Spain's Union of Fighting Parties Proposes Electoral Strategy Protocol

The electoral program of the Spanish group Unión de Partidos Luchadores does not propose concrete measures: it proposes a method. Two four-rule checklists decide whether to confront or pact, and two lists of checkboxes choose against whom to compete and with whom to collaborate.

There are electoral programs that promise tax cuts, others that promise trains. This one promises something different: a way to decide. The document by **Unión de Partidos Luchadores** contains not a single sectoral measure. It contains two decision protocols and two lists of checkboxes to mark.

## Two questions and four outcomes

The first block is called "general political program for competition." It works with two binary-response questions: if the opponent seeks to weaken our political position and if we have sufficient resources to confront directly. Each combination of true and false has its assigned task.

If both answers are true, it is time to launch a public contrast campaign or present an alternative legislative initiative. If there is a threat but resources are lacking, the text mandates strengthening the social base or seeking temporary tactical alliances. When there is no threat and yes resources, the instruction is to monitor the adversary or prepare a platform for own proposal. And if both fail, consolidate internal identity or avoid unnecessary confrontation.

The block repeats at the exit with the same two questions. Tasks change: media pressure, formal public debate, retreat to local terrain, negotiation from weakness, proactive offensive, occupation of neglected institutional spaces, passive surveillance, or cadre training. Eight possible outcomes for four scenarios.

## Collaboration also has its checkbox

The second protocol replicates the structure for allies. The questions are if the potential ally shares our main political objectives and if there is mutual trust with open communication channels. With both true, formal coalition or joint legislative agenda. With shared objectives but without trust, prior dialogue or limited cooperation agreement.

The most revealing part is in the negative scenario. If the ally does not share objectives but there is trust, the text allows maintaining a cordial relationship without programmatic commitment. If both fail, collaboration is not initiated or is limited to sporadic information exchange. The outcome even contemplates dissolving collaboration and moving to a purely institutional relationship.

## Checkboxes decide enemy and partner

The third part of the document is a list of ten checkboxes to mark what to compete against. Among the options are an opposition political party, a specific government policy, established economic interests, dominant narrative in the media, current electoral system, administrative bureaucracy, rival political leader, contrary ideology, barriers to entry for new actors, and coordinated disinformation. There is a free section to add another thing.

The fourth list does the same with collaborators: like-minded party, social movement, union, NGO, academic institution, allied local or regional government, activist network, independent media, international coalition, and shared legislative initiative. Another blank checkbox at the end.

## A party that looks like a manual

Read coldly, the document looks less like an electoral program than a procedure manual for an organization that has not yet decided what it is. There is no healthcare, no education, no taxation. There is a decision tree. Politics is reduced to a two-variable matrix where the adversary and the ally are interchangeable entities depending on the moment.

It is a way of organizing, not a country project. And it is worth remembering that an electoral program is a declaration of intentions, not a contract: what a party does later with those checkboxes will depend on who marks them.