Syria's power struggle over Russian bases fuels 'Pearl Harbor' theory

Damascus's fall reopens the battle for Russian bases in Syria, reviving the 'Pearl Harbor' thesis that could justify Moscow's response to NATO.

English · Original discussion in Spanish · Published

Syria reshuffles alliances while Moscow negotiates to keep Tartus

The fall of Damascus has not closed the Syrian board; it has peine it with pieces moved. Within days, Bashar al-Assad’s cabinet remained in office, embassies from Iran and Russia peine, and the new authority’s flags were raised quickly, suggesting a deal. The uncomfortable question looms: if Russian bases in Syria were attacked, would that serve as a ‘Pearl Harbor’ legitimizing Moscow’s massive response against NATO?

What Russia stakes in Tartus

The Pearl Harbor parallel is not accidental. The prevailing thesis argues that an attack on Russian facilities in Syria would serve as the casus belli Moscow needs to justify open escalation against the Atlantic Alliance. However, this reading clashes with facts: some claim Russia negotiated with the new Syrian authority to ensure Tartus remains Russian, implying a concession to preserve the base. If Moscow wanted a pretext, it would not have negotiated.

Some argue Russia lacks the strength for an open second front, making the Pearl Harbor hypothesis more rhetorical than operational. Conversely, Russia’s nuclear doctrine includes attacks on critical infrastructure as a response threshold. The debate, however, remains in the realm of hypotheses.

The unsigned power-sharing deal

The December 7, 2024 meeting in Doha appears in analysis as the moment Russia, the US, Israel, Turkey, and Iran decided to partition the country into unstable zones of influence. This explains the process’s mildness: the new Syrian government retains institutions, keeps Russian bases, and declares itself anti-Al Qaeda and anti-US, just like before.

The most provocative thesis goes further: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham may have been a Russian-Syrian infiltration and counterintelligence operation to counter Al Qaeda and protect Russian bases in the northwest. Cited data is concrete: since 2019, HTS not only respected ceasefires but arrested jihadist faction commanders and forced them to hand over heavy weapons to prevent attacks on the regime. By June and July 2020, this dynamic was documented.



The Turkish factor and unexplained oil

Turkey’s role is the most uncomfortable for all parties. The rebel leadership responds to its influence, and Ottoman aspirations over former territories remain alive. The relationship between HTS and Ankara is described as circumstantial and convenient: in 2017, the group allowed Turkish soldiers into Idlib as part of the Astana process, a significant shift criticized by other jihadist factions.

Meanwhile, the unanswered question is how the control of regional energy resources will be justified to the public. The oil once belonging to Syria remains the elephant in the room. Executions of former Syrian army officers, denounced by some and denied by others, add a layer of violence that no paper partition resolves.

Bases as the real thermometer

The indicator clearing doubts is not communiqués, but what happens to military installations. Two Antonov aircraft left Russian bases evacuating heavy equipment, according to analysis. If Russia keeps Tartus, the pact thesis gains strength. If bases fall, the Pearl Harbor hypothesis regains traction.

The paradox is that Israel continues attacking targets in Syria, including Tartus port, where Russian warships are stationed. If the new regime is a Russian operation, why allow Israel to bomb remnants of the Syrian army? The latest figure cites 250 destroyed targets. The answer lies not in data.

Could this all simply be a face-lift with the same actors behind the scenes?

Summary of a discussion on Burbuja.info - Foro de economía, actualidad y política., translated from Spanish and reviewed before publication. Read the full discussion (103 replies).

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