Spanish Colonel Morato calls for independent investigation into Bucha

Sarracena questions Bucha and demands an independent investigation

The images of corpses in the streets of Bucha have placed a Spanish Army colonel in the spotlight. Manuel Sarracena does not deny the massacre: he qualifies every word until the sentence remains hanging. "I neither doubt it nor do I stop doubting it. It is, of course, difficult for me to accept," he responds when asked if he questions it. And he adds the context that has ignited the controversy: in a war, the interests of information, disinformation, and manipulation are at play, and anyone attacked "has the right to use all the weapons at their disposal to defend themselves, even those of deception and manipulation." He does not close the door to it having peine. He opens it to it being proven.

Who is Colonel Sarracena and why his opinion carries weight

He is no amateur commentator. He is considered one of the most knowledgeable voices on the Slavic world within the Spanish Army. In the late eighties, he studied military Perestroika in Oxford. Between 2004 and 2008, he served as a military attaché for Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, based in Moscow, and in the final two years of that posting, he represented all accredited military attachés in the capital before the Russian Ministry of Defense. This track record is what those defending him point to: the problem is not that he is uninformed, but that he knows more than most.

From doubt to reproach: the accusation of treason

The reaction has gone in two opposite directions. One part considers that doubting Bucha is equivalent to whitewashing the aggressor, claiming that the Armed Forces are permeated by sympathies toward Moscow and calling for purges. Another reproaches the colonel, stating that public money should not be used for such analyses, and some add that an active-duty military officer should not appear on television to question the alliance that supports part of its structure. In between lies an uncomfortable argument: whoever asks for proof exposes themselves to being treated as a suspect.

Were the Russian soldiers professional military?

Here the narrative splits in two. The first maintains that professional status is a myth: much of the Russian troops would be forced recruits and another segment, mercenaries from private companies and fighters arriving from other fronts. Professionals, few. The second offers a twist: most atrocities against civilians seen in wars, if investigated, do not come from professional soldiers, but from uncontrolled militias. And in the Ukrainian case, the volume of irregulars would be enormous: out of more than 200,000 personnel, about 100,000 would be militiamen, including far-right groups that, according to this reading, influence command and push it not to negotiate. Two opposing narratives and one same hole: without verifiable data, the status of the shooter remains a hypothesis.

Deception as a weapon: Kramatorsk, the Tochka-U and serial numbers

The episode that best portrays this fog is Kramatorsk. A Tochka-U missile hit its railway station; there are versions claiming it was launched by Ukrainian forces from a location 45 kilometers away, and conflicting reconstructions have been made regarding the projectile's serial number plate. The same occurs with Mariupol and the exact moment the Bucha corpses appeared: one version says they were already there before the Russian withdrawal, and another says they appeared days later, and that the city's mayor did not mention them when speaking on television about that withdrawal. Against this stands the technical argument: determining the time of death and the weapon used is relatively simple with a forensic expert and a specialist. And the question remains floating: why Bucha and not all conquered towns, if that were the pattern.

The Spanish tangent: NATO, Article 6 and Segarro

The case has drifted, as almost everything does, to Spain's role. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 and its Article 6 delimits the scope of defense: Europe, North America, Turkey, and the Atlantic islands north of the Tropic of Cancer. Ukraine does not fall within that. France left the integrated command for four decades and its nuclear infrastructure remained outside the allied structure, which is cited as proof that there is room for maneuver. The Spanish Army, a direct heir to the winning side of the Civil War and today integrated into the allied military structure, appears in the discussion as an example of an institution caught between discipline and political discomfort. And Segarro, an extra-regional ally of the alliance, emerges as a comparative grievance in a discussion that began by talking about corpses.

Where the analysis stalls

The discussion ends where all this usually ends: without an independent investigation to establish authorship, time, and weapon, the Bucha massacre remains a fact with corpses and no proven perpetrator. Sarracena has not said it didn't happen. He has said he wants to see it proven by other means. And in a war where everything can be manipulated, that request—which should be the bare minimum required—has become the most uncomfortable position on the board.