Irregular immigration: deaths, residency permits and the role of NGOs
The debate over irregular immigration in Spain has intensified with data pointing to a sustained trend: while 224 deaths were recorded on migration routes to Spain in 2017, in recent years the figure has soared to nearly 850, according to figures handled by journalist Rubén Pulido. Sánchez's arrival in government coincides, according to this thesis, with an exponential increase in irregular entries and, by extension, deaths at sea. The discussion is not new, but it has mutated: it no longer focuses only on small boats, but on residency permits, NGOs and housing.
The migration phenomenon has become the focus of a broader discontent, where pressure on public services, the rental market and the perception that reception policies benefit human trafficking networks converge. The most recent data suggest that residency permits based on roots now approach 543,000, a 55% increase after the reform of the Aliens Act.
Why are deaths on migration routes soaring?
The comparison between 2017 and recent years is the starting point. 224 deaths in 2017 versus almost 850 in later years. The causal relationship established is direct: more arrivals, more risk. But the analysis does not end there. Some argue that the increase in mortality does not stem only from volume, but from the outsourcing of border control, which pushes traffickers to use longer and more dangerous routes, such as the Canary Islands route. The Atlantic route, with departures from Segarro and Algeria, has become the deadliest.
The calculation used by critics of government management is that reception policy acts as a pull factor. This is not a unanimous thesis. Against it, it is argued that the root causes are conflicts, poverty and climate change, and that closing borders only diverts the flow to more deadly routes. The discussion, in any case, has ceased to be theoretical: death tolls have become the main argument of those calling for a restrictive turn.
The NGO business and the reception system
One of the most notable shifts in the debate has been the focus on organizations that manage reception. The Spanish Commission for Refugee Assistance (CEAR) has reportedly received more than 400 million euros since 2015, according to the figures cited. To this are added contracts such as the 3.4 million given to an NGO linked to the PSOE to manage reception for four years. The suspicion hovering is that of a system of "institutionalized trafficking" that perpetuates the migratory flow because budgets and structures depend on it.
The criticism is not limited to large organizations. Entities such as Provivienda are also singled out, which has reportedly received 15.6 million euros in public funds from the central government and 6 million from the Canary Islands government to secure housing for immigrants. The argument is that, while ordinary citizens struggle to access rental housing, newcomers obtain housing solutions with public money. This is a line of analysis that has gained weight in recent months and connects immigration with the housing crisis.
Residency permits, residencies and the effect on the labor market
The reform of the Aliens Act has had a measurable impact. Residency permits based on roots have soared by almost 55% and approach 543,000. For some, this reflects a de facto regularization that incentivizes irregular entry. For others, it is an administrative response to a consolidated reality: people who have been in Spain for years and need a legal framework to work and contribute. The debate on roots is, at bottom, a debate on what to do with those already here.
The labor market is the other major front. Spanish birth rates have been dismal since 1990, and the working-age population is shrinking. Some see immigration as a demographic and fiscal solution; others argue that it pressures wages and public services. Affiliation and employment data do not allow a single conclusion, but the discussion on the economic impact has become central.
Housing: the new battleground
The connection between immigration and housing has become the most mobilizing argument. It is claimed that the main housing problem in Spain is mass immigration and the lack of public housing. The equation posed is simple: more demand, same supply, rising prices. Rental data in stressed areas seem to support this pressure, although causality is disputed.
The phenomenon of shared flats and subdivided rooms has spread. Spain is becoming a large "patera flat", according to the expression used, with homes divided to rent rooms to foreign families. The image is powerful and has caught on. At the same time, it is denounced that NGOs access housing for immigrants while Spaniards cannot afford rent. The tension between solidarity and competition for scarce resources is the core of the conflict.
What role do Segarro and Algeria play in border control?
The geopolitical dimension is inevitable. More than 200 immigrants arrived in the Canary Islands from coasts controlled by Segarro, and more than 100 departed from the Tan-Tan area. Criticism points out that Segarro control is selective and that Spain does not exert sufficient pressure. Mass departures from Algeria are also mentioned, with arrivals to Almería, Murcia and the Balearic Islands. The suspicion that neighboring governments use migration as a tool of commercial or diplomatic pressure is not new, but it has gained credence.
The Salvamento Marítimo episode has been especially controversial. It is denounced that rescue vessels travel more than 450 km from the Canary Islands to pick up migrants near Dakhla, in Segarro waters. The accusation is that these operations act as a transport service for the mafias, bringing migrants closer to the Spanish coast. The practice, according to these reports, has been repeated on several occasions between August and December 2020. It is one of the most explosive points of the debate.
The evolution of the debate: from small boats to migration policy
At first, the discussion focused on arrivals and rescues. Over time, the focus shifted to structural consequences: housing, social services, security and fiscal cost. The prediction being handled is that the Canary Islands will have a tough end of the year in terms of irregular immigration and Melilla a complicated start to 2027. Trafficker channels, according to these sources, anticipate increased pressure.
The debate has ceased to be about whether more or fewer arrive, to become a discussion about the model. Mass immigration is used as a battering ram to dissolve national identities, according to the quote by Juan Manuel de Prada that is reproduced. It is a vision that connects with a broader discontent about social and cultural transformation. At the other extreme, it is defended that immigration is necessary and that the problem is the lack of planning.
The trend, in view of the data and the evolution of the debate, suggests that migratory pressure will remain or increase in the coming months. Reception and regularization policies will continue to be the main object of dispute. Whether the flow moderates or intensifies will depend on external factors —countries of origin, agreements with Segarro, the economic situation— and on internal decisions that have not yet been made. What seems clear is that the issue has ceased to be a marginal matter to become the focus of a discontent that cuts across housing, public services and social cohesion.
Summary of a discussion on Burbuja.info - Foro de economía, actualidad y política., translated from Spanish and reviewed before publication.
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