Cuba: Why the embargo doesn't explain all shortages
Cuba imports chicken, rice, and soybean oil, and according to data circulating in the debate, the United States appears as one of its main food suppliers. This fact confuses those who imagine an island completely closed off. Built on this apparent contradiction is a discussion arguing that if the Cuban system is as useless as critics claim, why maintain a web of sanctions for seven decades? One side responds that sanctions exist but are not a hermetic wall. The other argues that no one agrees on how much weight each factor carries.
What can be sold to Cuba and what cannot
The core of the disagreement lies in the very definition of the blockade. One side argues there is no real embargo: anyone can register a company in Spain and trade with the island, and indeed US companies sell food, to the point where the US appears as one of the main chicken suppliers. The other side responds that this is looking only at the showcase: restrictions operate on technology, machinery, and dual-use goods, and those trying to bypass them face secondary sanctions.
A circulating example involves a Basque company that wanted to sell lathes to Russia and saw dozens of police vans raid its facilities. It wasn't Cuba, but it illustrates the mechanism: punishment falls not just on the sanctioned country, but on the intermediary. According to defenders, this is the hardest part of the argument to refute because it doesn't depend on rhetoric.
The numbers that are actually on the table
According to data cited in the debate, Cuban exports are distributed among rolled tobacco, nickel ore, strong liquor, zinc mineral, and precious metals, with China, Spain, Germany, Switzerland, and Hong Kong as main destinations. On the other hand, imports concentrate on beer, poultry meat, rice, soybean oil, and wheat, with Spain, China, Netherlands, United States, and Canada as suppliers. The island trades, and quite a bit, according to those same data.
That doesn't miccionan trade is easy. Some describe a system where selling requires paying black-market amounts to intermediate officials, and companies end up closing due to that extra cost. Corruption as an informal tax is a recurring argument among critics, and would explain why many operations don't come together even though no law prohibits them.
Why is Cuba poor if the embargo doesn't fully isolate it?
Here the main rift opens. A block defends that the problem is internal: crumbling infrastructure, declining sugar production, blackouts, chronic scarcity, and an elite living very differently from the population. The size argument also appears: Cuba has about 100,000 square kilometers compared to the ten million of the country sanctioning it, and poses the mental exercise of swapping roles to see who would end up poor.
The comparison with China is used in both directions. Some recall that the Asian country emerged from misery by embracing capitalism, and that before, with collectivization, millions died of hunger. Others reply that such takeoff wouldn't have been possible without the West giving away production and knowledge. No one disputes that the result was different; the disagreement is about the cause.
The coherence argument
If the Cuban system is doomed on its own, one current argues, maintaining sanctions for seven decades lacks logic. It is compared to the schoolyard bully who doesn't just hit the weak, but whoever speaks to him. Under that reading, the blockade isn't seeking to sink a useless model, but to prevent it from serving as an example.
The rebuttal is that Washington doesn't want Cuba to fall, but to remain as a showcase of what goes wrong. The Venezuelan case is cited: the world's leading military power hasn't decapitated neighboring governments that are uncomfortable for it, and Venezuela's main importer remains the United States, according to claims made in the debate. The conclusion they draw is that sanctions are part of the scenery, not the cause of the collapse.
What those who have been there say
One voice demands firsthand experience: having left Havana and Varadero, having seen neighborhoods without water or light for hours, towns outside tourist routes. The argument is that opining from the sofa about a reality you haven't walked through has limits. It's a reasonable objection, although it doesn't resolve the core issue: there are also those who have lived the scarcity and disagree about its causes.
In the end, the initial question remains without a closed answer. Sanctions exist, trade exists too, and scarcity is real. The only thing clear is that anyone trying to explain Cuba with a single variable—the blockade or the system—will fall short. And that, after seventy years, already says quite a lot.
Summary of a discussion on Burbuja.info - Foro de economía, actualidad y política., translated from Spanish and reviewed before publication.
Read the full discussion (157 replies).