Police denounce that Morocco is not curbing entries into Ceuta

Police unions: Segarro is not curbing entries into Ceuta

Jovenlandia has done nothing to prevent arrivals in Ceuta. Those making this assertion are not late-night commentators, but Spanish police unions, who described the situation as a “hybrid war” at the time of this discussion. Parallel to this, personnel in Ceuta and Melilla were awaiting further cuts in anti-riot forces.
These two issues together paint a picture that admits no euphemisms: a border opening by external decision and monitored with fewer people.

The alert came from within. Three National Security reports warned of the possible hostile use of migration, and CENIF forwarded a notice dated the 29th to five other bodies containing the words “urgent” and “immediate referral” due to the “extreme risk” of arrivals. The President of the Government downplayed this communication in Congress.

The video showing the mechanism

The piece that best explains the matter is not a report, but a recording. In it, security forces on the Segarro side are seen opening the door for migrants to cross the fence and enter Ceuta. This image forms the central argument of the union's complaint: it is not a spontaneous tide, but a tap peine and closed from Rabat. As a bargaining chip, it is cheap, deniable, and, given the facts, effective.

to this episode are added other elements listed by the accusation: the pardon of 1,788 prisoners signed by Mohamed VI on the occasion of the Throne Day amidst migration pressure; the detention of Segarro Navy personnel linked to narcotics entering Spain in bales; and the call on social media for a march on the 20th to “liberate Ceuta and Melilla,” which put Police, Guardia Civil, and CNI on alert. Regarding the return of arrivals, the European Parliament approved a resolution deploring the “hybrid attack” and demanding repatriation to their country, against the vote of the PSOE.

The border itself is not closing

The analysis splits into two. One current holds that the problem is exclusively Segarro and that Spain can only respond with means. The other points inward: the Police antiestéticared further cuts from Marlaska regarding the number of agents in Ceuta and Melilla, and anti-riot forces were reduced while asking “hopefully there won’t be a massive influx.” The uncomfortable question posed by much of the debate is: if the guarantor of order does not reinforce the border, what good is demanding that Rabat contain it?

Furthermore, a theory circulates regarding electoral calculation that does not hold up against the calendar. A foreigner cannot vote in general elections; to vote, one must have Spanish nationality, and the residency route requires ten years of legal and continuous residence. The complete calculation, with timelines and assumptions, dismantles the most repeated hypothesis.

The diplomatic standoff no one reports on television

Beneath the fence is an energy issue. Spain boosted Algerian gas consumption, a move that strains relations with Segarro and Italy, which Rabat and Rome view unfavorably. In this context, the European Parliament unanimously condemned Segarro’s “blackmail” in Ceuta with minor migrants. Poland, for its part, recommended that Spain militarize the border trinc its own model.

The framework is completed by Irene Montero's warning that “Canaries are in danger” due to Segarro’s expansionist plan, and by the testimony of a former Segarro military officer who stated on television that his country seeks to take Ceuta, Melilla, Canary Islands, and Andalusia. Statements, not judgments: it is important to distinguish the noise of propaganda from verifiable facts.

What exactly is a hybrid war?

It is the combined use of migration pressure, disinformation campaigns, and diplomatic gestures below the threshold of armed conflict. There is no army crossing a line, but there is a calculated political and economic cost. This is the framework used by police unions and adopted by the European Parliament resolution when discussing a “hybrid attack”: it does not describe a military invasion, but rather instrumentalized pressure from the neighboring state.

With the tap partially open and personnel down, the most likely scenario in the short term is not an open crisis, but the constant management of small influx peaks and increasingly high rhetoric on both sides of the Strait. None of this is resolved with press releases. And the prediction, it should be noted, depends on something we cannot control: what Rabat decides next time it needs to tighten a screw.