23J: Scrutiny doubts and INDRA role in Spain's election

The alleged fraud on 23J and INDRA's role

Shortly after nine PM, once polling stations close, party agents take photos of the official minutes. According to online complaints, this reveals a fraudulent manipulation: votes are supposedly counted using data from INDRA, bypassing the manual scrutiny mandated by law. No court ruling supports the accusation. Nevertheless, the narrative has taken hold, raising the question: why not count votes by hand again?

Why is the general scrutiny skipped?

Electoral law requires each provincial board to perform an official count based on signed polling station minutes. Complaints allege several boards, notably Burgos, refuse this and use INDRA’s results directly. While electoral crime is cited, no conviction or ruling confirms it.

Legal arguments cite that the Central Electoral Board and regional courts stated INDRA’s data is unofficial and scrutiny must occur. This is a legal battle: the body judging the complaint is often the one accused.

What exactly does INDRA do in the count?

The narrative clashes with system mechanics. Polling staff enter data from a few minutes into INDRA’s app, which sums them for early results after 9 PM. Party agents receive signed copies of these minutes to verify data against official records. The presiding officer is randomly selected.

This conclusion undermines massive fraud claims: such a scheme would require collusion among staff, officials, presidents, and all parties. Fraud would be easier and less visible where no agents monitor.

Mail-in voting as the system’s weak point

The most plausible theory points to envelopes, not screens. Some allege fraudulent mail-in votes come from voters on the CERA census who do not vote in person, exploiting the fact that CERA voters cannot vote physically in Spain. Abstentionists are key: no one verifies if their identity was used to vote.

Allegations claim algorithms adjust votes to finalize results. This is unproven. However, the distribution of mail-in votes is noted as anomalous: a 17% difference between blocs, with the losing bloc getting a higher percentage of mail-in votes than in-person votes, something never seen before.

Buying half a million votes costs 100 million euros

The arithmetic argument challenges the fraud thesis. In networks exposed in Mojácar or Melilla, the price per vote was 100–200 euros. Moving half a million votes would cost 50–100 million euros in cash. With a 50% success rate, contacting a million people would be required.

No national network has been proven. Documented fraud in Spain is municipal: buying small numbers of votes to elect councilors. Jumping to stealing general election seats remains unproven.

Why parties claiming theft stay silent

The political front is another issue. If fraud were real, the opposition would denounce it first. Critics note PP and VOX have not joined platforms like Transparent Elections that have filed complaints for years. Some see silence as complicity; others see lack of proof.

Bitter comparisons with Venezuela appear, alongside suspicions that less-known individuals preside over boards, suggesting the lottery isn’t fully random. This too lacks verification.

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A disconcerting fact remains unexplained: the losing bloc obtained a higher percentage of mail-in votes than in-person votes. With this piece on the table, the debate on whether the system is broken or merely miscounted will remain open until votes are counted by hand again.