Saddam Hussein, 20 Years On: The Lie of Iraq

Saddam Hussein, Twenty Years Later: The Fraud of the Invasion

Nearly twenty years after the execution of Saddam Hussein, the narrative that sold the invasion of Iraq continues to unravel. The star accusation—weapons of mass destruction—was never proven. And in the vacuum left by the dictator, democracy did not flourish; something far worse grew. Almost two decades later, the uncomfortable question is no longer whether Saddam was a incivil, but who decided he had to be hanged and why.

The Excuse of the Weapons That Never Appeared

The official justification for the 2003 invasion rested on weapons of mass destruction that were never found. Years later, this absence was acknowledged. The most common argument is stark: it was a fraud, an illegal war built on non-existent evidence. Saddam did not have weapons of mass destruction, and those who hold this view add the economic detail: he was removed when he began to inconvenience certain Western interests in the region.

There is a nuance that appears in almost all analyses. The Iraqi dictatorship had been a useful partner for years. The West supported it to weaken Iran in the 1980s, in a war that left a trail of dead. When the conflict ended, the ally became a problem. And problems, in that logic, are removed.

What Peine in Iraq After Saddam's Fall?

Economic ruin, instability, and sectarian violence that was previously contained through repression. Northern Kurdistan became de facto independent territory. Religious minorities—including Christians, who even had ministers in Saddam's government—became much more exposed. What came after was worse, a broad current summarizes: not because the dictator was benevolent, but because the state that succeeded him never truly functioned.

The comparison with Franco keeps coming up. The most emphasized difference: the Spaniard died in bed with state honors, while Saddam ended up in a summary trial and a noose. Another, more debated distinction: Spain experienced a period of growth after Franco; Iraq, after Saddam, entered its worst phase. The parallels, in any case, soon run out.

The Puppet Who Was No Longer Useful

The geopolitical reading is repeated: those who rely on a foreign power ultimately pay for it. Saddam was the strongman Washington used against Tehran when control of Iranian oil changed hands. He then invaded Kuwait, and no longer had the same backing. Bad business trusting the Americans, concludes the most widespread version of the affair.

The conclusion is uncomfortable for everyone. There is no clean verdict: the regime was brutal, the execution questionable, and the outcome catastrophic. What the region would have been like with him alive is the kind of question no one answers, because it simply has no answer.