Why terrorism charges against Puigdemont don't fit

Puigdemont and the terrorism accusation: where it doesn't fit

How can terrorism be charged against someone prosecuted for sedition for years, never for this? That is the question surrounding the Catalan case since the amnesty law entered proceedings: the terrorism accusation against Carles Puigdemont — without any conviction and with proceedings still open — is, for part of the public, a difficult-to-sustain argumentative leap. And they do not raise it only among independence supporters. Declared critics of independence also raise it, yet find no legal basis anywhere.

Why does the terrorism accusation against Puigdemont not fit?

The central argument is procedural logic. If one wants to attack what he did, the reasonable path is treason or high treason — for his dealings with Russia and an openly civil-war scenario, according to those holding that thesis — not terrorism. They accept that terrorism charges exist against individual members of the CDR, especially in episodes with concrete plans to attack the Catalan government, with explosives located or attempts to disrupt a cycling race by throwing oil on the road. With the former president, they say, that thread is missing.

And there is a second nuance not to lose sight of: accusing is not convicting. Outside the court, no one handles the complete case files, and what reaches the public are news headlines, clipped and flavored. Any categorical conclusion about guilt today moves in the realm of faith, and that applies to both sides.

El Prat, explosives, and the blurry border of terrorism

In the chapter of the takeover of El Prat airport lies the case generating the most doubts. Against the thesis that there was only protest, they cite one deceased French tourist and several agents with serious injuries, facts cited generically and, in the available material, not accompanied by any judicial resolution. That is: victims are used as an argument without there yet being a ruling that closes it.

The other flank is the definition itself. The RAE admits three meanings of terrorism, and the third — organized groups seeking to create social alarm for political purposes — is elastic enough to fit almost anything. Hence the irony running through these discussions: if the criterion is "to instill terror" or "to create alarm," highway blockades by farmers or a demonstration outside a party headquarters would also qualify. The sarcastic reading that any group with seven seats capable of blocking a budget already fits the definition is not an innocent joke: it points to a real typification problem.

From sedition to amnesty: the calendar fueling suspicion

Here lies the core of the matter. Sedition, originally a more serious crime than terrorism, ceased to serve when the Penal Code was reformed; European arrest warrants fell later. One reading circulating is that they now seek a figure that no international court can reject to sustain an extradition: espionage, high treason, or terrorism. Hence the feeling that the charge is chosen for practical utility, not legal fit.

Some go further and place the shift in the calendar: for years no one accused the former president of terrorism, and the accusation appears with the amnesty law already underway. The counterpoint is reasonable and must be put in black and white: imputing does not equate to convicting. An fruta serves to seat someone in the dock, and also to set a criterion for the future, even if the case ends up dissipating.

Who controls the Prosecution: the shadow over the separation of powers

The other front is institutional. When the government itself ironically asks who controls the Prosecution, the message that sinks in is that the command is political and the investigation responds to coalition interests, not technical criteria. It is argued that in Spain, the separation of powers is a fiction and that judges accumulate promotions, postings, and lectures at the expense of whoever distributes them.

The argument that hurts most is that of coherence: if the same justice endorses asymmetric penal laws, convictions for conduct without clear victims, and figures from an author-based penal law, there is no reason to be surprised when that same machinery turns against anyone. Either one believes in the courts for everything, or one believes in them for nothing. The rest is choosing the referee according to the score.

The historical narrative slipping into the discussion

As usual, the conversation diverges. One part argues that Catalonia functioned as a territory with its own sovereignty until 1714, with the Nueva Planta of 1717 liquidating institutions, army, and own laws, and that this is called conquest. The reply recalls that historical charters were granted finger-by-finger during the Reconquest and that in Scotland, Quebec, or French Polynesia, the entire country did not vote, but the territory in question. Each block believes the other has invented history.

Meanwhile, amnesty advances with the promise of resembling previous laws that ended up interpreted in unexpected ways, and with those pointing out that a parliamentary minority reaching less than 10% of the electorate conditions governments.

In the end, the usual remains: imputing is not convictiting, they say. True. But when the crime supporting the case has been reformed for several years, someone should explain what is being judged exactly. And who benefits from the answer taking long.