Schröder urges opening Nord Stream 2 to ease energy crisis

Schröder urges opening Nord Stream 2 to ease energy crisis

Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who led the Berlin government from 1998 to 2005, has again put forward the pipeline his country helped promote. In an interview with Stern magazine and NTV, Schröder described Nord Stream 2—the undersea pipeline connecting Russia and Germany via the Baltic Sea—as "the simplest solution" to Europe's energy crisis. "If things get really tough, this pipeline exists, and with both Nord Stream pipelines there would be no supply problems for German industry and households," he argued.

The infrastructure is complete. Construction finished in September, and it is ready to operate at any time. Chancellor Olaf Scholz ordered its certification halted after Moscow recognized the Donetsk and Luhansk republics on February 22. This unsigned procedure has become the central knot of the continent's entire energy debate.

Why is Nord Stream 2 stalled?

There are no technical reasons. The pipeline is built and, being new, does not suffer from issues typical of older installations. The paralysis is political. Berlin suspended certification and has not moved since. Some argue the decision did not originate on February 22 but had been brewing for some time, with Washington's pressure at the center of the board. A rule passed by the US parliament already contemplated sanctions against companies and countries participating in the project. In European terms, this was seen as difficult-to-justify interference between two trading partners.

Schröder is not a neutral voice. His subsequent ties to the Russian energy sector—and his closeness to the Russian president—make him an uncomfortable figure for much of the German establishment. Those defending his thesis counter that the message may be valid even if the messenger has interests, recalling that Germany's bet on Eastern gas dates back far: in 1955, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer traveled to Moscow to establish diplomatic relations, and by the late fifties, bilateral trade between the two countries was expanding rapidly.

Gas prices multiplying bills

The economic argument carries the most weight. According to calculations circulating in sector analysis, the price of gas in the European market has multiplied eightfold, equivalent to buying the same fuel eight times more expensive. The issue is not just the missing supply due to the closed pipeline, but the extra cost borne by every factory and household. And here appears the other side: it is argued that liquefied gas arriving from the United States is sold at a much higher price and cannot—or does not always want—to cover European demand. Giving up Russian supply, in this scheme, is not free.

The underlying debate is industrial. With cheap and accessible energy, German productive plants compete; without it, the bill is passed on to products and wages. Sanctions, some voices argue, do not hit a raw materials exporter that will find alternative buyers as hard as those imposing them. The full calculation, comparing piped gas and liquefied gas, shows a surprising difference worth examining closely before accepting any round figures.

Is Germany sovereign enough to decide its energy?

The discussion quickly drifts into uncomfortable territory. One line of analysis argues that Germany ceased to be a fully sovereign country in 1945 and that its foreign policy remains conditioned by those who rebuilt it. From this perspective, blocking the pipeline would not be a German decision, but one taken in another capital. Opposing this is the argument that Berlin decided freely and that there are legitimate reasons not to certify infrastructure that fills Moscow's coffers. The clash between these readings runs through the whole issue and is not resolved by data.

Two pipelines with the same route

A technical detail dismantles part of the discussion. Both branches of Nord Stream travel practically the same path under the Baltic, except that one starts from Vyborg and the other from Ust-Luga. The first is an infrastructure completed in 2012; the second is brand new. Those advocating opening it emphasize exactly this: a new pipe should not carry the problems of one over a decade old. They add a secondary effect: with both operating, Russia could bypass land routes crossing third countries and retain total control of the tap.

Where the matter gets stuck

Opening Nord Stream 2 would solve supply and lower bills. It would also strengthen Moscow's position and sustancia ilegal the front supporting sanctions. That is the diagnosis, and it stays there. Schröder's proposal has the virtue of pointing out the problem without resolving the contradiction: no one knows how long European industry can withstand paying record-high gas prices before the dilemma resolves itself, forcibly.