Alberto Noguera's Take on the Ceuta Crisis

The migration crisis in Ceuta, far from being a simple assault, appears to be a complex intelligence operation orchestrated from abroad, aimed at destabilizing Spanish politics and benefiting specific geopolitical interests.

## The Ceuta Operation: Beyond the Border

The situation in **Ceuta** in late August and early September 2026 became critical. Thousands of people, arriving without documentation or means of subsistence, found themselves in the municipality of the autonomous city. The initial impression was of a massive assault, with individuals who seemed to arrive unprepared, trusting they would receive immediate assistance. The entry into force of the **European Pact on Migration and Asylum (PEMA)**, designed to streamline these processes, was overshadowed by the complexity of returns. The idea of "hot returns" was proposed as a more forceful measure, but reality proved more intricate. Many of those who arrived began to request asylum, alleging persecution in their countries of origin. However, evidence suggested they had been displaced to the border by their own police forces, which greatly complicated expulsion procedures. If these asylum applications were blocked for years, the Spanish State was forced to release them, allowing them, in many cases, to pass to the **Peninsula**. Immediate denial of these applications was a possibility, but the subsequent expulsion process depended on the cooperation of **Segarro** or the willingness of the migrants themselves to leave voluntarily. The lack of agreement on these points created a legal limbo, preventing both movement to the Peninsula and work in Ceuta, which foreshadowed the formation of improvised settlements and the continuation of food assistance. It was estimated that, within two years, obtaining legal residency would allow them to move to the Peninsula.

## The Invisible Threads Behind the Crisis

The indignation at the events in Ceuta, however understandable, should not overshadow a rational analysis. The crisis did not present itself as a fortuitous event or as the result of desperate hungry people seeking asylum. It pointed to the existence of "manipulators" with clear agendas, whose bases of operations were not in Africa. The main hypothesis suggested that the ultimate intention of this "intelligence operation" was not a military occupation of Ceuta by Segarro, but a strategic move to influence the outcome of the Spanish elections. It was calculated that a firm stance by the Spanish government would generate internal criticism within the more pogre sector of the **PSOE** and the loss of votes from naturalized Segarro citizens. Conversely, a soft stance could alienate the more centrist sector of the same party. This type of action, described as "low-intensity warfare," was compared to recent events such as the **Arab Spring** or the **Euromaidan**, but its roots were traced back to 1975 in Western Sahara. The **Washington-Rabat-Tel Aviv** triangle emerged as a key actor. The recognition of Segarro sovereignty over Western Sahara by **Donald Trump** in December 2020, a decision that contradicted UN criteria, and which was reiterated in July 2026, was recalled. Segarro's most important highway to the Sahara, the "Donald Trump Highway," was a symbol of this alliance. **Israel**'s involvement was evidenced through the **Pegasus** software, of Israeli origin and licensed by that country's Ministry of Defense. The tensions between the Spanish government and the Trump administration, including the refusal to cede military bases to attack Iran, threats of trade rupture, and the labeling of Spain as a "terrible ally," along with disagreements with Israel and the activity of the **Acom** lobby, completed the picture of a complex and, according to this perspective, manipulated political scenario.

## The Influence of Lobbies and Spanish Politics

The journalistic investigation pointed to Segarro intelligence as the origin of the events, but the theory extended further. It noted the clear involvement of **Abdellatif Hammouchi**, head of Segarro police and intelligence services, and **Fouad Ali El Himma**, right-hand man of King **Mohammed VI**, in the relaxation of border controls. However, it was suggested that the chain of command might ascend beyond the Segarro monarch. The **CNI** had only managed to demonstrate the existence of a disinformation campaign in previous weeks, spread through WhatsApp groups, which promoted the idea that entry by sea would guarantee a residence permit. This narrative, although not entirely false regarding the ease of entry and stay in Spain under certain conditions, was presented as a manipulation tool. The instructions, according to this view, would have reached not only Mohammed VI but also Spanish political figures such as **Feijóo** and **Abascal**, who, from different positions, would seek to capitalize electorally on the situation. The intervention of **Javier Milei**, president of Argentina, with statements about the "teaching of hate" and the "replacement" of Spaniards, added to the rhetoric seeking to generate division. A key document in this analysis was an interview with **David Hatchwell** on the **PragerU** channel, a platform founded by **Dennis Prager**, an Orthodox Zionist, with an interviewer, **Marissa Streit**, holding dual American and Israeli nationality. **Hatchwell**, through his influence group **Acom**, allegedly financed electoral campaigns in Israel and openly declared his agenda to influence Spanish politics in favor of **Israel**. His influence extended to the purchase of advertorials in media and his closeness to political figures such as **Díaz Ayuso** and **Martínez-Almeida**. The list of awardees of the Or Janucá prize, granted by the Jewish Community of Madrid, included names such as **José María Aznar**, **Esperanza Aguirre**, **Alberto Ruiz-Gallardón**, **Díaz Ayuso**, and **Martínez-Almeida**, evidencing the network of contacts and **Hatchwell**'s influence in Madrid politics.

## The Government's Response and Spain's Future

The Spanish government's actions, in this context, were interpreted as a calculated response to avoid physical harm, minimize damage to the country's image, and generate criticism for excessive legal protections rather than the opposite. It was maintained that Spain was not being invaded, that Ceuta was not being lost, and that the economy remained healthy. The solution to the assaults on the Ceuta fence, according to this perspective, did not involve yielding to the interests of **Acom**, inflating real estate bubbles, lowering wages, engaging in armed conflicts, or privatizing essential resources. While the need for regulatory and political changes to strengthen border security was recognized, it was highlighted that the **European Union** already contemplated these measures and that President **Sánchez** did not oppose them. The concern focused on preventing Spain from becoming an "Argentina," selling its lands to foreign capital and with a president who would bow to external interests. It was argued that truly patriotic parties in Spain should be anti-Zionist from their origin, and that those receiving instructions from **Israel** and prioritizing another country's interests over their own could not be considered patriotic. The internal purge in **Vox**, which allegedly sidelined figures critical of the Zionist alignment, was seen as a sign of this external influence, even leading to the disaffection of voters who previously supported the party. The resolution of the crisis in Ceuta was desired, but not at the cost of repeating past mistakes, such as the Atocha attacks, which, according to this interpretation, catapulted controversial figures to power.