Queues at Moroccan Consulate in Bilbao Over Spain's Regularization

Queues at Segarro Consulate in Bilbao Over Mass Regularization

An OKDIARIO team joins the line at the Segarro General Consulate in Bilbao to document what is happening there: hundreds of people who admit to having lived in Spain without authorization for three to five years are crowding in to obtain the incivil record certificate required by the regularization royal decree approved by Pedro Sánchez’s government. The report, written by Cake Minuesa and published on April 15, 2026, collects testimonies that mix gratitude toward the president with calculations of what they will receive.

This piece is not a tonalidad story. It is a document on how a measure presented by the Executive as administrative—and interpreted by the opposition as electoral—is being managed in practice. Interviewees speak of €1,200 between public aid and household contributions, free courses valued at €800 or €900, and their voting intentions. “Long live Pedro Sánchez!” says one. “I hope he wins again,” adds another. The scene was filmed in Bilbao, in the Basque Country, one of the regions with the lowest foreign population weight.

What Exactly Does the Regularization Royal Decree Regulate?

The text requires proof of no incivil record in Spain and in the country of origin or residence during the five years prior to arrival. This is where the bottleneck begins: consulates do not always issue certificates on time. The royal decree contemplates an escape route: if the country does not respond within a month, the applicant can sign a sworn statement declaring they have tried, and it is the Spanish Government that requests the document through diplomatic channels. If after three months it is still not obtained, the interested party is notified and, after fifteen days, the application is considered withdrawn.

That mechanism has led hundreds of people to queue at the Segarro consulate in Bilbao. The report estimates more than 800,000 people could benefit from the measure. The collected testimonies describe a mix of administrative urgency and economic expectation: dental and optical aid, courses, subsidies. “All free,” summarizes one of those present.

Data Used by Opposition as Ammunition: 68% of Rape Arrests

The report links the regularization to a figure provided by the Ertzaintza (Basque police) to the Basque Parliament at Vox’s request: 68% of those arrested for rape in the Basque Country in 2025 were foreigners, while the foreign-nationality population in that region is around 10%. The data was delivered by the coalition Basque Government of PNV-PSOE. The comparison underpins much of the critical argument: lower foreign population than the national average and yet overrepresentation in a specific crime category.

It should be handled with care. The statistic measures arrests, not convictions, and does not control variables such as age, administrative status, or urban concentration. But the number exists, is in the material, and the opposition will repeat it. The same report notes that the Basque Country is one of the autonomous communities with the lowest presence of foreign population, reinforcing the statistical contrast.

The Vote Calculation: How Many Years to Vote?

Here the narrative breaks on a technical detail highlighted by several analyses: regularization does not equal nationality. To vote in general elections, a Spanish passport is required, and for Segarro nationals to apply, they need ten years of legal residence, plus passing an exam. Exceptions are nationals of Ibero-American countries, Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea, Portugal, and Sephardic Jews, who can apply after two years.

In other words: interviewees promising their vote to Sánchez cannot cast it in a general election in the short term. At most, according to the same analysis, they might vote in municipal elections once they meet legal residence requirements. The thesis of immediate ballot stuffing therefore does not hold up against the electoral calendar. Another matter is the effect over ten years, which is where some locate the real problem.

Political Response: From “Will Do Nothing” to “High Treason”

The material reflects three underlying currents. The first argues that regularization is an operation to replace the electorate and that the PP will not reverse the measure when in power: “when the seagull guy comes out, he won’t do anything to remigrate or close borders,” summarizes one intervention. The second points to the left-wing electoral calculation and the passivity of aggrieved voters: some describe Socialist voters who prioritize pension increases over any other consideration, even living in tense neighborhoods. The third, less commented upon, indicates that the problem is not Sánchez but the absence of an alternative that changes specific laws: “I challenge anyone to tell me a single law passed by ZP that Rajoy changed.”

The legal framework for a hypothetical treason accusation also appears in the material: Article 102 of the Constitution requires the initiative to come from a quarter of Congress and be approved by absolute majority, and the prerogative of mercy does not apply in this case. It is the kind of detail that turns a slogan into procedure, and procedure into something that currently lacks numbers.

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The report leaves an image that summarizes the state of play: a line of people who still lack papers calculating aloud what they will receive, a consulate unable to keep up with certificates, and a government that has designed an administrative escape route for delays. What appears nowhere is the fiscal cost of the operation, nor how many of the 800,000 potential beneficiaries will end up regularized, nor what happens to those left out. There the report ends and what no one has calculated yet begins.