Why the US Won the Moon Race and the USSR Lost

Moon Landing: The US Touched Down While the USSR Stayed Grounded

On July 16, 1969, a Saturn V rocket launched from Kennedy Space Center carrying three astronauts. Four days later, Neil Armstrong and Edwin Aldrin walked on the lunar surface while Michael Collins waited in orbit. Soviet press reacted the next day with a brief note acknowledging the milestone without enthusiasm. For Washington politicians, it was perfect revenge against Sputnik in 1957 and Gagarin’s flight. For many Soviet citizens, the question was different: Why them and not us?

The USSR Started First But Stalled

By 1961, the Soviet Union was two steps ahead. It had put the first satellite into orbit and sent the first human to space. Two consecutive victories were enough to shake the US status as the flagship of global pogre. A third seemed only a matter of time.

A month and a half after Gagarin’s flight, President John Kennedy announced the start of a crewed lunar program. In 1962, he delivered his speech at Rice University: “We choose to go to the Moon.” According to records, this phrase set the vector for the US space program for the next decade. Kennedy was assassinated a year later, but his bet was already underway.

The Soviet lunar program, however, did not officially begin until 1964. Three years of delay that, in a race of such magnitude, equated to an eternity.

Competing Design Bureaus

While rival companies like Boeing, North American, and McDonnell Douglas united for a common cause in the US, backed by IBM and Aerojet Rocketdyne, each design bureau in the USSR kept its cards close to its chest. Korolev’s and Chelomey’s bureaus developed two distinct lunar spacecraft in parallel instead of merging: the N1-L3 and the UR-700-LK-700. Departments under Korolev, Chelomey, and Yangel all worked simultaneously on the super-heavy launch vehicle.

The rivalry between Korolev and Glushko, central figures in Soviet astronautics, escalated from tension to open hostility. Glushko ended up working for Chelomey after Korolev pressured Kremlin sponsors to impose Kuznetsov’s engine, a less experienced bureau. As a result, Glushko’s own developments took a back seat. The common cause suffered.

The cost of the Soviet lunar project was no less than a nuclear program. Irrational spending and poor logistics did the rest. The circulating comparison is that of two athletes: one trains with strict discipline; the other also trains but gets distracted by family disputes and part-time jobs. The first almost always wins.

Was the USSR Ready to Fly to the Moon?

Cosmonaut Alexei Leonov, who nearly became the lunar Gagarin, held a different view. He believed the USSR was prepared to fly to the Moon, but indecision by authorities ruined everything. In his memoirs “Two Sides of the Moon” (often translated as "Time of the First"), he asks why, having the opportunity to orbit the Moon six months before the US, it never peine. Six spacecraft flew, he recalls, and none carried a human aboard. Why not at least the fifth or sixth? His answer points to an unreliable launcher, though he himself questions that argument.

The USSR lost the battle for the Moon. US politicians celebrated having shown up the hostile despotism, as Kennedy had requested. But not all Americans shared the president’s rhetoric. Frank Borman, commander of Apollo 8, stated during the lunar mission days that Russian achievements played an important role: the work of Tsiolkovsky and other Soviet scientists, the first satellite, Gagarin’s flight, and Leonov’s first spacewalk.

Why Is the Moon Landing Questioned 55 Years Later?

The debate over the authenticity of the moon landing remains alive. Some participants argue that computing power at the time was insufficient to guide a spacecraft to the Moon. The most repeated response is that onboard computers didn’t need great power: ballistic trajectories were calculated beforehand on Earth, and the pilot’s brain handled the rest. Neil Armstrong, besides being an astronaut, was an exceptional pilot.

Another recurring argument involves current planes and satellites: if 1960s technology was so limited, how do things work today? The comparison turns against those using it. It is also noted that China has orbited the Moon with robots and taken high-resolution images: if US junk weren’t there, they would have exposed it by now.

The strongest argument against conspiracy theories is logistical. Hundreds of thousands of people saw the Saturn V fly, and millions watched on TV. Keeping such a secret for 55 years would require hundreds of thousands of people to stay silent. Moreover, lunar soil samples are still sent to laboratories worldwide: they weigh kilograms, and no probe of that era could bring back that amount. The USSR brought back only a few grams.

Some take skepticism further, claiming the Twin Towers didn’t exist, were holograms, or that the October attacks were allowed by a government to justify military response. These are unsubstantiated claims circulating mixed with the previous ones.

The Bottomless Pit of the Space Race

One school of analysis argues that the space race was a bottomless pit of public spending, a forward escape with no clear economic return. The Internet, it is argued, has been more important than trips to the Moon. Russians would have taken advantage to stop wasting money, while Americans continued acting foolishly for a couple more years.

Others recall that in 1969, 300,000 kilometers were traveled, the Moon was landed on, filmed, and returned from, whereas today a spacecraft on the ISS can remain stranded indefinitely because the capsule can’t withstand atmospheric re-entry. The floating question is why the space race hasn’t advanced at the pace of aviation or satellites. Has no one stepped on Mars in 55 years? Is it so hard to admit it was a propaganda competition?

With these elements, the discussion doesn’t close. The USSR lost the Moon due to internal divisions, delays, and mismanagement. The US won it with a rocket capable of putting more than 100 tons into orbit. Everything else, including skepticism, remains on the table.