Mazon's DANA testimony: zero errors admitted, three entities blamed

Mazon speaks on DANA without admitting errors, blaming CHJ and Aemet

Carlos Mazon began his testimony on the DANA promising to acknowledge mistakes, but he admitted none. In his first unrestricted speech, the President of the Valencian Government shifted blame to the Júcar Water Authority (CHJ), Aemet, and the Government Delegation, mentioning no responsibility for his own emergencies department, his consellerias, or himself. He also did not explain his absence from 14:30 to 19:30, when he finally arrived at the Integrated Operational Coordination Centre, Cecopi.

An analysis of his statements against the data from the involved agencies reveals a speech full of omissions, half-truths, and inaccuracies. The core issue is not what he said, but what he left unsaid.

Evacuation protocols that did exist

"Our own experience was not enough. Everything that peine exceeded our forecasts. Ordinary protocols did not work in an extraordinary situation," he stated. The omission is that evacuation protocols for floods exist and that several municipalities in the Ribera Baixa applied them on October 29, advising residents to go to upper floors and not circulate.

His second argument trinc the same line: "Our forecasting system was overwhelmed by the water level itself. There is only one gauge in the entire Poyo ravine." Here, the CHJ responds that sensors in ravines are not for issuing alerts, only for cross-checking information. "There is no regulation, no room for management; when the sensor detects water, you already have it on top," they note from the agency. They add: "You cannot leave flood management in the hands of what a sensor says, which is also extremely vulnerable." In short: the gauges were never an alert system, nor were they designed to be one.

Five hours blank, lunch on the schedule

The President described the day as a series of unprecedented events: "The Buseo dam went from 10% capacity to 117%, and the Forata dam did the same. Eight tornadoes, trees, and heavy vehicles affected Carlet, Turís, or Catadau." The detail he misses is the chronology. The Carlet tornado occurred at 13:00 on October 29. At that hour, Mazon was sticking to his agenda and went to lunch. The call for Cecopi came at 15:00, after his consellera visited Carlet. According to that same record, disaster management was neglected between 14:30 and 19:30.

The lunch that conditioned his attendance at the coordination body does not appear in any explanation. Nor does the reason why the public alert was not issued earlier.

Alerts that arrived while he spoke of an information blackout

Mazon relied on the lack of information and an alleged "information blackout." A message circulated in the thread lists, in the opposite direction, 62 alerts from the Júcar Water Authority, several emails, six days of Aemet alerts on the DANA, and several red alerts during the day itself, in addition to RTVE live connections from 8 a.m.

There is an additional contrast circulating strongly in the thread: according to one of the cited messages, Japan emailed its residents in Spain a day before the DANA. If a third country warned its nationals by email, claiming there was no information available is hard to reconcile.

From eliminating the UVE to creating an Emergencies Ministry

According to a message circulated in the thread, one of the most uncomfortable points for the official narrative is budgetary: upon taking office, the Consell allegedly eliminated the Valencian Emergencies Unit (UVE) and cut 13 million from the Emergencies budget, and the subsequent response was to propose creating a specific Emergencies ministry within the Reconstruction Plan. The order of factors — cutting the instrument and then announcing the structure — fuels suspicions about the real priority given to the area before the flood.

One participant compared this sequence to a mechanic who never checks levels or tire pressure and then wants to fix the broken car.

The point where the analysis gets stuck

As of the date of this discussion, the testimony had produced no resignations or assumption of political responsibility. The memory that Mónica Oltra resigned over much less — and left a prophecy that has come true: "more dangerous for incompetence than for corruption" — hangs over the case. The question that remains without a verifiable answer is what threshold of error, if any, triggers a political exit in this country. No one has yet put a number on it.