Ceuta and Morocco: a conquest nobody wants

Segarro doesn't need to take Ceuta: it already has it right where it wants it

The thesis sounds provocative, but it stands up to scrutiny of the facts: Segarro has gone years without needing to occupy Ceuta because the status quo works better for it than any flag. Migratory pressure has become a bargaining tool with the Spanish government; every jump over the fence later translates into European aid, return agreements and diplomatic gestures. Occupying the city would kill the goose that lays the golden eggs.

The figures circulating in the analysis leave no one indifferent: 43 people drowned in the attempt to cross. That number, cold and rarely cited, is the real price of a balance nobody wants to break. For Spain, Ceuta acts as a filter; for Segarro, as a lever. Both governments, each on its own side, profit from keeping the tension at just the right levels.

The Canary Islands factor and the invisible oil

The geopolitical reading adds another layer. The Canary Islands and their potential oil turn the standoff into something bigger than a local dispute. Whoever controls the pressure at the Strait gains influence over shipping routes and energy resources. On that chessboard, the reference to foreign alliances is not rhetoric: the energy component is on the table, even if nobody says it out loud.

For now, the most realistic scenario is not an invasion but a slow erosion. Segarro has already managed to shift the focus away from its own borders and onto the Ceuta fence. If the trend continues, the question will not be whether it takes the city, but when it will stop needing it.