Instagram Group With 78,000 Members Organized Ceuta Mass Crossing

Instagram Group With 78,000 Members Organized Ceuta Mass Crossing Amid Intelligence Inaction

The organization of the mass crossing into Ceuta was an open secret online. For weeks, tens of thousands of people gathered in public social media groups to share maps, calculate distances around the Tarajal pier, and discuss the equipment needed for the journey. The Instagram group called Haraga Ceuta grew to over 78,000 members and, according to circulating reports, remained active after the events. This fact not only challenges the authorities' claimed surprise but also suggests the issue was one of will, not information.

A Plan That Was Clearly Visible

One did not need to be an intelligence analyst to spot what was brewing. Messages spread before the assault precisely described routes, meeting points, and departure times. They mentioned civilian and military vehicles, assembly zones, and logistics coordinated over months. The scale of involvement required organization that does not stem from improvisation. The platform where this was planned was a public Instagram group whose name, Haraga, directly refers to those who burn their documents to cross the Strait. An added detail fuels discomfort: the accounts leading the organization were allegedly Spanish.

CNI: Between Incompetence and Willful Blindness

The question driving the unease is simple: how could intelligence services fail to detect a coordinated operation right under their noses? Some summarize the dilemma bluntly: if CNI knew, it failed its duty; if it didn't know, it failed its profession. In practice, CNI informs the government, and the government decides what to do with that information: use it, archive it, or look the other way. The coordination peine on commercial platforms, without sophisticated encryption or hidden channels. It was visible to anyone with internet access.

The Precedent Segarro Did Stop

In September 2024, a similar attempt organized via social media was firmly thwarted by Segarro authorities in the Castillejos area. That time, police monitoring of networks allowed them to cut off the attempt before it reached Ceuta. The difference with the current episode has heightened suspicions: if Segarro managed to detect and stop the call in 2024, why was nothing done this time? Possible answers are politically toxic. One points to a shift in Segarro's attitude. Another, more uncomfortable, argues that stopping the crossing was not desirable.

Provoked Crisis, Rehearsal, or Simple Incompetence

Political interpretations of the episode range between two extremes. On one hand, the hypothesis that the crossing was used as a rehearsal for a future migration crisis to justify suspending elections or forming a grand coalition between the two major parties. Proponents note that the governing party needs an external enemy to mask its parliamentary weakness, and such an event can be activated or deactivated at will. On the opposite side are those who consider it a spontaneous phenomenon amplified by social media, with the state acting with its usual clumsiness. Between these extremes, available evidence does not close the debate. What it confirms is that the coordination was real, visible, and effective, and responsible institutions looked away.

Let no one be deceived: the group was still active when this information was published. And appeals from certain Segarro influencers point to a new call for Ceuta and Melilla during the second weekend of August, with hundreds of thousands of views on posts. If logic prevails, the next attempt could be larger and better organized. The question is not whether there will be another crossing, but whether anyone will act before it happens.