Real Madrid basketball: from Laso's core to Pedro Martínez

From Laso's core to Pedro Martínez: how Madrid's basketball changed

The Real Madrid basketball bench has had three coaches in a few years. Chus Mateo left, Sergio Scariolo arrived with a contract until 2028, he also ended up out, and the club ended up signing Pedro Martínez, the coach who had made Valencia Basket ACB champion. All while the section closed signings like Maledon, Kramer, Luvawu-Cabarrot, Pradilla, Damian Jones or Jantunen and continued dragging the question that has been repeated since the 2012 Copa del Rey season: which pivot.

The conversation started with a reasonable thesis: keep the core and the coach after a winning cycle —2012 Copa del Rey, Supercopa, EuroLeague final and ACB title— and only tweak the weakest positions. The problem is that one of those positions, the five, became the structural hole of an entire decade. While in football there was talk of spending 100 million on Bale, the club haggled over a couple or three million for a pivot who could make a difference, and that asymmetry is repeated every summer.

Why does Real Madrid never sign a dominant pivot?

The diagnosis has remained stable from the beginning: there is a real shortage of top-level fives in Europe and whoever has them doesn't let them go. There parade Mejri from Obradoiro, Darden's continuity seeking not to be non-EU, the predictable cut of Hetts due to the aftermath of the injury or the eternal doubt with Begic and his Turkish offer. The question is not where the names come from, but why the budget never reaches for the one who would make the difference.

Personal preferences filled the market gap. Schortsanitis and Jawai appeared among the favorite pivots of some fans, Bourousis —who had not renewed with his Greek team— was seen as better than Faverani, and there was always someone betting on a more physical profile. Others defended Begic as a young player in pogre who intimidates and rebounds. No option convinced everyone, and that, in a critical position, is already a diagnosis.

The Laso era: from champion core to doubts about the bench

The first serious debate was about the coach. Trust in Laso was limited for part of the fans, who saw a known pattern: a young Spanish coach who starts well but proves incapable of making the team grow beyond a certain point. The comparison with Joan Plaza appeared again and again. On the other side, the argument that with that squad in Spain it was almost impossible to fail, and that the real problem was in Europe.

The tension exploded in the bad moments of EuroLeague. When the team fell with little resistance in a playoff and did not compete, the criticism shifted from the bench to the sporting direction. It was not just losing: it was not competing with a squad prepared to do so. The question of who fires the coach remained unanswered because no one wanted to assume the political cost of moving the piece.

Poirier, Tavares and the rotation of fives that did work

A period arrived in which the problem seemed to be solved by accumulation. The signing of Poirier for the remainder of the season and three more, with Deck leaving for Oklahoma for 17 million over three and a half years, gave the team forty minutes of guarantee in the position. With Tavares as reference and Poirier responding from the bench without going crazy with ten or fifteen minutes, the section found the depth it had been seeking for years.

There were those who claimed for Poirier the role of MVP for sustaining the relief of the most decisive player in Europe without lowering the level. And the sweet spot arrived: victories in tight finals, the tenth European crown, League number 35 and nights for history with Llull resolving from any distance. In the collective memory remain Sabonis, Hervelle, Djorjevic or Bullock as those who suffered the dark years before this golden age.

Chus Mateo, Scariolo and a bench that never stops turning

With Mateo the complaint changed shape. The criticism was not about results but about management: distribution of minutes, disputed rotations and players without confidence. He was reproached that tied games always ended on the same side, with the feeling that the rival only had to play with a net. The exit was seen coming and the arrival of Scariolo was announced with a contract until 2028.

His tenure did not last either. The defense of part of the fans was that the coach could not be judged with three injured pivots, and that his management of timeouts and prepared plays contributed. The reply: it was hasty to dismiss him, yes, but it was also hasty to maintain a project that did not take off. The result was another turn, this time towards Pedro Martínez, a coach who had never missed the opportunity to criticize Madrid and who landed with the fruta of knowing about this.

Why has the EuroLeague become impossible for Madrid?

Here the economic analysis is the one that generates the least discussion. Panathinaikos assembled the most expensive quintet in EuroLeague history, with Nunn, Hayes-Davis, Yabusele, Lessort and Bonga adding 21 million dollars a year. Fenerbahçe, Efes or Olympiacos sign stars like Micic, Larkin or Vezenkov without Madrid entering that salary league.

The most repeated conclusion is uncomfortable: in football the club behaves like a sheikh and in basketball like a mid-table ACB team. With Greeks and Turks willing to burn money, competing for the European title becomes a race that cannot be won on tactics alone. The hope, when it arrives, is of another order: work, tough defense and the rival having a bad night.

Pedro Martínez and the first EuroLeague SuperCup

The start of the new era left an objective fact: Pedro Martínez's Madrid became the first EuroLeague SuperCup champion, with a victory over Olympiacos and a more comfortable game than expected. The signings began to respond: Luvawu-Cabarrot as a highly coveted reinforcement, Pradilla contributing defense, rebounding and a reasonable outside shot, Damian Jones as Tavares' replacement and Jantunen as a threat from the triple.

The feeling is that there are more resources than the previous year, better shooters and better ball handlers, and a team that finally defends. On the table remains the departure of Hezonja, the competition from Valencia and Baskonia for national talent and a market in which Madrid has gone from fishing for stars to fishing for what remains of the dismembered ACB champion.

The start of the season does not clear any of the underlying doubts. The team competes, adds minor titles and walks. What no one knows yet is whether this core, with another coach and another list of signings, will withstand the first serious EuroLeague crossover. That is where the accounts have always gone wrong.