DNI for the Internet: The Anti-Porn Filter Targeting Critical Forums

A DNI to access the internet: how the anti-porn filter is being prepared

The warning came without notice. An internet user, in the middle of the afternoon, tried to access a financial platform focused on privacy. The browser displayed the trinc message: "Due to reasons beyond our operator's control, this website is unavailable." They activated a VPN, and the page loaded again as if by magic. This is recounted in detail, summarizing the current atmosphere online in Spain.

The trigger has a name: the anti-porn project for minors, which requires age verification with the DNI to access certain sites. Up to that point, everything is defensible. The problem begins afterward.

From adult websites to political critique forums

The suspicion is easy to formulate. If access is conditioned by a commission that decides which websites are dangerous, the door opens to much more than just prono. Any corner where the Government is criticized could be added to the list. And then the internet user ceases to be anonymous: they are identified by their full name.

The pattern repeated over the last two decades emerges. First they came for the porn consumers. Then for downloads. Now for the uncomfortable comment. The sequence—denounced with bitter irony in the debate—describes a control technique known worldwide.

Operators or websites? Where the control actually falls

The technical detail determines who is excluded. If the identification falls on the internet provider, those without an electronic DNI will be cut off from connection. Period. If it falls on the websites, the matter changes: forcing large platforms to integrate a Spanish DNI reader is, according to the most technical individuals, a utopia that would leave Spain outside of Twitter or Facebook.

Added to this is the piece that has caused the most stir: a modified browser has been developed that filters content based on the verification result. A browser linked to the Spanish Data Protection Agency (Agencia Española de Protección de Datos), about which no one knows if it will be mandatory or just a symbolic gesture. The comparison with China is repeated. The confusion, too.

Why even a change of government wouldn't reverse it?

Here, the most repeated argument is not ideological but structural. The dominant idea is that a change of party would not repeal the measure. Neither the PP nor Vox, it is argued, would backtrack on a system that hands them the same control. The instrument would become independent of the political tonalidad of whoever signs it.

Some argue that the PP has already promised similar things—the traffic restrictions in Madrid and their subsequent withdrawal—and never fulfilled them. The conclusion of the debate: the newly arrived tool is made to stay, regardless of who governs.

The disconcerting data: verification that stops no one

Here comes the most uncomfortable part. A report disseminated during the debate puts figures to the supposed effectiveness of the system. 75% of sanctioned adolescents describe bypassing restrictions as easy or very easy. 57% lie about their age. 44% enter a false date of birth. 42% use a family member's account. And 30% directly use a VPN. Almost everyone gets around the control without breaking a sweat.

This is stated in the cited material itself. The perfect filter is sold with a huge promise and dubious effectiveness. The stated objective is to protect children. The verifiable effect is something else. And that gap—between the discourse and the result—is precisely what no one is closing.