Simeone's property empire: 180 Madrid flats acquired through his company

Simeone now manages 180 flats: property as a savings haven

One hundred and eighty apartments. Seven buildings. And a company, Carpersim SL, with assets nearing €40 million. The real estate portfolio that Diego Pablo Simeone and Carla Pereyra have built in Madrid—revealed in a report published in April 2026—is not a millionaire's eccentricity: it reflects what has been favored for years by historically low interest rates and a tax framework that treats housing as the best available pension plan. The Atlético coach buys well-located flats, renovates them, and rents them to middle-to-high-income students, executives, and tourists. Nothing he does is illegal. And that's precisely where the discussion begins.

What Carpersim SL's accounts reveal

The figures come from the financial statements filed with the Mercantile Registry. The company has assets nearing €40 million, with approximately €13.8 million accounted for as real estate investments and over €19 million in tangible fixed assets. The net worth, close to €20 million, has been entirely contributed by the family. Operations are professionalized: a large portion of the apartments are marketed through MyLocation, their own rental platform, allowing end-to-end control of the product. In 2024, turnover—practically all from rental income—tripled compared to the previous year, exceeding €330,000.

The project continues to grow. In Tres Cantos, two buildings with 140 apartments are under construction, financed by family contributions and bank loans. The plan, as described by Pereyra herself, was to build from scratch: moving from managing a few flats for students to overseeing a structure with 180 apartments and seven buildings. A textbook retirement plan, but on a scale that already competes with specialized groups.

Why money ends up in flats, not industrial warehouses

The criticism is not directed at real estate in general, but at the chosen asset. Simeone could have invested in commercial spaces, industrial warehouses, agricultural land, stocks, or financing startups. He chose the only market where its profitability directly clashes with the basic need of an average family: shelter. Some argue it's not a whim, but a calculation: it's where money yields with fewer risks and better tax treatment.

On this point, the most frequent criticism targets the framework, not the coach. As long as accumulating residential housing offers tax and legal advantages, capital will do what it knows best. The grimmest scenario considered is one of scale: if nothing is restricted, concentration could reach half the market in five or six decades. Currently, large holders—owning more than ten properties—are estimated to control around 10% of the rental market. The percentage is low because the phenomenon is recent: four decades ago, the concept didn't even exist.

Would building more housing be enough to lower rents?

Here, consensus breaks down. For some analysts, the problem is supply: too many hurdles to building and too few developments. The opposing argument claims that this supply never reaches the end buyer. If the number of new buildings in Madrid were to triple tomorrow, there would be enough investor capital to absorb them, keep prices high, and exclude those aspiring to own a single home. Building extensively, in this scenario, doesn't lower prices: it enriches the portfolios of those who already own property.

Added to this is legal certainty. With eviction processes complicated when a tenant stops paying, a portion of the housing stock is directly withdrawn from the market. Then there are the fine details of licenses, deadlines, and construction costs, which no one disputes and everyone cites as a brake.

What's the real return on a rental flat?

The figure that frames the discussion is profitability. A flat costing €600,000 and rented for €600 per month yields a 1% gross return: no one gets involved for that. The typical return on residential rental properties ranges between 6% and 7% gross, according to industry calculations. With these figures, the business is not a quick win, but a slow money-making machine with many management headaches.

However, exceptions exist that change everything: buying in areas not yet revalued. The specific case presented—purchase of €75,000, €850 monthly rent, current sale value €110,000—yields a 10% net return and 30% annually including capital gains. The complete arithmetic, broken down by taxes, community fees, and insurance, explains why institutional money continues to flow into housing.

The elephant in the room: demand, empty homes, and large holders

Madrid receives around 100,000 new residents annually since 2012-2013, according to cited figures. This influx strains a housing stock that isn't growing at the same pace. Regarding the approximately 300,000 empty homes counted in the capital fifteen years ago, there are two opposing interpretations: that they were unrehabilitated ruins costing hundreds of thousands of euros to fix, or that there was a large number of owners willing to let them decay rather than rent them out. Neither has been proven with the certainty its proponents demand.

What is on the table are proposals: limits on the number of properties based on ownership (national, foreign, or corporate), revision of tax deductions and subsidies, and taxes to reduce rental profitability. Added to this, in the same package, are more construction and social housing with prices regulated indefinitely. No one promises it will be enough.

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How much of this is a coach with a nose for real estate, and how much is a system that turns housing into the most profitable and least penalized asset? The former is fixed, if at all, on the field. The latter requires legislation, and so far, no one has presented a formula that satisfies landlords, tenants, and the state treasury simultaneously.