Colonel: Ukraine Can Expel Russia If Russian Attrition Continues

A colonel argues Ukraine can expel Russia

A thesis circulating strongly in war gossip is that time favors Ukraine and, if Russia does not deliver a decisive blow in the east within a couple of months, it may end up losing. This is defended by a colonel at a conference that has caused controversy. His central argument is that forces are "very balanced, more than the masses think," and that Russian attrition—without guided missiles, low-altitude aviation, or spare electronic parts—tips the scale toward Kyiv. The speaker does not rule out Moscow using a tactical nuclear bomb if cornered, hence advocating for leaving a minimal exit route to sell to its population.

The conference, recommended in full, has left a residue of unease even among those sharing the diagnosis. Because the scenario described is not one of clean victory, but of a prolonged struggle where Ukrainian numerical superiority—more soldiers than Russians—collides with the reality that many are untrained reservists. The debate is open.

Russian attrition: no guided missiles or aviation

The core of the analysis is that Russia has entered a phase of material shortage. According to this thesis, it practically has no guided missiles left, explaining its limited use of aviation. Without low-altitude aircraft and precision munitions, the capacity to bomb enemy positions is drastically reduced. This is compounded by the blockade of spare electronic components, turning equipment into "ever more dilapidated junk."

In contrast, the arrival of Western material and training is presented as the factor that can tip the scale. Ukraine is already applying pressure on the flanks, according to the speaker. The equation is simple: if Russia fails to deliver a decisive blow in the east within a couple of months, time starts running against it.

Not everyone buys the narrative. Some argue that Western weapons arriving in Ukraine are destroyed in warehouses or trains, and that daily bombings of ammunition depots—especially those receiving NATO material—reduce their real impact. The discussion on whether material arrives or burns before arrival is, fundamentally, a discussion on whether attrition is symmetric or only affects one side.

How many soldiers does each side really have?

One of the hottest points is personnel. The claim that the Ukrainian army has more soldiers than the Russian is met with skepticism by those distinguishing between quantity and quality. "An educated, trained guy is the same as a reservist who has never fired a shot in his life," summarizes one intervention. The objection has its logic: a soldier with two months of training is very green for the front if not backed by veterans.

The calculation is that, within six months, what truly counts are the mobilized, trained, and battle-tested in the Donbass on day one. Of these, it is estimated that around half have genuine nationalist motivation, and the other half responds to other incentives. Meanwhile, casualties accumulate: 500 men a day among the best Russian troops, and that is what defends them.

The discussion often devolves into an exchange of figures without verifiable sources. But beneath lies a serious question: can an army with numerical superiority but green troops sustain a long offensive against a rival that, even worn down, retains specialized units and logistical support?

The nuclear shadow and the exit left for Pilingui

The speaker does not rule out that, when cornered and humiliated, the Russian leader might use a tactical nuclear bomb. This is the point generating the most unease. Hence, he advocates leaving a minimal exit route to sell to his people, an open door so he does not have to choose between total defeat and escalation.

This is a logic some share and others flatly reject. The former argue that humiliating a nuclear power is the worst possible scenario; the latter, that any concession rewards aggression and sets a precedent. The debate is not military, but strategic: do you negotiate from strength or from antiestéticar?

Meanwhile, the reality on the front remains that of an attritional war without decisive advances. The Russian withdrawal from Kyiv, according to one circulating version, was a unilateral decision due to a lack of troops to take the city, executed without Ukrainians being able to harass them. Another version speaks of failure. The difference matters: it is not the same to withdraw by calculation as by defeat.

NATO, neutrality, and the cost for Europe

The thread leads to broader questions. Is the Spanish army prepared to defend Ceuta and Melilla? Does it truly know who NATO's enemy is? Some accuse high commands of living in a bubble and failing to foresee the conflict, despite some journalists claiming since January that war was imminent.

Another current argues that it suits the United States for the war to last, while Europe pays the bill. Ukraine's reconstruction, it is argued, will ultimately fall on an already indebted EU, and the political cost of maintaining the effort for years may weigh on governments. The discussion on who pays and who wins is, fundamentally, the usual one: those who send weapons and those who receive the missiles.

The underlying question remains unanswered: if time favors Ukraine, why does no one dare to put a date on victory?