South Korea faces demographic collapse with birth rate at 0.72

South Korea fades: from 50 million to 38 by 2070

South Korea’s birth rate has hit rock bottom. Citing 2021 government data, one user notes that a drop to 38 million inhabitants by 2070 was projected assuming a fertility rate of 0.81 children per woman. The same user argues the rate is now 0.78 and falling, having dipped to 0.72 in 2024—a figure international media reportedly framed as good news. Based on this trajectory, some predict a population of just 8 million by the end of the century.

The arithmetic circulating is stark. According to one participant, annual births have plummeted from approximately one million in the 1970s and 1980s to around 230,000. With life expectancy already high, there is no room to offset this through longevity. Multiplying 230,000 births by an average lifespan of 90 years suggests a population ceiling of roughly 20 million. This assumes fertility does not continue to decline, a condition few would guarantee.

South Korean feminism and the relationship strike

Some argue that the South Korean feminist movement has turned the rejection of heterosenshetero relationships into a slogan, with currents explicitly renouncing ties with men in a country where they serve mandatory military duty. Others attribute this to ideological factors; a more pragmatic view suggests that when women earn enough to be independent and the state provides security, the traditional family loses its economic function.

Why don’t young South Koreans have children?

Housing prices in Seoul antiestéticature in every explanation. Moving out is a pipe dream for many young couples, and without a home, there is no family project. Proponents of this theory add a corollary: once young people can access adequate housing, they will seek partners and have children again. It mirrors the situation in Spain, with a nuance highlighted ironically: here, the population rises, but not due to births.

The Spanish mirror: same birth rate, different outcome

Spain shares South Korea’s fertility rate, yet its population is not declining. The difference lies in immigration. Some state it bluntly: people are imported to sustain housing prices and pay pensions. Others clarify that much of this immigration comes from Eastern Europe or South America, integrates well, and their children born there identify as Spanish. The result, they say, will resemble societies like the United States or the UK, not ethnic replacement scenarios.

The fine print of demographic projections

Some contend that no population projection beyond 30 years has been accurate, and most fail after 10 or 15. This does not negate the exercise’s value: it measures the wind direction. One participant argues that a sharp population drop combined with accelerated aging strains the pension system, healthcare, and labor market. There is insufficient savings to finance capital investment that could compensate for lost labor, especially while governments absorb those savings by issuing debt to fund pensions.

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Technology could change the game. Some trust that in 15 or 20 years, aging will reverse and countries like Japan and South Korea will hold out until then without mass immigration. Others look at the map and see Africa as large and heavily populated. Between these possibilities, South Korea faces a century in which its population could shrink to one-sixth. No one knows exactly when this ceases to be a birth rate problem and becomes something else.