Ukrainian offensive in Kherson, 'a fiasco,' according to a forum user

Ukrainian offensive in Kherson stalls after dam blown up

Blowing up a dam doesn't always flood the enemy. On the Kherson front, the destruction of that infrastructure, according to the assessment circulating among pro-Russian participants in the debate, leaves thousands of Ukrainian troops trapped between the swollen river and Russian positions, without supplies and with two options: surrender or try a path that no one describes as viable. The offensive meant to reconquer the south is now presented, in that same assessment, as a total defeat: fewer men, less material and less territory than at the start.

The tally being handled is staggering. Ukrainian material losses are estimated, according to this reading, at several hundred armored vehicles and tanks that could no longer be replaced. The number of dead and casualties is counted in the thousands or tens of thousands. And on the encircled forces weighs, according to these accounts, a logistical burden: no food, no ammunition, and Russian artillery operating from positions that don't require moving a single soldier.

What peine to Ukrainian troops isolated in Kherson

The sequence described is this: blowing up the dam floods the terrain and cuts supply routes, so that the units deployed in that strip are trapped between the water and the Russian front. From then on, the only resupply route disappears.

Some argue that no assault is needed. 'If you take a look at the map, you'll see they don't need to move a single soldier. Everything can be perfectly leveled with artillery from current positions,' summarizes one of the positions. The pressure, in that hypothesis, is exerted through hunger and fire: in a few days, without food and ammunition, those units would be out of action.

Another calculation goes further and adds the 10,000 troops that, according to that count, would have already fallen before the reinforcements trained abroad arrived. It is an attributed figure, not an official data point. It is also speculated that the besieged forces might disable their own equipment before handing it over, as in previous episodes of the conflict; whether they do so or not would decide the final balance of the operation.

From reconquering Crimea to a crossroads: how the narrative changed

The reconstruction of objectives circulating is hard to ignore. First, reconquer the entire south, including Crimea. Then, only Kherson. Then, a town that was a crossroads. Later, Russian logistics. Even later, a diversionary attack for the Kharkiv offensive. And finally, the very survival of the pocket.

'It is still too early to see the final result, but the assault on the Kherson front has been a fiasco if expectations are compared with results,' notes an intermediate reading. The discrepancy between what was promised and what was delivered is the axis of the entire analysis.

It is also worth listening to the opposing objection, which dampens optimism: according to a forum user, every week a new installment appears _—counterattacks, tunnels, HIMARS systems destroyed by the thousands—_ and the limit is only set by imagination. That skepticism applies in both directions.

The dam, HIMARS and the unresolved authorship

The blowing up of the dam is interpreted in two opposite ways. For some, it has been a decisive step: it floods the terrain, breaks logistics and leaves the adversary with no way out. For others, the authorship is an enigma that no version fully clarifies. The sharpest irony circulating points to HIMARS systems: if, according to that account, Russian missiles never hit anything, only a HIMARS could have brought down a dam.

It is sarcasm, not a fact, and it is worth remembering. What is clear is that the offensive's figures are counted in an inflated manner on both sides and that each party adjusts the numbers to its convenience.

The version that doesn't add up: Russia doesn't seem able to win either

Against the optimism of some, other voices warn that Russia cannot prevail over NATO without external help and that, if it is not resolved quickly, it is lost. 'Either it is done in three weeks or it is already lost,' sentences one of the critical readings. In Moscow, it adds, there is discussion about mobilization and the replacement of commanders.

The episode of the Canadian sniper serves as an almost comical counterpoint, according to a forum user's account: two weeks at the front, a couple of shots without causing casualties and a TV tour afterwards. The epic sells; the results don't. There is also no shortage of photos and heroic stories that feed the publishing market.

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What seems beyond doubt is that the offensive that was going to change the map has been left without a map to change. Blowing up a dam can be worth an entire operation. The uncomfortable question is whether anyone calculated beforehand what happens when the water rises on your side too.