progress from electoral
democracy to a citizen’s democracy. The true democratic nature of a
government and its degree of legitimacy have to be tested against a
set of criteria, such as the ones listed by the United Nations
Commission of Human Rights in 1999, which include:
* Freedom of opinion, of expression and of association
* The rule of law, equal for all citizens
* Universal and equal suffrage
* Political participation, with equal opportunity for all
* Transparent and accountable government institutions
* Equal access to public services.
I have no doubt in my mind that the regime of Hugo Chávez fails this
test for legitimacy and should be classified as illegitimate by
international organizations such as the U.N. and the O.A.S.
This belief is based on my analysis of the Venezuelan situation during
the years under Chávez rule. It is, of course, a subjective analysis,
but is largely backed by facts. Let us take a look:
Sources of political legitimacy
1. Free and Fair Elections.
The Chávez regime came to power through free and reasonable
transparent elections. After his clear initial victory, Chávez went on
to control the electoral system, by placing his amowers
(Carrasquero, Jorge Rodriguez) in the top positions of the National
Electoral Council. The cases of government intervention and
manipulation have been amply documented. The call for the presidential
recall referendum in 2004 generated a process characterized by open
abuse of power by this council. The results of the recall referendum
itself have been denounced as fraudulent and, as a result, an
important portion of the population has lost credibility in the
electoral system. This lack of trust will result in progressively
higher levels of absenteeism in future electoral events, weakening the
legitimacy of the regime. In spite of these irregularities, the
electoral origin of the Chávez regime remains as its main and
practically sole claim to political legitimacy.
2. Accountability.
A legitimate government has to be accountable to the people for their
actions and for the manner in which they utilize national assets and
resources. This is definitely not the case with the Chávez regime.
Citizens are largely kept in the dark regarding the utilization of
those assets and resources. There are no controls to the way Chávez
decides to use them. Three examples: (1) 90,000 barrels per day of oil
are going to Cuba at highly subsidized prices, partly bartered in
exchange for obsolete technologies and medical services of
questionable quality. Chávez went ahead with this agreement without
proper institutional approval and against the desires of the
Venezuelan people. Cuba already owes Venezuela over US$2 billion but
the mandatory steps to interrupt this unpaid supply have not been
taken by the negligent Venezuelan authorities. (2) The oil income, all
of which should go to the Venezuelan Central Bank is being illegally
diverted from the national treasury, to be used directly by Chávez
without any transparency or accountability. At this moment there are
over US$3 billion unaccounted for, a gigantic crime that the majority
of the people remain unaware of, due to its rather complex technical
nature, and (3) The attempt at handing over to China the patents to
manufacture Orimulsion, a Venezuelan technology to mix extra heavy
oils with water and emulsifiers (a transaction that was being done in
secret, without the knowledge of Venezuelans and without proper public
disclosure).
3. The Rule of Law.
The law is not being applied in an impartial manner. Members of the
opposition do not receive the proper protection of the law or of the
institutions that should protect them. In fact the Attorney General,
Isaias Rodriguez and the ombudsman, German Amundarain, have become the
main enemies of political dissenters: Journalists are being
persecuted, political prisoners are already counted by the dozens. The
Supreme tribunal of Justice is stacked with Chávez amowers. Citizens
can no longer trust in the impartiality of the law.
4. Social Inclusion.
Chávez has built his amowing among the very poor. This certainly
would not be objectionable if it were not for the two amowing
reasons; (1) that most of the promises made by Chávez to the poor
remain tragically unfulfilled, to the extreme that poverty is now
greater than when Chávez arrived in power, and (2) that the money
being handed out to the poor in terms of subsidies and freebies does
not constitute a structural solution to poverty and is being done at
the expense of the impoverishment of the other half of the population:
the regular workers, the middle class and the private industrial
sector. What the regime understands as popular participation and
inclusion is simply participation by, and the inclusion of, his
amowers, not over all inclusion and truly collective participation.
Today half the country is excluded from participating in the issues
that affect all Venezuelans. This is a fraud.
5. A Strong and Independent Media.
For some time after his electoral victory Chávez respected the freedom
of the media. During the last two to three years, however, this
freedom has been progressively restricted through the harassment, by
diverse agencies of the regime, of TV stations and newspapers that
oppose Chávez. The major blow to freedom of expression in Venezuela
has been the enacting of a Law that regulates the content of media
news. This law has been combined with changes in the Penal Code that
make it punishable by prison, of up to six years, any "disrespect" by
the media of Mr. Chávez and his relatives and inner circle,
"disrespect" defined by the regime itself. Obviously this has led to
major self-censorship among the media. As a result, much information
that should be known by Venezuelans is not reported upon, for antiestéticar of
retaliation based on the Gag Law and the revised penal code.
6. Existence of Institutional Checks and Balances.
A legitimate democracy requires checks and balances. No one should be
able to dictate his or her wishes to the rest of society without the
limitations imposed by the public good. Today Chávez is the law of the
land in Venezuela. What he says goes, without any opposition from the
institutions that should make sure that no one could become a
dictator. These institutions: the Attorney General, the Comptroller
General, the Ombudsman, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, the National
Assembly and the National Electoral Council are all in Chávez's
pockets, due to the invertebrate nature of the position holders. The
illegal use of public assets (airplanes and other state owned
equipment) and monies (billions of dollars diverted away from the
proper agencies) goes unchecked. The persecution and imprisonment of
dissenters go unchecked. Decisions of foreign policy (Cuban-Venezuelan
agreements, Orimulsion to the Chinese, alignment with Iran and other
States to build an anti-U.S. global coalition) which are highly
detrimental to our nation go unchecked and are taken without public
discussion or accountability. The abuse of State Television and the
imposition of TV and radio hookups to allow Chávez to give long and
irrelevant speeches go unchecked. There is no restraint of power,
there are no minority rights, there is no civilian control over the
military, and there is no independent Central Bank. The authoritarian
posture of Hugo Chávez is no longer a matter of biased perceptions by
the opposition but an integral component of an arrogant and disdainful
style of ruling. Chávez already considers himself to be above the law
and this is the main characteristic of dictators.
7. Economic and Political Stability.
A legitimate government has to provide a nation with reasonable
economic and political stability. This is not the case with the Chávez
regime. During his six and a half years in power Chávez has received
about US$130 billion from oil exports but this money is nowhere to be
seen, except as in the form of handouts. He has doubled the national
debt. He is attempting to grab a good portion of the international
reserves, a move that would greatly increase our country risk and keep
international investors away. He has imposed for years a rigid
exchange control that has been used as a political tool to punish
companies managed by dissenters ("not one single dollar for the
enemies of the revolution," he has said). Exchange controls have
forced the closing down of hundreds of businesses. While the
hemisphere has been enjoying an economic mini-boom, Venezuela has
remained as the almost only Latin American country with double-digit
inflation (25% plus) and extremely high unemployment (17% and higher).
Fiscal deficits remain enormous and it seems evident that oil income,
no matter how great, will not be enough to satisfy the thirst for
money Chávez has developed. Bureaucratic corruption levels are
extremely high due to the lack of controls and the ineptness of the
top members of the administration. Petróleos de Venezuela, the main
source of hard currency, is suffering great deterioration and is being
subject to partial liquidation of its assets (Orimulsion patents being
turned over to China, petrochemical assets being turned over to U.S.
companies, Citgo refineries on sale). Poverty is increasing although
money showering, in the form of handouts, is temporarily keeping the
poor reasonably hopeful that their lot will improve.
This bleak economic picture leads to an equally bleak political
situation and they feed on each other. The revolution is beginning to
show serious signs of internal fracturing, due to personal ambitions
among the revolutionary leadership and the desire of competing groups
(PPT, MVR, the military) to get their portion of the spoils. The Armed
Forces and the political parties that support the regime are at
increasing internal odds due to: (1) the creation by Chávez of a
popular, armed militia that will eventually serve to replace the
regular army, (2) the increasing alignment between Chávez and Castro's
Cuba that is rapidly converting Venezuela into a Cuban political
satellite and, (3) the desire by these groups to attain more political
power and financial rewards. The opposition, although still in
disarray, is ardently opposed to the violation of Chávez electoral
mandate to conduct democratic change and to his recent and arrogant
declaration of being a Socialist and leading a Socialist revolution,
something that even his amowers did not have in mind when voting for
him. Venezuelans will not accept this attempted political rape without
a determined fight.
8. Equal Access to Public Services.
Today there are many second-class Venezuelan citizens who do not
receive proper attention from government agencies. They are the ones
who signed the petition for the presidential recall referendum. These
citizens are not given government jobs or have been dismissed from
their existing jobs, are not extended passports or identity cards.
These citizens are in a black list generated by a man called Luis
Tascón, under orders of Hugo Chávez. This list alone would suffice to
render the regime of Hugo Chávez illegitimate.
---o0o---
I think that these comments will show that there is a growing issue of
illegitimacy surrounding the Hugo Chávez presidency. But, even if this
were true, people might ask: "So what?" Who can remedy this situation?
Venezuelan society appears incapable of generating an internal protest
strong enough to force a change in this situation, at least in the
short term. Elections are a highly doubtful alternative, as Chávez
controls and manipulates electoral mechanisms. An armed rebellion,
such as the one Chávez staged in 1992, would either fail due to
incompetence of the leaders (as it happened with Chávez in 1992) or,
worse, would result in the replacement of Chávez by an armed gorilla,
someone even worse than Chávez, who would take us even farther back
into the 19th century.
Ousting Chávez will require a combination of strategies, including
domestic and international components. The starting point must be a
rational and unselfish commitment by the opposition to work towards a
unified leadership, a common political platform and a systematic
campaign to open the eyes of all Venezuelans to the national disaster
that Venezuela has become under the rule of Chávez. The main obstacle
to the short-term success of this strategy is the illusory feeling of
progress Chávez has been able to instill into the poor, due to his
expedient policy of handouts. Millions of my countrymen and women live
on a day-to-day survival mode. This is understandable but limits the
power of any message designed to make them see that this illusion of
progress is temporary, that it will end when the regime runs into
economic difficulties and that the true answers to their existential
problems are of a more structural nature. This limitation should not
stop the putting into effect of the strategies designed to stop the
Chávez crimes against the nation.
These strategies, in fact, should have started yesterday!
--------------
Gregg
---------------
"This is an age of exhausted whoredom groping for its God."
(James Joyce, Ulisses p.280)
http://www.geocities.com/airborne_col/America.html
By Gustavo Coronel
June 10, 2005 | Many world governments, even democratic ones, still
consider the Venezuelan regime of Hugo Chávez to be legitimate.
Although they are increasingly aware of the authoritarian and
repressive nature of the regime, they justify their diplomatic
accommodation by claiming that Chávez came into power through
elections. For too many years now, the definition of political
legitimacy has rested exclusively on the manner in which political
power was obtained. Transparent elections seem to be all that was
needed for a government to be classified as legitimate. Political
scientists now tell us that such a definition is highly inadequate.
Legitimacy requires much more than elections. A document published by
the United Nations Development Program ( Democracy in Latin America,
UNDP, 2004) argues that countries need to progress from electoral
democracy to a citizen’s democracy. The true democratic nature of a
government and its degree of legitimacy have to be tested against a
set of criteria, such as the ones listed by the United Nations
Commission of Human Rights in 1999, which include:
* Freedom of opinion, of expression and of association
* The rule of law, equal for all citizens
* Universal and equal suffrage
* Political participation, with equal opportunity for all
* Transparent and accountable government institutions
* Equal access to public services.
I have no doubt in my mind that the regime of Hugo Chávez fails this
test for legitimacy and should be classified as illegitimate by
international organizations such as the U.N. and the O.A.S.
This belief is based on my analysis of the Venezuelan situation during
the years under Chávez rule. It is, of course, a subjective analysis,
but is largely backed by facts. Let us take a look:
Sources of political legitimacy
1. Free and Fair Elections.
The Chávez regime came to power through free and reasonable
transparent elections. After his clear initial victory, Chávez went on
to control the electoral system, by placing his amowers
(Carrasquero, Jorge Rodriguez) in the top positions of the National
Electoral Council. The cases of government intervention and
manipulation have been amply documented. The call for the presidential
recall referendum in 2004 generated a process characterized by open
abuse of power by this council. The results of the recall referendum
itself have been denounced as fraudulent and, as a result, an
important portion of the population has lost credibility in the
electoral system. This lack of trust will result in progressively
higher levels of absenteeism in future electoral events, weakening the
legitimacy of the regime. In spite of these irregularities, the
electoral origin of the Chávez regime remains as its main and
practically sole claim to political legitimacy.
2. Accountability.
A legitimate government has to be accountable to the people for their
actions and for the manner in which they utilize national assets and
resources. This is definitely not the case with the Chávez regime.
Citizens are largely kept in the dark regarding the utilization of
those assets and resources. There are no controls to the way Chávez
decides to use them. Three examples: (1) 90,000 barrels per day of oil
are going to Cuba at highly subsidized prices, partly bartered in
exchange for obsolete technologies and medical services of
questionable quality. Chávez went ahead with this agreement without
proper institutional approval and against the desires of the
Venezuelan people. Cuba already owes Venezuela over US$2 billion but
the mandatory steps to interrupt this unpaid supply have not been
taken by the negligent Venezuelan authorities. (2) The oil income, all
of which should go to the Venezuelan Central Bank is being illegally
diverted from the national treasury, to be used directly by Chávez
without any transparency or accountability. At this moment there are
over US$3 billion unaccounted for, a gigantic crime that the majority
of the people remain unaware of, due to its rather complex technical
nature, and (3) The attempt at handing over to China the patents to
manufacture Orimulsion, a Venezuelan technology to mix extra heavy
oils with water and emulsifiers (a transaction that was being done in
secret, without the knowledge of Venezuelans and without proper public
disclosure).
3. The Rule of Law.
The law is not being applied in an impartial manner. Members of the
opposition do not receive the proper protection of the law or of the
institutions that should protect them. In fact the Attorney General,
Isaias Rodriguez and the ombudsman, German Amundarain, have become the
main enemies of political dissenters: Journalists are being
persecuted, political prisoners are already counted by the dozens. The
Supreme tribunal of Justice is stacked with Chávez amowers. Citizens
can no longer trust in the impartiality of the law.
4. Social Inclusion.
Chávez has built his amowing among the very poor. This certainly
would not be objectionable if it were not for the two amowing
reasons; (1) that most of the promises made by Chávez to the poor
remain tragically unfulfilled, to the extreme that poverty is now
greater than when Chávez arrived in power, and (2) that the money
being handed out to the poor in terms of subsidies and freebies does
not constitute a structural solution to poverty and is being done at
the expense of the impoverishment of the other half of the population:
the regular workers, the middle class and the private industrial
sector. What the regime understands as popular participation and
inclusion is simply participation by, and the inclusion of, his
amowers, not over all inclusion and truly collective participation.
Today half the country is excluded from participating in the issues
that affect all Venezuelans. This is a fraud.
5. A Strong and Independent Media.
For some time after his electoral victory Chávez respected the freedom
of the media. During the last two to three years, however, this
freedom has been progressively restricted through the harassment, by
diverse agencies of the regime, of TV stations and newspapers that
oppose Chávez. The major blow to freedom of expression in Venezuela
has been the enacting of a Law that regulates the content of media
news. This law has been combined with changes in the Penal Code that
make it punishable by prison, of up to six years, any "disrespect" by
the media of Mr. Chávez and his relatives and inner circle,
"disrespect" defined by the regime itself. Obviously this has led to
major self-censorship among the media. As a result, much information
that should be known by Venezuelans is not reported upon, for antiestéticar of
retaliation based on the Gag Law and the revised penal code.
6. Existence of Institutional Checks and Balances.
A legitimate democracy requires checks and balances. No one should be
able to dictate his or her wishes to the rest of society without the
limitations imposed by the public good. Today Chávez is the law of the
land in Venezuela. What he says goes, without any opposition from the
institutions that should make sure that no one could become a
dictator. These institutions: the Attorney General, the Comptroller
General, the Ombudsman, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, the National
Assembly and the National Electoral Council are all in Chávez's
pockets, due to the invertebrate nature of the position holders. The
illegal use of public assets (airplanes and other state owned
equipment) and monies (billions of dollars diverted away from the
proper agencies) goes unchecked. The persecution and imprisonment of
dissenters go unchecked. Decisions of foreign policy (Cuban-Venezuelan
agreements, Orimulsion to the Chinese, alignment with Iran and other
States to build an anti-U.S. global coalition) which are highly
detrimental to our nation go unchecked and are taken without public
discussion or accountability. The abuse of State Television and the
imposition of TV and radio hookups to allow Chávez to give long and
irrelevant speeches go unchecked. There is no restraint of power,
there are no minority rights, there is no civilian control over the
military, and there is no independent Central Bank. The authoritarian
posture of Hugo Chávez is no longer a matter of biased perceptions by
the opposition but an integral component of an arrogant and disdainful
style of ruling. Chávez already considers himself to be above the law
and this is the main characteristic of dictators.
7. Economic and Political Stability.
A legitimate government has to provide a nation with reasonable
economic and political stability. This is not the case with the Chávez
regime. During his six and a half years in power Chávez has received
about US$130 billion from oil exports but this money is nowhere to be
seen, except as in the form of handouts. He has doubled the national
debt. He is attempting to grab a good portion of the international
reserves, a move that would greatly increase our country risk and keep
international investors away. He has imposed for years a rigid
exchange control that has been used as a political tool to punish
companies managed by dissenters ("not one single dollar for the
enemies of the revolution," he has said). Exchange controls have
forced the closing down of hundreds of businesses. While the
hemisphere has been enjoying an economic mini-boom, Venezuela has
remained as the almost only Latin American country with double-digit
inflation (25% plus) and extremely high unemployment (17% and higher).
Fiscal deficits remain enormous and it seems evident that oil income,
no matter how great, will not be enough to satisfy the thirst for
money Chávez has developed. Bureaucratic corruption levels are
extremely high due to the lack of controls and the ineptness of the
top members of the administration. Petróleos de Venezuela, the main
source of hard currency, is suffering great deterioration and is being
subject to partial liquidation of its assets (Orimulsion patents being
turned over to China, petrochemical assets being turned over to U.S.
companies, Citgo refineries on sale). Poverty is increasing although
money showering, in the form of handouts, is temporarily keeping the
poor reasonably hopeful that their lot will improve.
This bleak economic picture leads to an equally bleak political
situation and they feed on each other. The revolution is beginning to
show serious signs of internal fracturing, due to personal ambitions
among the revolutionary leadership and the desire of competing groups
(PPT, MVR, the military) to get their portion of the spoils. The Armed
Forces and the political parties that support the regime are at
increasing internal odds due to: (1) the creation by Chávez of a
popular, armed militia that will eventually serve to replace the
regular army, (2) the increasing alignment between Chávez and Castro's
Cuba that is rapidly converting Venezuela into a Cuban political
satellite and, (3) the desire by these groups to attain more political
power and financial rewards. The opposition, although still in
disarray, is ardently opposed to the violation of Chávez electoral
mandate to conduct democratic change and to his recent and arrogant
declaration of being a Socialist and leading a Socialist revolution,
something that even his amowers did not have in mind when voting for
him. Venezuelans will not accept this attempted political rape without
a determined fight.
8. Equal Access to Public Services.
Today there are many second-class Venezuelan citizens who do not
receive proper attention from government agencies. They are the ones
who signed the petition for the presidential recall referendum. These
citizens are not given government jobs or have been dismissed from
their existing jobs, are not extended passports or identity cards.
These citizens are in a black list generated by a man called Luis
Tascón, under orders of Hugo Chávez. This list alone would suffice to
render the regime of Hugo Chávez illegitimate.
---o0o---
I think that these comments will show that there is a growing issue of
illegitimacy surrounding the Hugo Chávez presidency. But, even if this
were true, people might ask: "So what?" Who can remedy this situation?
Venezuelan society appears incapable of generating an internal protest
strong enough to force a change in this situation, at least in the
short term. Elections are a highly doubtful alternative, as Chávez
controls and manipulates electoral mechanisms. An armed rebellion,
such as the one Chávez staged in 1992, would either fail due to
incompetence of the leaders (as it happened with Chávez in 1992) or,
worse, would result in the replacement of Chávez by an armed gorilla,
someone even worse than Chávez, who would take us even farther back
into the 19th century.
Ousting Chávez will require a combination of strategies, including
domestic and international components. The starting point must be a
rational and unselfish commitment by the opposition to work towards a
unified leadership, a common political platform and a systematic
campaign to open the eyes of all Venezuelans to the national disaster
that Venezuela has become under the rule of Chávez. The main obstacle
to the short-term success of this strategy is the illusory feeling of
progress Chávez has been able to instill into the poor, due to his
expedient policy of handouts. Millions of my countrymen and women live
on a day-to-day survival mode. This is understandable but limits the
power of any message designed to make them see that this illusion of
progress is temporary, that it will end when the regime runs into
economic difficulties and that the true answers to their existential
problems are of a more structural nature. This limitation should not
stop the putting into effect of the strategies designed to stop the
Chávez crimes against the nation.
These strategies, in fact, should have started yesterday!
--------------
Gregg
---------------
"This is an age of exhausted whoredom groping for its God."
(James Joyce, Ulisses p.280)
http://www.geocities.com/airborne_col/America.html
