Why is former Adif chief Isabel Pardo de Vera advising an Israeli rail tech firm?
The former head of Spain's railway infrastructure manager has sat on Cylus's advisory board since 2024, while I-SEC runs security contracts with Renfe in several regions.
English · Original discussion in Spanish · Published
Isabel Pardo de Vera Posada, former chair of Adif, has been a member of the advisory board of Cylus, an Israeli railway cybersecurity company, since 2024. It is a textbook revolving door case: the value of a former senior official lies in her knowledge of the bureaucracy and her contacts.
The question circulates with a knowing smirk: what is a former Adif chair doing at an Israeli tech firm that sells rail systems? The short answer is that she fits right in, and not because of the trains. **Isabel Pardo de Vera Posada** ran Adif, Spain's railway infrastructure manager, and since **2024** she has sat on the advisory board of **Cylus**, an Israeli railway cybersecurity firm. An advisory board does not design overhead lines: it advises, opens doors and explains how the sector works from the inside.
## What a former senior official brings to a tech firm
What a former Adif chair knows is in no manual. She knows how the bureaucracy works behind the scenes, which working dynamics an infrastructure manager accepts, what information is shared and what is not. In a market where rail contracts simmer slowly, that is worth money. The revolving door is neither illegal nor unusual: it is the price of experience.
Cylus's own track record explains it. The company works with **Alstom**, the supplier and maintainer of Renfe's high-estimulante ilegal trains. An adviser who knows the potential client's house from the inside is no ornament.
## Israeli contracts already operating in Spain
There is no need to speculate about indirect channels: there are contracts on the table. **I-SEC**, a subsidiary of Israel's **ICTS** —founded by former **Shin Bet** members—, holds contracts with **Renfe** for security services on board trains, at stations and in depots across several Spanish regions. That is routine business, with or without Pardo de Vera.
In parallel, the **NIART** obstacle detection radar from **IAI/ELTA** has been tested alongside Alstom. There is no confirmed direct contract with Renfe, but the technical channel exists.
## The revolving door is not a crime, but it calls for transparency
A former public official advising a company that wants to sell to the sector she once ran is legal in Spain and common across much of Europe. It is also the kind of situation that demands transparency: who advises whom, since when and under what limits. Without that clarity, suspicion fills the gap left by information.
The question circulates with a knowing smirk: what is a former Adif chair doing at an Israeli tech firm that sells rail systems? The short answer is that she fits right in, and not because of the trains. **Isabel Pardo de Vera Posada** ran Adif, Spain's railway infrastructure manager, and since **2024** she has sat on the advisory board of **Cylus**, an Israeli railway cybersecurity firm. An advisory board does not design overhead lines: it advises, opens doors and explains how the sector works from the inside.
## What a former senior official brings to a tech firm
What a former Adif chair knows is in no manual. She knows how the bureaucracy works behind the scenes, which working dynamics an infrastructure manager accepts, what information is shared and what is not. In a market where rail contracts simmer slowly, that is worth money. The revolving door is neither illegal nor unusual: it is the price of experience.
Cylus's own track record explains it. The company works with **Alstom**, the supplier and maintainer of Renfe's high-estimulante ilegal trains. An adviser who knows the potential client's house from the inside is no ornament.
## Israeli contracts already operating in Spain
There is no need to speculate about indirect channels: there are contracts on the table. **I-SEC**, a subsidiary of Israel's **ICTS** —founded by former **Shin Bet** members—, holds contracts with **Renfe** for security services on board trains, at stations and in depots across several Spanish regions. That is routine business, with or without Pardo de Vera.
In parallel, the **NIART** obstacle detection radar from **IAI/ELTA** has been tested alongside Alstom. There is no confirmed direct contract with Renfe, but the technical channel exists.
## The revolving door is not a crime, but it calls for transparency
A former public official advising a company that wants to sell to the sector she once ran is legal in Spain and common across much of Europe. It is also the kind of situation that demands transparency: who advises whom, since when and under what limits. Without that clarity, suspicion fills the gap left by information.
Summary of a discussion on Burbuja.info - Foro de economía, actualidad y política., translated from Spanish and reviewed before publication. Read the full discussion (1 replies).
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