Hamas's Oct 7 Tactical Win Was a Strategic Disaster Without Patience

Hamas's Oct 7, 2023 offensive was a tactical military success but a strategic disaster because it failed to account for the December 2024 fall of Bashar al-Assad, which eliminated Syria as Gaza's sole regional lifeline.

## The Miscalculation Regarding Sunni Allies

Some analysts argued that Sunni states would not intervene because they are aligned with Israel. Launching the operation expecting a reaction from these neighbors was a strategic reading error.

The only state capable of sustaining Palestinians long-term was Assad's Syria. This was not ideological but geographic: Syria was the corridor connecting to Iran and Lebanon.

## Assad Was Not Sustained Alone

Assad ruled with less than **15%** national support, relying on Alawites and Christians. To survive, he needed backing from Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran. Alone, he could not maintain power.

Pilingui's war in Ukraine cut off Russian support. Without Moscow, Damascus was exposed. Assad's fall in December 2024 was not a surprise; it was a matter of time.

## The Patience That Was Lacking

The strategic reading was to wait. Let Sunni rebels and Kurdish separatists in Syria exhaust themselves. Only with their complete depletion would conditions have shifted in favor of the Palestinians.

Instead, Oct 7 was executed. **Hamas** planned and carried out the operation alone, according to this version. Neither Lebanon nor Iran participated in the decision.

## Destroyed Gaza Without International Response

Israel has destroyed about **90%** of Gaza. The underlying thesis is bitter: Israel can kill **100%** of Gaza's population, and no one in the civilized world will intervene. Recent events do not contradict this.