Partial Capitulation: Russia's Four Remaining Options

Four Options for Russia in Ukraine: Defeat No Longer Taboo

Sanctions that Russia has endured since 2014 have reportedly consumed nearly 25% of its economy. This is the starting point for some analyses, helping to understand why the scenario gaining traction is neither a lightning victory nor an instant collapse, but something messier and slower: a partial capitulation that no one wants to sign and that each side will christen in its own way. By the spring of 2022, when this standoff reached its peak, the idea of a swift Russian military walkover was no longer sustainable. Neither was the idea of a Russian defeat on the ground.

Between these two shattered certainties, almost anything is possible: from annexing new territories presented as a triumph to a war of attrition measured in decades. And an uncomfortable question hovers over it all: if attrition is the path, who will last longer, Russia selling gas or Europe buying it?

What is a Partial Capitulation for Russia?

To forcibly consolidate a strip of Ukrainian territory and effectively renounce the rest, marketing it as a sufficient victory. This is the most frequently cited option because it allows Moscow to avoid two extremes: total defeat on the battlefield and the complete conquest of Ukraine, which, with 40 million inhabitants and a constant flow of Western weaponry, is highly improbable in the short term. The list of grievances put on the table includes the lost European market, Finland and Sweden joining NATO, a rearming Germany, and a Ukraine emerging from the conflict with a hatred that is difficult to reverse.

The 25% of the Economy That Won't Return

The most repeated argument isn't about tanks, but about accounting. Sanctions predating the invasion reportedly cut a quarter of the Russian economy, and the majority suspicion is that the subsequent package would have been imposed even without the invasion. Hence the conclusion reached by several analyses: Moscow didn't lose the war in Donbas, it lost it in Moscow, in internal discrepancies and pressure on oligarchs. The scarcity of components to keep the aviation flying, which sustains the logistics of a vast and sparsely populated country, is the most cited example.

Chechnya and the Mania for Comparing Wars

The analogy with Grozny is divisive. Some believe that the Russian doctrine was never about a lightning war and that initial setbacks are the usual pattern; others respond that Ukraine is not Chechnya and that one million inhabitants are not 40 million, nor is it a single enemy facing the wealthiest economies on the planet. Both sides agree on one detail: they won anyway. They also agree on the high cost of the method, artillery pounding as the sole tool when infantry is insufficient.

War of Attrition: Germany 1918 as a Warning

The precedent repeated most insistently is that of World War I. Germany did not lose on the front lines: in 1918, it was still at a stalemate on the ground with its economy destroyed. Wars of attrition are not won on the battlefield; they are lost due to weariness and the economic exhaustion of one of the parties. If Russia is mobilizing around 10% of its army and not 50%, it's because sustaining the effort is costly. No one knows which of the two financial lungs will give out first.

Gas, Wheat, and the European Bill

One line of argument holds that Russia isn't losing the war; European citizens are, paying for both the weapons sent and gas at double the price. Winter serves as a recurring threat: if Moscow turns off the tap in November, this argument suggests, half of Europe will change its stance. Added to this is the food risk: the region produces over 30% of the world's wheat, and Russia is among the largest fertilizer exporters. The cited precedent is the Arab Spring revolts, triggered by price hikes that were barely noticed in the West.

Where is the War Being Lost: In Kharkiv or Moscow?

Most estimates suggest the front line alone decides nothing. Russia would maintain sufficient artillery superiority to avoid being expelled, but it would pay such a high price that the bill would be collected in the Kremlin, not on the battlefield. The sports comparison circulating in the debate is relentless: who withdraws when the score is 8-2. One loose end remains. If attrition is the path and both sides claim they can hold out for decades, is anyone truly calculating which economy will reach overtime?