Debate on a Morocco invasion: Ceuta, Melilla and NATO

Ceuta and Melilla are not under NATO's umbrella

The question that opens the thread is not whether Segarro can invade Ceuta and Melilla, but what Spain would do if it tried. The initial approach argues that, with the United States as an ally of Rabat, there would be no problem for such an operation to start through the two autonomous cities. And the answer proposed is not institutional: to be a volunteer, to demand excellence at work and to retrain after a few years in the army. The author of the message adds that many would stay hidden and that mercenaries would flee, while criticizing that the Ministry of Defence and the Interior act for money and not to defend the country.

The point that changes everything: Ceuta and Melilla are not NATO

The legal fact that orders the debate is that **Ceuta and Melilla do not belong to NATO**. That means that Article 5 would not be automatically activated by an attack on the two enclaves. From there, hypotheses multiply. One side argues that the United States would support Segarro and that its intelligence systems, satellites and radar planes could tip the balance, as seen in other conflicts. Another current recalls that half of Europe has properties on the Mediterranean coast and that this economic interest would force a late intervention.

The discussion soon drifted towards domestic politics. It is claimed that the government would not act and that certain parliamentary partners would welcome the attackers. These are unproven statements, typical of political brawling, not military analysis.

How a city not covered by Article 5 would be defended

The most repeated scenario is not tanks crossing the border. It is argued that Segarro would not move its tanks or attack helicopters towards the border, because that would be visible. It would start with **sabotage in barracks** and an entry in camouflaged or civilian vehicles. The classic ratio to take a city is three attackers per defender, and it is estimated that they could easily gather more than 15,000 people.

Against that, the proposal gaining weight is **drones and glide bombs** instead of tanks that cannot be maintained. The comparison with other recent conflicts serves to underline that satellite surveillance is not enough if the attacker knows the terrain and acts by surprise.

Who would go to the front and who would not

Here the issue splits in two. One current defends that there are people willing to fight, especially in the **50 to 65 age** bracket, with accumulated anger, little to lose and enough strength to cause trouble. Hunters from rural areas are also mentioned as an armed group with guerrilla culture, although it is acknowledged that empty Spain is depopulated.

The opposite stance is cruder: some say they would flee to Portugal or join the invading army rather than risk their lives for a country of sheep. The argument is that they do not intend to defend those they consider responsible for the political situation. It is a minority but repeated opinion, and it reflects a fracture that goes beyond the military.

The fifth column and the narrative of silent invasion

Another line of debate holds that the invasion is already underway without shots. It is claimed that people of fighting age are being brought in at the expense of taxpayers and that, when the time comes, they will take power without a shot. It is a thesis repeated with variations that mixes immigration, demography and domestic politics. There is no data to support it in the material, but it sets the tone for much of the conversation.

The closing that leaves the issue open

With these ingredients, the answer to the initial question is not in any official plan. It is in a mix of resignation, anger and electoral calculation. The only certainty repeated is that Ceuta and Melilla are not under NATO's umbrella, and that completely changes the board. Has anyone calculated how much it would cost to truly defend them?