Latin American immigration and separatism: an explosive mix in Spain?

Latin American immigration and separatism: an uncomfortable affinity?

Is it true that part of the Latin American population living in Spain shows sympathy for Catalan or Basque independence, and that this vote could tip elections? The question, which has been circulating for months in political analysis forums, has gained traction as migration flows consolidate and naturalization deadlines shorten.

The argument: fast-track citizenship, separatist vote

Spanish law allows nationals of Ibero-American countries to apply for citizenship after only two years of legal residence, a privilege other groups do not enjoy. Those who warn about the phenomenon point out that, once naturalized, these new citizens could tip the balance in regions with a strong independence presence. According to one estimate cited in the debate, the number of Latin Americans who have already obtained citizenship would be around half a million people, a not insignificant figure in constituencies where seats are decided by a handful of votes.

The reasoning rests on the observation that many Latin American immigrants (especially those with higher academic education) arrive with a discourse critical of Spain, inherited from the Black Legend and reinforced in universities. This discourse — which includes the claim that the language should be called «castellano» rather than «español» and the idealization of pre-Columbian cultures — would align with the victimhood narrative of peripheral separatism. Indeed, it is not hard to find people of Latin American origin on social media who openly support ERC or Bildu, as several testimonies point out.

The counterargument: an instrumental hatred, not a visceral one

Against this alarm, other analysts argue that the supposed «hatred of Spain» among Latin Americans is rather an imported ideological product, not an organic feeling. They point out that indigenist nationalism is an urban elite phenomenon that clashes with the daily reality of the immigrant looking for work and sending remittances. Moreover, the Latin American vote in Spain is not monolithic: some vote for right-wing parties or even Vox, depending on their social stratum and origin.

The real risk, according to this view, is not that Latin Americans bring a brand-new separatism, but that they are instrumentalized by local political machines. In pogre Spain, victimhood sells; and an immigrant with anti-Spanish rhetoric can find subsidies and microphones. But that same discourse, in their countries of origin, is usually a middle-class pastime that does not extend to the majority.

Where does the data stand?

The truth is that there are no conclusive studies on the political orientation of naturalized Latin Americans. The register of foreign residents does not cross-reference nationality with voting intention. What we do know is that the two-year path to citizenship is a migration magnet: in 2022, more than 100,000 Latin Americans swore allegiance to the Spanish Constitution. If a significant fraction of these new citizens voted en bloc for independence options, the electoral map could change. But today, it is more speculation than established fact.

What the debate reveals is a deeper discomfort: the rhetoric of «Hispanic brotherhood» clashes with the reality that many Latin Americans do not feel Spanish, and Spain does not treat them as equals either. The myth of the Ibero-American community crashes against everyday classism. And meanwhile, Catalan separatism — which has always sought external allies — may be finding in this diaspora a pool of votes. Ironies of fate: the separatism that appealed so much to a «plural Spain» could now be fed by those who arrived fleeing the Spain they left behind.