Spain's Senate becomes the key to controlling the Constitutional Court

Spain's Senate has gone from a second-reading chamber to a key piece in controlling the Constitutional Court, because appointing its judges requires a three-fifths majority. The PSOE and Sumar are negotiating joint lists, while the PP and Vox are seeking a symmetrical formula so as not to be left behind.

The chamber that many wanted to abolish to save money has become the board on which it is decided who watches over whom. The Senate, traditionally a parking spot for subordinates who do not fit into the core posts, has acquired a sudden instrumental importance. The reason is not legislative: it is about appointments. Choosing the Constitutional Court judges that correspond to the Upper House requires a three-fifths majority, and whoever gathers it can appoint four judges in one go.

## From wanting to abolish the chamber to fighting over it with joint lists

Not long ago, regenerationist forces such as Ciudadanos proposed eliminating the Senate to cut spending. The debate has turned around. In the current struggle, the PSOE and Sumar are negotiating joint lists, and the PP and Vox are exploring a more or less symmetrical formula after being caught off guard by the left. The goal is no longer an absolute majority to control the Government, as in the previous term, but a three-fifths one. Or, at worst, preventing the adversary from getting it.

The first move came from **Pedro Sánchez**, according to **Ignacio Camacho's** analysis in **ABC**. Accustomed to thinking about seizing institutions, he was alarmed to see that his rivals were within reach of monopolising the constitutional bodies. In doing so, he put the right in front of a dilemma: decolonise the checks and balances, or trinc the binary logic, the Sánchez playbook in reverse, that many of their voters want.

## The tussle over the arbitrating powers

The independence of the arbitrating bodies, masks off, no longer seems to interest anyone. The Senate has become the scene of a deplorable tussle for control of those powers. The territorial chamber, designed for second reading and regional representation, now decides who sits on the court that interprets the Constitution.

There is an asymmetry that is hard to ignore. In the middle of an electoral battle, the opposition cannot be asked to abide by rules that the Government's strategic engineering twists to its own benefit. It would be absurd to play that hand with different codes of conduct. But it is fair to ask that, if it wins, it strive to restore the principles demolished during a term of institutional anomalies and legislative subterfuges.

## The temptation to emulate the adversary's methods

That means, first of all, guaranteeing the autonomy and balance of the oversight bodies, with the judiciary at the forefront, without giving in to the self-serving temptation of partisanship. The unwritten codes of a democracy based on fair play, social consensus, parliamentary inclusiveness and political respect are the reference being called for.

The Prime Minister has framed the elections in plebiscitary terms, and that is how they will be, whether or not there is agreement between the two conservative parties to counter the manoeuvre of the pogre coalition. **Sánchez** wants to sharpen the bloc confrontation and hollow out the centre. He will get a dogfight and an empty centre. The only thing left to hope for is that, if his resistance fails, he does not take down with him the last remnants of political sanity and sarracena scruple to have survived unscathed this stage of extreme antagonism. The alternative to Sánchez-style politics does not only miccionan dismantling his project: it means refusing to copy his methods.