Leyendo esta madrugada el New York Times, aun lamiendo mis
heridas y tratando de 'evaluar' que hicimos bien o mal en Iraq
desde el punto de vista tactico, veo, que como entonces -cuando
servi mi pais en ese hervidero de hormigas-, aunque fuimos criticados
por algunos, inclusive la prensa internacional, por haber actuado muy
duramente en Fallujah en Noviembre de 2004 - mi ultima accion militar
en la region antes de volver a los EEUU, tanto los 'liederes tribales'
como la mayoria de los miembros coherentes de la region, mantienen
y hasta PIDEN que las FFAA de los EEUU actuen tacticamente como
nosotros lo hicimos en la oportunidad de literalmente "aplanar'
Fallujah en el enfrentamiento militar mas cruento y definiente que
yo haya tenido memoria en ios anios militares.

Hoy... meses han pasado, mi pierna aun me molesta del disparo
recibido... pero poco a poco se disipan esas dudas del momento,
cuando las criticas solo sirven para nublar las mentes decididas
a un objetivo concreto y sin tanta politiqueria correctiva.

Ayer fue Fallujah... hoy, Tal Afar... solo que, esta estrategia de
'sostenimiento politico' que adoptan los EEUU hoy, NO ha de
funcionar... hay que 'escuchar a los lideres tribales'... yo, nosotros
lo hicimos... y en esas bases actuamos. Con absouluto prejudicialismo
contra las fuerzas terroristas de Iran y Siria que estaban emplazadas
en Fallujah... creyeron que podrian... no fue asi. La leccion de todo
esto es olo una: al terrorista hay que arrasarlo sin consideraciones
laterales... sin asco, sin tregua. sin opcion a retirada... cerrarle
los flancos y destruirlo. Mi exeriencia en Fallujah en 2004, y este
post del New York Times, condirman lo que siempre crei fuese la
mejor deoctrina tactica en estos contextos de accion militar.

No hay otra...
-----------------------------
The New York Times
June 16, 2005
Magnet for Iraq Insurgents Is a Crucial Test of New U.S. Strategy
By RICHARD A. OPPEL Jr.

TAL AFAR, Iraq, June 15 - Nine months ago the American military laid
siege to this city in northwestern Iraq and proclaimed it freed from
the grip of insurgents. Last month, the Americans returned in force -
to reclaim it once again.

After the battle here in September the military left behind fewer than
500 troops to patrol a region twice the size of Connecticut. With so
few troops and the local police force in shambles, insurgents came
back and turned Tal Afar, a dusty, agrarian city of about 200,000
people, into a way station for the trafficking of arms and insurgent
fighters from nearby Syria - and a ghost town of terrorized residents
afraid to open their stores, walk the streets or send their children
to school.

It is a cycle that has been repeated in rebellious cities throughout
Iraq, and particularly those in the Sunni Arab regions west and north
of Baghdad, where the insurgency's roots run deepest.

"We have a finite number of troops," said Maj. Chris Kennedy,
executive officer of the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment, which arrived
in Tal Afar several weeks ago. "But if you pull out of an area and
don't leave security forces in it, all you're going to do is leave the
door open for them to come back. This is what our lack of combat power
has done to us throughout the country. In the past, the problem has
been we haven't been able to leave sufficient forces in towns where
we've cleared the insurgents out."

While officials in Washington say the military has all the troops it
needs, on-the-ground battle commanders in the most violent parts of
Iraq - in cities like Ramadi, Mosul and Mahmudiya - have said
privately that they need more manpower to pacify their areas and keep
them that way.

Now, with the pace of insurgent attacks rising across Iraq and scores
being killed daily in bombings and mass executions, Tal Afar and the
surrounding area is becoming something of a test case for a strategy
to try to break the cycle: using battle-hardened American forces
working in conjunction with tribal leaders to clear out the insurgents
and then leaving behind Iraqi forces to try to keep the peace.

Many tribal sheiks here say they favor an all-out assault to rout the
city's insurgents, but American commanders say a major attack like the
one that leveled Falluja last November is to be avoided almost at all
costs. The bloodshed, destruction of property and alienation of the
Iraqi public is too high a price to pay, they say.

A political solution is best, the Americans said, but fiendishly
difficult, given the tangle of insurgent pressures and tribal
loyalties and divisions.

"If you take all the complexities of Iraq and compressed it into one
city, it is Tal Afar," said the regiment's commander, Col. H. R.
McMaster.

The military's decision to reassign the regiment from the so-called
Triangle of Death south of Baghdad to the region around Tal Afar was
an implicit acknowledgement that it had lost control of the area. The
first troops began arriving in April, and nearly 4,000 were in place
by mid-May.

A Place Frozen in Fear

On arrival here, commanders found a town that was, for all practical
purposes, dead, strangled by the violent insurgents who held it in
their thrall. "Anyone not helping the terrorists can't leave their
homes because they will be kidnapped and the terrorists will demand
money or weapons or make them join them to kill people," said Hikmat
Ameen al-Lawand, the leader of one of Tal Afar's 82 tribes, who said
most of the city is controlled by insurgents. "If they refuse they
will chop their heads off."

Khasro Goran, the deputy provincial governor in Ninewa, which includes
Tal Afar, concurred. "There is no life in Tal Afar," he said in an
interview a week ago. "It is like Mosul a few months ago - a ghost
town." There are more than 500 insurgents in Tal Afar, he said, and
they project a level of fear and intimidation across the city far in
excess of their numbers. Thoroughfares lined with stores have been
deserted, the storefronts covered with blue metal roll-down gates.

In northeast Tal Afar, a young mother now home-schools her six
children, after a flier posted at their school warned: "If you love
your children, you won't send them to school here because we will kill
them." A neighbor, Muhammad Ameen, will not let his kids play outside.
"Standing out in the open is not a good idea," he said.

Tribes sympathetic to the new Iraqi government have suffered constant
assaults at the hands of insurgents and rival tribes. More than 500
mortars have struck lands belonging to the Al-Sada al-Mousawiyah tribe
since September, said the tribe's leader, Sheik Sayed Abdullah Sayed
Wahab. "All of my tribe are prisoners in their own homes," he says.
"We can't even take our people to the hospital."

At least 40 members of two predominantly Shiite tribes of Turkomen,
the Sada and Jolak, were killed in two car bombings in May. The
perpetrators are believed by American officers to be members of the
predominantly Sunni Arab Qarabash tribe, which they say has strong
ties to Syrian fighters and links to the network of Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, the Al Qaeda leader in Iraq. "I need someone to hear my
cries for help because we are in a bad situation," said Sheik Wali
al-Jolak in an interview at his compound in southwest Tal Afar, only a
few blocks from the Qarabash neighborhood. He lost 28 tribe members in
the two attacks.

The Tal Afar police force disintegrated last fall, and the few who
remain stay in an ancient hilltop castle, afraid to venture out.
Commanders here caution troops to assume that anyone on the street
dressed as a policeman is an impostor. Insurgents wearing police
uniforms shoot at American helicopters and threaten residents.

Even with the new regiment, the military still lacks troops to
completely patrol the outlying desert and grazing lands, where
insurgents had taken over remote villages, providing sanctuary a short
distance from Mosul, the country's dominant northern city and an
active insurgent hub. Insurgents use irrigation canals to elude
American forces chasing them in armored vehicles that cannot cross the
waterways. Smugglers drive through holes cut in the large berm that
guards the Syrian border. Remote cinderblock farmhouses serve as safe
havens.

At the Rabia border crossing into Syria, several hundred American
soldiers arrived three weeks ago and say they have disrupted the
smuggling of weapons and money. But they doubt there has been any
curtailment yet in the infiltration of foreign fighters. "As far as
foreign fighters coming in from the border control point, I can't say
we've had any impact on that," said Capt. Jason Whitten, the company
commander at Rabia. Commanders say new technology will be installed at
the border crossing shortly to help track travelers and detect false
identification materials.

In its first weeks here, the regiment has pressed sweeps deep into
desert areas that had not seen a large American presence since the
101st Airborne Division left in early 2004. Instead, many areas had
witnessed, at best, only sporadic patrols that had done little to
deter insurgents, commanders say. "Resources are everything in combat,
and when you don't have enough manpower to move around, you have to
pick the places," said Maj. John Wilwerding, executive officer of
Sabre Squadron, a 1,000-strong unit that now oversees Tal Afar.

Two weeks ago more than 1,000 troops from the new regiment poured into
Biaj, a town of 15,000 people about 40 miles southwest of Tal Afar,
where insurgents had destroyed the police station, and the mayor and
the police fled last fall. Soldiers eventually searched every house in
the town, capturing more than a dozen suspected insurgents without a
shot being fired.

Biaj faces a severe water shortage and trash and sewage fill the
streets. But the markets and neighborhoods teem with children who give
passing American patrols waves and a thumbs-up. Indeed, the town
appears to show what happens if there are enough troops to pacify an
area and police it effectively afterward. But commanders plan to
withdraw all but 150 American troops and leave a battalion of about
500 Iraqi soldiers and 200 police officers in Biaj.

Taking Back Tal Afar

In Tal Afar, Lt. Col. Chris Hickey, commander of Sabre Squadron, which
is equipped with tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles and helicopters,
moved quickly to reassert control of strategic sites. Soldiers drove
out insurgents who had taken control of the area around the hospital,
and turned over security there to Iraqi troops.

Similarly, soldiers cleared the main east-west highway, which had been
made impassable by improvised explosive devices. An Iraqi battalion
now patrols the route, and Colonel Hickey is spearheading an effort to
rebuild the police with recruits drawn from tribes and trained in
Jordan.

Insurgents waged heavy assaults against the squadron in the first few
weeks after it arrived but suffered heavy losses while having little
impact on the American troops. Those attacks have declined while
violence against townspeople has increased, Colonel Hickey said.
"We've disrupted the terrorists' network," he said. "But what I have
to overcome is a population too scared to open their stores or step
out on the street."

Tal Afar has little municipal leadership to speak of. American
commanders say the mayor, a Sunni Arab, may have ties to the
insurgency. The police chief - a Shiite dismissed a few days ago for
the second time in as many months - may have been involved in the
abuse or torture of suspects, they say.

Real leadership in Tal Afar lies with the 82 tribal leaders. Angered
by the attacks and emboldened by the enlarged American military
presence here, some sheiks have become outspoken critics of the
insurgency. On June 4, at great risk to their own lives, more than 60
attended a security conference at Al Kasik Iraqi Army base near here.
To the surprise of Iraqi and American commanders who organized the
gathering, many sheiks demanded a Falluja-style military assault to
rid Tal Afar of insurgents and complained that American forces do not
treat terror suspects roughly enough.

Other sheiks said it was better to pursue a political solution. But
sheiks from each point of view accused one another of being unwilling
to identify suspected insurgents. American commanders had planned to
circulate a list of 1,400 people thought to have potential insurgent
connections, seeking verification - or denials - from the sheiks. But
they decided against it because few sheiks would openly affirm or deny
the status of insurgent suspects in front of other Iraqis, Colonel
Hickey said.

Tal Afar's tribes have to bury old grudges for the city to be at
peace, says Brig. Gen. Mohsen Doski, a Kurd who commands a brigade of
2,000 Iraqi troops garrisoned here. "If we continue talking about the
past or what this certain person did or this tribe did, we will stay
in a closed circle," he said. If the city's problems cannot be solved
politically, he said, "We have to do in Tal Afar the same as in
Falluja."

The American regiment's commander, Colonel McMaster, warned the sheiks
at the close of the day-long conference that the insurgents cannot be
defeated unless the tribes work together better. "To an outsider, it
seems there is not a lot of power because there are divisions. That's
exactly what the terrorists want," he said.

In an interview, the colonel said the violence "isn't intertribal" but
a mixture of foreign fighters, Zarqawi loyalists and others working
"to incite chaos, breed fear and set conditions for them to continue
to operate out of Tal Afar." With the regiment now in place, he added,
"Tal Afar is clearly contested, where before it wasn't."

An Iraqi Fighting Force?

One week ago Tuesday, 1,000 American soldiers and hundreds of Iraqi
troops swept into the insurgency's principal safe haven in Tal Afar,
the Sariya neighborhood, detaining 34 suspected insurgent leaders and
fighters and killing as many as 10 fighters.

Relying on Iraqi troops proved a miserable failure 13 months ago in
Falluja, where Iraqis were put in charge only to see the city come
rapidly under the sway of a Taliban-style terrorist theocracy that had
to be rooted out six months later by the Marines. But American
commanders now maintain that in some places, like Haifa Street, a
former insurgent stronghold in the heart of Baghdad, Iraqi soldiers
are improving.

In Tal Afar, commanders say the new Iraqi troops they work with - two
predominantly Kurdish battalions and one mainly of Shiites from Basra
- have helped immeasurably in identifying insurgents. Capt. Greg
Mitchell, a company commander with Sabre Squadron, said his troops
could not have apprehended so many suspects on Tuesday had Iraqis not
been involved. "They have a much more discerning eye" for clues about
suspicious Iraqis, he said.

Yet American troops also remain wary of Iraqis' tendencies to respond
to an attack by shooting wildly in all directions - a "death blossom,"
as the troops here call it. "They keep their fingers on the trigger
and they'll just shoot without aiming," Command Sgt. Maj. Mark Horsley
warned during the operation Tuesday, as fire rang out.

Last Tuesday, an insurgent gunman wounded an American officer as he
walked through an alley accompanied by Iraqi troops. When the shooting
started, the Iraqis ran back to the street as the gunman continued to
fire at the wounded officer, said Capt. Jesse Sellars, a company
commander here. An American sergeant had to cajole a handful of Iraqis
to return fire in an effort to rescue the officer, who later died.

"They're new soldiers," Major Wilwerding, of Sabre Squadron, said of
the Iraqis who fled. "They're not conditioned yet. They'll get
better."
--------------

Salud,

Gregg


---------------
"This is an age of exhausted whoredom groping for its God."
(James Joyce, Ulisses p.280)

http://www.geocities.com/airborne_col/America.html

GREGG . <-TheScatologist@hotmail.com-> dixit:

> Ayer fue Fallujah... hoy, Tal Afar... solo que, esta estrategia de
> 'sostenimiento politico' que adoptan los EEUU hoy, NO ha de
> funcionar... hay que 'escuchar a los lideres tribales'... yo, nosotros
> lo hicimos... y en esas bases actuamos. Con absouluto prejudicialismo
> contra las fuerzas terroristas de Iran y Siria que estaban emplazadas
> en Fallujah... creyeron que podrian... no fue asi. La leccion de todo
> esto es olo una: al terrorista hay que arrasarlo sin consideraciones
> laterales... sin asco, sin tregua. sin opcion a retirada... cerrarle
> los flancos y destruirlo. Mi exeriencia en Fallujah en 2004, y este
> post del New York Times, condirman lo que siempre crei fuese la
> mejor deoctrina tactica en estos contextos de accion militar.

Bajo mi punto de vista, Fallujah fue un gran exito militar y una batalla
a la altura de las grandes confrontaciones del siglo XX en que participo
el USMC: Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Saipan, Okinawa, etc. Lamentablemente,
habria que haber realizado una operacion del mismo estilo en Ramadi,
Bagdad City, etc. para derrotar decisivamente a los terroristas. No
pueden haber "safe heavens" para los terroristas donde estos puedan
reagruparse y contraatacar. La base de la lucha antiterrorista moderna,
escinificada con gran exito por los israelies, es no dar respiro al
enemigo, ponerlo a la defensiva, perseguirlo, no dejarle dormir. La gente
que esta demasiado ocupada salvando su pellejo no tiene tiempo ni
oportunidad de realizar acciones ofensivas.

Bajo mi punto de vista, EEUU deberia de cambiar el enfoque de su
presencia en Iraq. Destacar maximo 40,000 a 50,000 soldados de combate,
dejar a la Guardia Nacional iraqui las tareas de mantenimiento del orden
publico, y concentrarse en operaciones relampago de limpieza de
terroristas. Primero, conseguir inteligencia sobre el terreno,
observacion, y finalmente, el golpe decisivo. EEUU debe saber aprovechar
su potencia de fuego. Es eso lo que esta faltando en la planificacion de
esta guerra, en mi opinion.

Saludos arevalianos,

BOLUDOVSKY

On 16 Jun 2005 13:042 GMT, ARIEL BOLUDOVSKY
wrote:

>GREGG . <-TheScatologist@hotmail.com-> dixit:
>
>> Ayer fue Fallujah... hoy, Tal Afar... solo que, esta estrategia de
>> 'sostenimiento politico' que adoptan los EEUU hoy, NO ha de
>> funcionar... hay que 'escuchar a los lideres tribales'... yo, nosotros
>> lo hicimos... y en esas bases actuamos. Con absouluto prejudicialismo
>> contra las fuerzas terroristas de Iran y Siria que estaban emplazadas
>> en Fallujah... creyeron que podrian... no fue asi. La leccion de todo
>> esto es olo una: al terrorista hay que arrasarlo sin consideraciones
>> laterales... sin asco, sin tregua. sin opcion a retirada... cerrarle
>> los flancos y destruirlo. Mi exeriencia en Fallujah en 2004, y este
>> post del New York Times, condirman lo que siempre crei fuese la
>> mejor deoctrina tactica en estos contextos de accion militar.
>
> Bajo mi punto de vista, Fallujah fue un gran exito militar y una batalla
>a la altura de las grandes confrontaciones del siglo XX en que participo
>el USMC: Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Saipan, Okinawa, etc. Lamentablemente,
>habria que haber realizado una operacion del mismo estilo en Ramadi,
>Bagdad City, etc. para derrotar decisivamente a los terroristas. No
>pueden haber "safe heavens" para los terroristas donde estos puedan
>reagruparse y contraatacar. La base de la lucha antiterrorista moderna,
>escinificada con gran exito por los israelies, es no dar respiro al
>enemigo, ponerlo a la defensiva, perseguirlo, no dejarle dormir. La gente
>que esta demasiado ocupada salvando su pellejo no tiene tiempo ni
>oportunidad de realizar acciones ofensivas.
>
Completamenmte de acuerdo Ariel. Sucede que - esto ya sucedio
con Vietnam-, cuando la guerra se politiza y se lleva al campo de
las relaciones publicas internacionales, la cosa pierde su valor
y pureza militar. El militar esta entrenado para la guerra, no para
la diplomacia, las relaciones publicas -incluyendo la participacion
abusiva del media - y mucho menos el political correctness. La
guerra es un negocio sucio... es la ultima posibilidad del ser humano
de indentificarse como tal y consigo mismo. Es predatoria, inhumana,
letal, y en lo posible in_con_di_cio_nal. Lo dije antes, si me piden
que actue militarmente en una guerra, lo acepto. Pero no me aten
las manos... ya de por si tendre suficientes preocupaciones por
la vida de mis hombre y mujeres en uniforme, y si me queda tiempo,
por mi propia vida. En esta guerra los unicos objetivos son los
elementos terroristas..., pero si a esos objetivos los cubren con
mas derechos que los mismos soldados regulares, la cosa no
funciona. Seamos claros... el terrorista NO tiene ningun derecho
de guerra. No es miembro signatario de las Leyes de Guerra,
y tampoco las sigue en su conducta ofensiva... por lo tanto, el
unico derecho que tiene el guerrillero es el derecho a que lo
mate. No me vengan con otras estupideces. El guerrillero,
repito, no se encuentra amparado por ninguna ley de guerra
ni tratado internacional, es un freelancer, tal cual. es un
free-target.
>
> Bajo mi punto de vista, EEUU deberia de cambiar el enfoque de su
>presencia en Iraq. Destacar maximo 40,000 a 50,000 soldados de combate,
>dejar a la Guardia Nacional iraqui las tareas de mantenimiento del orden
>publico, y concentrarse en operaciones relampago de limpieza de
>terroristas. Primero, conseguir inteligencia sobre el terreno,
>observacion, y finalmente, el golpe decisivo. EEUU debe saber aprovechar
>su potencia de fuego. Es eso lo que esta faltando en la planificacion de
>esta guerra, en mi opinion.
>
Mira Ariel... cuando en gizmo (guantanamo) se ha llegado al punto
de usar guantes blancos de algodon para tocar el puto Coran para
asi no ofeder las 'sensibilidades' de esos terroristas, la cosa ya
muestra que esta completamente fuera de foco. Y menu especial
para esos sanguinarios??? Los EEUU gasta mas en cada plato
de alimentos que ingieren esas mierdas, que por racion que ingiere
un soldado en operaciones. No.. aqui se ha ido la mano. Yo te
puedo asegurar que si yo tuviese a cargo gitzmo... no te digo en
dos o tres meses... en 48 hrs. los hago declarar a esos hijos de
mil putas hasta el nombre del perro que dejaron en sus cuevas
del desierto. Ya les daria 'menu' sensible con su fe.... sure...
se cagarian tanto de hambre que se comerian el mismisimo
puto Coran sin sacarle las paginas una por una.

Una cosa cosa es tratar con "prisioneros de guerra", otra muy
distinta con "terroristas" no-clasificados bajo ninguna normativa
de guerra internacional. Verias como a esos mal paridos les
saco las ganas de hacerse guerrilleros... "dead men walking"
serian en lo que a mi concierne.

Bah! esto me da acidez..., pudiendo finalizar esta cosa de
una buena puta vez... se esta dilatando una situacion insostenible.

Lo peor de todo, es que esos soretes mal cagados lo saben...
lo saben... saben que pueden zafar con toda esta actitud
protocolar de la politica americana.
>
>Saludos arevalianos,
>
> BOLUDOVSKY

Saludos, Ariel.

Gregg

---------------
"This is an age of exhausted whoredom groping for its God."
(James Joyce, Ulisses p.280)

http://www.geocities.com/airborne_col/America.html

In article <0683b15o59glmfu7vs1b16mf4h4q1r1mgp@4ax.com>,
GREGG . <-TheScatologist@hotmail.com-> wrote:

> Seamos claros... el terrorista NO tiene ningun derecho
> de guerra. No es miembro signatario de las Leyes de Guerra,
> y tampoco las sigue en su conducta ofensiva... por lo tanto, el
> unico derecho que tiene el guerrillero es el derecho a que lo
> mate. No me vengan con otras estupideces. El guerrillero,
> repito, no se encuentra amparado por ninguna ley de guerra
> ni tratado internacional, es un freelancer, tal cual. es un
> free-target.
[...]
> Una cosa cosa es tratar con "prisioneros de guerra", otra muy
> distinta con "terroristas" no-clasificados bajo ninguna normativa
> de guerra internacional. Verias como a esos mal paridos les
> saco las ganas de hacerse guerrilleros... "dead men walking"
> serian en lo que a mi concierne.

Puesto que los resistentes al ejercito aleman en la 2a guerra mundial
entraban perfectamente en la definicion de terroristas (y asi eran
calificados por los Gobiernos locales), debes considerar que las
acciones de represalia que se llevaban a cabo contra ellos y contra la
poblacion que los cobijaba, a veces a la fuerza, estaban perfectamente
justificadas.

Tu habrias hecho lo mismo. O mas.


_x.

--
Only one "o" in my address.

On Thu, 16 Jun 2005 11:524 GMT, GREGG .
<-TheScatologist@hotmail.com-> wrote:

" LA GUERRA ES UNA MASACRE DE GENTES QUE NO SE CONOCEN,PARA PROVECHO
DE GENTES QUE SI SE CONOCEN PERO NO SE MASACRAN "



>Leyendo esta madrugada el New York Times, aun lamiendo mis
>heridas y tratando de 'evaluar' que hicimos bien o mal en Iraq
>desde el punto de vista tactico, veo, que como entonces -cuando
>servi mi pais en ese hervidero de hormigas-, aunque fuimos criticados
>por algunos, inclusive la prensa internacional, por haber actuado muy
>duramente en Fallujah en Noviembre de 2004 - mi ultima accion militar
>en la region antes de volver a los EEUU, tanto los 'liederes tribales'
>como la mayoria de los miembros coherentes de la region, mantienen
>y hasta PIDEN que las FFAA de los EEUU actuen tacticamente como
>nosotros lo hicimos en la oportunidad de literalmente "aplanar'
>Fallujah en el enfrentamiento militar mas cruento y definiente que
>yo haya tenido memoria en ios anios militares.
>
>Hoy... meses han pasado, mi pierna aun me molesta del disparo
>recibido... pero poco a poco se disipan esas dudas del momento,
>cuando las criticas solo sirven para nublar las mentes decididas
>a un objetivo concreto y sin tanta politiqueria correctiva.
>
>Ayer fue Fallujah... hoy, Tal Afar... solo que, esta estrategia de
>'sostenimiento politico' que adoptan los EEUU hoy, NO ha de
>funcionar... hay que 'escuchar a los lideres tribales'... yo, nosotros
>lo hicimos... y en esas bases actuamos. Con absouluto prejudicialismo
>contra las fuerzas terroristas de Iran y Siria que estaban emplazadas
>en Fallujah... creyeron que podrian... no fue asi. La leccion de todo
>esto es olo una: al terrorista hay que arrasarlo sin consideraciones
>laterales... sin asco, sin tregua. sin opcion a retirada... cerrarle
>los flancos y destruirlo. Mi exeriencia en Fallujah en 2004, y este
>post del New York Times, condirman lo que siempre crei fuese la
>mejor deoctrina tactica en estos contextos de accion militar.
>
>No hay otra...
>-----------------------------
>The New York Times
>June 16, 2005
>Magnet for Iraq Insurgents Is a Crucial Test of New U.S. Strategy
>By RICHARD A. OPPEL Jr.
>
>TAL AFAR, Iraq, June 15 - Nine months ago the American military laid
>siege to this city in northwestern Iraq and proclaimed it freed from
>the grip of insurgents. Last month, the Americans returned in force -
>to reclaim it once again.
>
>After the battle here in September the military left behind fewer than
>500 troops to patrol a region twice the size of Connecticut. With so
>few troops and the local police force in shambles, insurgents came
>back and turned Tal Afar, a dusty, agrarian city of about 200,000
>people, into a way station for the trafficking of arms and insurgent
>fighters from nearby Syria - and a ghost town of terrorized residents
>afraid to open their stores, walk the streets or send their children
>to school.
>
>It is a cycle that has been repeated in rebellious cities throughout
>Iraq, and particularly those in the Sunni Arab regions west and north
>of Baghdad, where the insurgency's roots run deepest.
>
>"We have a finite number of troops," said Maj. Chris Kennedy,
>executive officer of the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment, which arrived
>in Tal Afar several weeks ago. "But if you pull out of an area and
>don't leave security forces in it, all you're going to do is leave the
>door open for them to come back. This is what our lack of combat power
>has done to us throughout the country. In the past, the problem has
>been we haven't been able to leave sufficient forces in towns where
>we've cleared the insurgents out."
>
>While officials in Washington say the military has all the troops it
>needs, on-the-ground battle commanders in the most violent parts of
>Iraq - in cities like Ramadi, Mosul and Mahmudiya - have said
>privately that they need more manpower to pacify their areas and keep
>them that way.
>
>Now, with the pace of insurgent attacks rising across Iraq and scores
>being killed daily in bombings and mass executions, Tal Afar and the
>surrounding area is becoming something of a test case for a strategy
>to try to break the cycle: using battle-hardened American forces
>working in conjunction with tribal leaders to clear out the insurgents
>and then leaving behind Iraqi forces to try to keep the peace.
>
>Many tribal sheiks here say they favor an all-out assault to rout the
>city's insurgents, but American commanders say a major attack like the
>one that leveled Falluja last November is to be avoided almost at all
>costs. The bloodshed, destruction of property and alienation of the
>Iraqi public is too high a price to pay, they say.
>
>A political solution is best, the Americans said, but fiendishly
>difficult, given the tangle of insurgent pressures and tribal
>loyalties and divisions.
>
>"If you take all the complexities of Iraq and compressed it into one
>city, it is Tal Afar," said the regiment's commander, Col. H. R.
>McMaster.
>
>The military's decision to reassign the regiment from the so-called
>Triangle of Death south of Baghdad to the region around Tal Afar was
>an implicit acknowledgement that it had lost control of the area. The
>first troops began arriving in April, and nearly 4,000 were in place
>by mid-May.
>
>A Place Frozen in Fear
>
>On arrival here, commanders found a town that was, for all practical
>purposes, dead, strangled by the violent insurgents who held it in
>their thrall. "Anyone not helping the terrorists can't leave their
>homes because they will be kidnapped and the terrorists will demand
>money or weapons or make them join them to kill people," said Hikmat
>Ameen al-Lawand, the leader of one of Tal Afar's 82 tribes, who said
>most of the city is controlled by insurgents. "If they refuse they
>will chop their heads off."
>
>Khasro Goran, the deputy provincial governor in Ninewa, which includes
>Tal Afar, concurred. "There is no life in Tal Afar," he said in an
>interview a week ago. "It is like Mosul a few months ago - a ghost
>town." There are more than 500 insurgents in Tal Afar, he said, and
>they project a level of fear and intimidation across the city far in
>excess of their numbers. Thoroughfares lined with stores have been
>deserted, the storefronts covered with blue metal roll-down gates.
>
>In northeast Tal Afar, a young mother now home-schools her six
>children, after a flier posted at their school warned: "If you love
>your children, you won't send them to school here because we will kill
>them." A neighbor, Muhammad Ameen, will not let his kids play outside.
>"Standing out in the open is not a good idea," he said.
>
>Tribes sympathetic to the new Iraqi government have suffered constant
>assaults at the hands of insurgents and rival tribes. More than 500
>mortars have struck lands belonging to the Al-Sada al-Mousawiyah tribe
>since September, said the tribe's leader, Sheik Sayed Abdullah Sayed
>Wahab. "All of my tribe are prisoners in their own homes," he says.
>"We can't even take our people to the hospital."
>
>At least 40 members of two predominantly Shiite tribes of Turkomen,
>the Sada and Jolak, were killed in two car bombings in May. The
>perpetrators are believed by American officers to be members of the
>predominantly Sunni Arab Qarabash tribe, which they say has strong
>ties to Syrian fighters and links to the network of Abu Musab
>al-Zarqawi, the Al Qaeda leader in Iraq. "I need someone to hear my
>cries for help because we are in a bad situation," said Sheik Wali
>al-Jolak in an interview at his compound in southwest Tal Afar, only a
>few blocks from the Qarabash neighborhood. He lost 28 tribe members in
>the two attacks.
>
>The Tal Afar police force disintegrated last fall, and the few who
>remain stay in an ancient hilltop castle, afraid to venture out.
>Commanders here caution troops to assume that anyone on the street
>dressed as a policeman is an impostor. Insurgents wearing police
>uniforms shoot at American helicopters and threaten residents.
>
>Even with the new regiment, the military still lacks troops to
>completely patrol the outlying desert and grazing lands, where
>insurgents had taken over remote villages, providing sanctuary a short
>distance from Mosul, the country's dominant northern city and an
>active insurgent hub. Insurgents use irrigation canals to elude
>American forces chasing them in armored vehicles that cannot cross the
>waterways. Smugglers drive through holes cut in the large berm that
>guards the Syrian border. Remote cinderblock farmhouses serve as safe
>havens.
>
>At the Rabia border crossing into Syria, several hundred American
>soldiers arrived three weeks ago and say they have disrupted the
>smuggling of weapons and money. But they doubt there has been any
>curtailment yet in the infiltration of foreign fighters. "As far as
>foreign fighters coming in from the border control point, I can't say
>we've had any impact on that," said Capt. Jason Whitten, the company
>commander at Rabia. Commanders say new technology will be installed at
>the border crossing shortly to help track travelers and detect false
>identification materials.
>
>In its first weeks here, the regiment has pressed sweeps deep into
>desert areas that had not seen a large American presence since the
>101st Airborne Division left in early 2004. Instead, many areas had
>witnessed, at best, only sporadic patrols that had done little to
>deter insurgents, commanders say. "Resources are everything in combat,
>and when you don't have enough manpower to move around, you have to
>pick the places," said Maj. John Wilwerding, executive officer of
>Sabre Squadron, a 1,000-strong unit that now oversees Tal Afar.
>
>Two weeks ago more than 1,000 troops from the new regiment poured into
>Biaj, a town of 15,000 people about 40 miles southwest of Tal Afar,
>where insurgents had destroyed the police station, and the mayor and
>the police fled last fall. Soldiers eventually searched every house in
>the town, capturing more than a dozen suspected insurgents without a
>shot being fired.
>
>Biaj faces a severe water shortage and trash and sewage fill the
>streets. But the markets and neighborhoods teem with children who give
>passing American patrols waves and a thumbs-up. Indeed, the town
>appears to show what happens if there are enough troops to pacify an
>area and police it effectively afterward. But commanders plan to
>withdraw all but 150 American troops and leave a battalion of about
>500 Iraqi soldiers and 200 police officers in Biaj.
>
>Taking Back Tal Afar
>
>In Tal Afar, Lt. Col. Chris Hickey, commander of Sabre Squadron, which
>is equipped with tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles and helicopters,
>moved quickly to reassert control of strategic sites. Soldiers drove
>out insurgents who had taken control of the area around the hospital,
>and turned over security there to Iraqi troops.
>
>Similarly, soldiers cleared the main east-west highway, which had been
>made impassable by improvised explosive devices. An Iraqi battalion
>now patrols the route, and Colonel Hickey is spearheading an effort to
>rebuild the police with recruits drawn from tribes and trained in
>Jordan.
>
>Insurgents waged heavy assaults against the squadron in the first few
>weeks after it arrived but suffered heavy losses while having little
>impact on the American troops. Those attacks have declined while
>violence against townspeople has increased, Colonel Hickey said.
>"We've disrupted the terrorists' network," he said. "But what I have
>to overcome is a population too scared to open their stores or step
>out on the street."
>
>Tal Afar has little municipal leadership to speak of. American
>commanders say the mayor, a Sunni Arab, may have ties to the
>insurgency. The police chief - a Shiite dismissed a few days ago for
>the second time in as many months - may have been involved in the
>abuse or torture of suspects, they say.
>
>Real leadership in Tal Afar lies with the 82 tribal leaders. Angered
>by the attacks and emboldened by the enlarged American military
>presence here, some sheiks have become outspoken critics of the
>insurgency. On June 4, at great risk to their own lives, more than 60
>attended a security conference at Al Kasik Iraqi Army base near here.
>To the surprise of Iraqi and American commanders who organized the
>gathering, many sheiks demanded a Falluja-style military assault to
>rid Tal Afar of insurgents and complained that American forces do not
>treat terror suspects roughly enough.
>
>Other sheiks said it was better to pursue a political solution. But
>sheiks from each point of view accused one another of being unwilling
>to identify suspected insurgents. American commanders had planned to
>circulate a list of 1,400 people thought to have potential insurgent
>connections, seeking verification - or denials - from the sheiks. But
>they decided against it because few sheiks would openly affirm or deny
>the status of insurgent suspects in front of other Iraqis, Colonel
>Hickey said.
>
>Tal Afar's tribes have to bury old grudges for the city to be at
>peace, says Brig. Gen. Mohsen Doski, a Kurd who commands a brigade of
>2,000 Iraqi troops garrisoned here. "If we continue talking about the
>past or what this certain person did or this tribe did, we will stay
>in a closed circle," he said. If the city's problems cannot be solved
>politically, he said, "We have to do in Tal Afar the same as in
>Falluja."
>
>The American regiment's commander, Colonel McMaster, warned the sheiks
>at the close of the day-long conference that the insurgents cannot be
>defeated unless the tribes work together better. "To an outsider, it
>seems there is not a lot of power because there are divisions. That's
>exactly what the terrorists want," he said.
>
>In an interview, the colonel said the violence "isn't intertribal" but
>a mixture of foreign fighters, Zarqawi loyalists and others working
>"to incite chaos, breed fear and set conditions for them to continue
>to operate out of Tal Afar." With the regiment now in place, he added,
>"Tal Afar is clearly contested, where before it wasn't."
>
>An Iraqi Fighting Force?
>
>One week ago Tuesday, 1,000 American soldiers and hundreds of Iraqi
>troops swept into the insurgency's principal safe haven in Tal Afar,
>the Sariya neighborhood, detaining 34 suspected insurgent leaders and
>fighters and killing as many as 10 fighters.
>
>Relying on Iraqi troops proved a miserable failure 13 months ago in
>Falluja, where Iraqis were put in charge only to see the city come
>rapidly under the sway of a Taliban-style terrorist theocracy that had
>to be rooted out six months later by the Marines. But American
>commanders now maintain that in some places, like Haifa Street, a
>former insurgent stronghold in the heart of Baghdad, Iraqi soldiers
>are improving.
>
>In Tal Afar, commanders say the new Iraqi troops they work with - two
>predominantly Kurdish battalions and one mainly of Shiites from Basra
>- have helped immeasurably in identifying insurgents. Capt. Greg
>Mitchell, a company commander with Sabre Squadron, said his troops
>could not have apprehended so many suspects on Tuesday had Iraqis not
>been involved. "They have a much more discerning eye" for clues about
>suspicious Iraqis, he said.
>
>Yet American troops also remain wary of Iraqis' tendencies to respond
>to an attack by shooting wildly in all directions - a "death blossom,"
>as the troops here call it. "They keep their fingers on the trigger
>and they'll just shoot without aiming," Command Sgt. Maj. Mark Horsley
>warned during the operation Tuesday, as fire rang out.
>
>Last Tuesday, an insurgent gunman wounded an American officer as he
>walked through an alley accompanied by Iraqi troops. When the shooting
>started, the Iraqis ran back to the street as the gunman continued to
>fire at the wounded officer, said Capt. Jesse Sellars, a company
>commander here. An American sergeant had to cajole a handful of Iraqis
>to return fire in an effort to rescue the officer, who later died.
>
>"They're new soldiers," Major Wilwerding, of Sabre Squadron, said of
>the Iraqis who fled. "They're not conditioned yet. They'll get
>better."
>--------------
>
>Salud,
>
>Gregg
>
>
>---------------
>"This is an age of exhausted whoredom groping for its God."
> (James Joyce, Ulisses p.280)
>
> http://www.geocities.com/airborne_col/America.html

On Thu, 16 Jun 2005 19:44:52 +0200, Xavier Llobet
wrote:

>In article <0683b15o59glmfu7vs1b16mf4h4q1r1mgp@4ax.com>,
> GREGG . <-TheScatologist@hotmail.com-> wrote:
>
>> Seamos claros... el terrorista NO tiene ningun derecho
>> de guerra. No es miembro signatario de las Leyes de Guerra,
>> y tampoco las sigue en su conducta ofensiva... por lo tanto, el
>> unico derecho que tiene el guerrillero es el derecho a que lo
>> mate. No me vengan con otras estupideces. El guerrillero,
>> repito, no se encuentra amparado por ninguna ley de guerra
>> ni tratado internacional, es un freelancer, tal cual. es un
>> free-target.
>[...]
>> Una cosa cosa es tratar con "prisioneros de guerra", otra muy
>> distinta con "terroristas" no-clasificados bajo ninguna normativa
>> de guerra internacional. Verias como a esos mal paridos les
>> saco las ganas de hacerse guerrilleros... "dead men walking"
>> serian en lo que a mi concierne.
>
>Puesto que los resistentes al ejercito aleman en la 2a guerra mundial
>entraban perfectamente en la definicion de terroristas (y asi eran
>calificados por los Gobiernos locales), debes considerar que las
>acciones de represalia que se llevaban a cabo contra ellos y contra la
>poblacion que los cobijaba, a veces a la fuerza, estaban perfectamente
>justificadas.
>
Mira... la historia la dejo a los historiadores..., yo me manejo con
los fundamentales de hoy... contemporaneos y cuanto mas actuales
mejor. Francamente, no tengo tiempo para esas pavadas. Cuando
yo salto de un avion con el equipo de combate mi mente esta fija
en el objetivo. Mi accionar belico se basa solamente en un solo
principio: que sea LEGAL. No me interesan los factores morales,
eticos ni religiosos en el enfrentamiento armado... solo me interesa
que tanto yo como aquellos bajo mi mando respondan a reglamentos
LEGALES. nada mas, ni nada menos.

Durante el combate no hay tiempo para tantas pavadas de que si
fulano o mengano en la epoca de Matusalen o que los Nazis o
los Salvajes de Papua.... o que..., nah! Entrar en "war mode"
preclude todos esos excesos pseudo-intelectuales.
>
>Tu habrias hecho lo mismo. O mas.
>
Y tu habrias muerto por perder tiempo en tonterias....

Gregg


---------------
"This is an age of exhausted whoredom groping for its God."
(James Joyce, Ulisses p.280)

http://www.geocities.com/airborne_col/America.html

On Thu, 16 Jun 2005 119:27 GMT, NOBASURA@telefonica.net (MAQUI
SABATER) wrote:

>On Thu, 16 Jun 2005 11:524 GMT, GREGG .
><-TheScatologist@hotmail.com-> wrote:
>
>" LA GUERRA ES UNA MASACRE DE GENTES QUE NO SE CONOCEN,PARA PROVECHO
>DE GENTES QUE SI SE CONOCEN PERO NO SE MASACRAN "
>
Asi es amigo... como bien lo expresa el dicho: a alguien siempre
le toca el bailar con la mas puta.

Gregg

>
>
>>Leyendo esta madrugada el New York Times, aun lamiendo mis
>>heridas y tratando de 'evaluar' que hicimos bien o mal en Iraq
>>desde el punto de vista tactico, veo, que como entonces -cuando
>>servi mi pais en ese hervidero de hormigas-, aunque fuimos criticados
>>por algunos, inclusive la prensa internacional, por haber actuado muy
>>duramente en Fallujah en Noviembre de 2004 - mi ultima accion militar
>>en la region antes de volver a los EEUU, tanto los 'liederes tribales'
>>como la mayoria de los miembros coherentes de la region, mantienen
>>y hasta PIDEN que las FFAA de los EEUU actuen tacticamente como
>>nosotros lo hicimos en la oportunidad de literalmente "aplanar'
>>Fallujah en el enfrentamiento militar mas cruento y definiente que
>>yo haya tenido memoria en ios anios militares.
>>
>>Hoy... meses han pasado, mi pierna aun me molesta del disparo
>>recibido... pero poco a poco se disipan esas dudas del momento,
>>cuando las criticas solo sirven para nublar las mentes decididas
>>a un objetivo concreto y sin tanta politiqueria correctiva.
>>
>>Ayer fue Fallujah... hoy, Tal Afar... solo que, esta estrategia de
>>'sostenimiento politico' que adoptan los EEUU hoy, NO ha de
>>funcionar... hay que 'escuchar a los lideres tribales'... yo, nosotros
>>lo hicimos... y en esas bases actuamos. Con absouluto prejudicialismo
>>contra las fuerzas terroristas de Iran y Siria que estaban emplazadas
>>en Fallujah... creyeron que podrian... no fue asi. La leccion de todo
>>esto es olo una: al terrorista hay que arrasarlo sin consideraciones
>>laterales... sin asco, sin tregua. sin opcion a retirada... cerrarle
>>los flancos y destruirlo. Mi exeriencia en Fallujah en 2004, y este
>>post del New York Times, condirman lo que siempre crei fuese la
>>mejor deoctrina tactica en estos contextos de accion militar.
>>
>>No hay otra...
>>-----------------------------
>>The New York Times
>>June 16, 2005
>>Magnet for Iraq Insurgents Is a Crucial Test of New U.S. Strategy
>>By RICHARD A. OPPEL Jr.
>>
>>TAL AFAR, Iraq, June 15 - Nine months ago the American military laid
>>siege to this city in northwestern Iraq and proclaimed it freed from
>>the grip of insurgents. Last month, the Americans returned in force -
>>to reclaim it once again.
>>
>>After the battle here in September the military left behind fewer than
>>500 troops to patrol a region twice the size of Connecticut. With so
>>few troops and the local police force in shambles, insurgents came
>>back and turned Tal Afar, a dusty, agrarian city of about 200,000
>>people, into a way station for the trafficking of arms and insurgent
>>fighters from nearby Syria - and a ghost town of terrorized residents
>>afraid to open their stores, walk the streets or send their children
>>to school.
>>
>>It is a cycle that has been repeated in rebellious cities throughout
>>Iraq, and particularly those in the Sunni Arab regions west and north
>>of Baghdad, where the insurgency's roots run deepest.
>>
>>"We have a finite number of troops," said Maj. Chris Kennedy,
>>executive officer of the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment, which arrived
>>in Tal Afar several weeks ago. "But if you pull out of an area and
>>don't leave security forces in it, all you're going to do is leave the
>>door open for them to come back. This is what our lack of combat power
>>has done to us throughout the country. In the past, the problem has
>>been we haven't been able to leave sufficient forces in towns where
>>we've cleared the insurgents out."
>>
>>While officials in Washington say the military has all the troops it
>>needs, on-the-ground battle commanders in the most violent parts of
>>Iraq - in cities like Ramadi, Mosul and Mahmudiya - have said
>>privately that they need more manpower to pacify their areas and keep
>>them that way.
>>
>>Now, with the pace of insurgent attacks rising across Iraq and scores
>>being killed daily in bombings and mass executions, Tal Afar and the
>>surrounding area is becoming something of a test case for a strategy
>>to try to break the cycle: using battle-hardened American forces
>>working in conjunction with tribal leaders to clear out the insurgents
>>and then leaving behind Iraqi forces to try to keep the peace.
>>
>>Many tribal sheiks here say they favor an all-out assault to rout the
>>city's insurgents, but American commanders say a major attack like the
>>one that leveled Falluja last November is to be avoided almost at all
>>costs. The bloodshed, destruction of property and alienation of the
>>Iraqi public is too high a price to pay, they say.
>>
>>A political solution is best, the Americans said, but fiendishly
>>difficult, given the tangle of insurgent pressures and tribal
>>loyalties and divisions.
>>
>>"If you take all the complexities of Iraq and compressed it into one
>>city, it is Tal Afar," said the regiment's commander, Col. H. R.
>>McMaster.
>>
>>The military's decision to reassign the regiment from the so-called
>>Triangle of Death south of Baghdad to the region around Tal Afar was
>>an implicit acknowledgement that it had lost control of the area. The
>>first troops began arriving in April, and nearly 4,000 were in place
>>by mid-May.
>>
>>A Place Frozen in Fear
>>
>>On arrival here, commanders found a town that was, for all practical
>>purposes, dead, strangled by the violent insurgents who held it in
>>their thrall. "Anyone not helping the terrorists can't leave their
>>homes because they will be kidnapped and the terrorists will demand
>>money or weapons or make them join them to kill people," said Hikmat
>>Ameen al-Lawand, the leader of one of Tal Afar's 82 tribes, who said
>>most of the city is controlled by insurgents. "If they refuse they
>>will chop their heads off."
>>
>>Khasro Goran, the deputy provincial governor in Ninewa, which includes
>>Tal Afar, concurred. "There is no life in Tal Afar," he said in an
>>interview a week ago. "It is like Mosul a few months ago - a ghost
>>town." There are more than 500 insurgents in Tal Afar, he said, and
>>they project a level of fear and intimidation across the city far in
>>excess of their numbers. Thoroughfares lined with stores have been
>>deserted, the storefronts covered with blue metal roll-down gates.
>>
>>In northeast Tal Afar, a young mother now home-schools her six
>>children, after a flier posted at their school warned: "If you love
>>your children, you won't send them to school here because we will kill
>>them." A neighbor, Muhammad Ameen, will not let his kids play outside.
>>"Standing out in the open is not a good idea," he said.
>>
>>Tribes sympathetic to the new Iraqi government have suffered constant
>>assaults at the hands of insurgents and rival tribes. More than 500
>>mortars have struck lands belonging to the Al-Sada al-Mousawiyah tribe
>>since September, said the tribe's leader, Sheik Sayed Abdullah Sayed
>>Wahab. "All of my tribe are prisoners in their own homes," he says.
>>"We can't even take our people to the hospital."
>>
>>At least 40 members of two predominantly Shiite tribes of Turkomen,
>>the Sada and Jolak, were killed in two car bombings in May. The
>>perpetrators are believed by American officers to be members of the
>>predominantly Sunni Arab Qarabash tribe, which they say has strong
>>ties to Syrian fighters and links to the network of Abu Musab
>>al-Zarqawi, the Al Qaeda leader in Iraq. "I need someone to hear my
>>cries for help because we are in a bad situation," said Sheik Wali
>>al-Jolak in an interview at his compound in southwest Tal Afar, only a
>>few blocks from the Qarabash neighborhood. He lost 28 tribe members in
>>the two attacks.
>>
>>The Tal Afar police force disintegrated last fall, and the few who
>>remain stay in an ancient hilltop castle, afraid to venture out.
>>Commanders here caution troops to assume that anyone on the street
>>dressed as a policeman is an impostor. Insurgents wearing police
>>uniforms shoot at American helicopters and threaten residents.
>>
>>Even with the new regiment, the military still lacks troops to
>>completely patrol the outlying desert and grazing lands, where
>>insurgents had taken over remote villages, providing sanctuary a short
>>distance from Mosul, the country's dominant northern city and an
>>active insurgent hub. Insurgents use irrigation canals to elude
>>American forces chasing them in armored vehicles that cannot cross the
>>waterways. Smugglers drive through holes cut in the large berm that
>>guards the Syrian border. Remote cinderblock farmhouses serve as safe
>>havens.
>>
>>At the Rabia border crossing into Syria, several hundred American
>>soldiers arrived three weeks ago and say they have disrupted the
>>smuggling of weapons and money. But they doubt there has been any
>>curtailment yet in the infiltration of foreign fighters. "As far as
>>foreign fighters coming in from the border control point, I can't say
>>we've had any impact on that," said Capt. Jason Whitten, the company
>>commander at Rabia. Commanders say new technology will be installed at
>>the border crossing shortly to help track travelers and detect false
>>identification materials.
>>
>>In its first weeks here, the regiment has pressed sweeps deep into
>>desert areas that had not seen a large American presence since the
>>101st Airborne Division left in early 2004. Instead, many areas had
>>witnessed, at best, only sporadic patrols that had done little to
>>deter insurgents, commanders say. "Resources are everything in combat,
>>and when you don't have enough manpower to move around, you have to
>>pick the places," said Maj. John Wilwerding, executive officer of
>>Sabre Squadron, a 1,000-strong unit that now oversees Tal Afar.
>>
>>Two weeks ago more than 1,000 troops from the new regiment poured into
>>Biaj, a town of 15,000 people about 40 miles southwest of Tal Afar,
>>where insurgents had destroyed the police station, and the mayor and
>>the police fled last fall. Soldiers eventually searched every house in
>>the town, capturing more than a dozen suspected insurgents without a
>>shot being fired.
>>
>>Biaj faces a severe water shortage and trash and sewage fill the
>>streets. But the markets and neighborhoods teem with children who give
>>passing American patrols waves and a thumbs-up. Indeed, the town
>>appears to show what happens if there are enough troops to pacify an
>>area and police it effectively afterward. But commanders plan to
>>withdraw all but 150 American troops and leave a battalion of about
>>500 Iraqi soldiers and 200 police officers in Biaj.
>>
>>Taking Back Tal Afar
>>
>>In Tal Afar, Lt. Col. Chris Hickey, commander of Sabre Squadron, which
>>is equipped with tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles and helicopters,
>>moved quickly to reassert control of strategic sites. Soldiers drove
>>out insurgents who had taken control of the area around the hospital,
>>and turned over security there to Iraqi troops.
>>
>>Similarly, soldiers cleared the main east-west highway, which had been
>>made impassable by improvised explosive devices. An Iraqi battalion
>>now patrols the route, and Colonel Hickey is spearheading an effort to
>>rebuild the police with recruits drawn from tribes and trained in
>>Jordan.
>>
>>Insurgents waged heavy assaults against the squadron in the first few
>>weeks after it arrived but suffered heavy losses while having little
>>impact on the American troops. Those attacks have declined while
>>violence against townspeople has increased, Colonel Hickey said.
>>"We've disrupted the terrorists' network," he said. "But what I have
>>to overcome is a population too scared to open their stores or step
>>out on the street."
>>
>>Tal Afar has little municipal leadership to speak of. American
>>commanders say the mayor, a Sunni Arab, may have ties to the
>>insurgency. The police chief - a Shiite dismissed a few days ago for
>>the second time in as many months - may have been involved in the
>>abuse or torture of suspects, they say.
>>
>>Real leadership in Tal Afar lies with the 82 tribal leaders. Angered
>>by the attacks and emboldened by the enlarged American military
>>presence here, some sheiks have become outspoken critics of the
>>insurgency. On June 4, at great risk to their own lives, more than 60
>>attended a security conference at Al Kasik Iraqi Army base near here.
>>To the surprise of Iraqi and American commanders who organized the
>>gathering, many sheiks demanded a Falluja-style military assault to
>>rid Tal Afar of insurgents and complained that American forces do not
>>treat terror suspects roughly enough.
>>
>>Other sheiks said it was better to pursue a political solution. But
>>sheiks from each point of view accused one another of being unwilling
>>to identify suspected insurgents. American commanders had planned to
>>circulate a list of 1,400 people thought to have potential insurgent
>>connections, seeking verification - or denials - from the sheiks. But
>>they decided against it because few sheiks would openly affirm or deny
>>the status of insurgent suspects in front of other Iraqis, Colonel
>>Hickey said.
>>
>>Tal Afar's tribes have to bury old grudges for the city to be at
>>peace, says Brig. Gen. Mohsen Doski, a Kurd who commands a brigade of
>>2,000 Iraqi troops garrisoned here. "If we continue talking about the
>>past or what this certain person did or this tribe did, we will stay
>>in a closed circle," he said. If the city's problems cannot be solved
>>politically, he said, "We have to do in Tal Afar the same as in
>>Falluja."
>>
>>The American regiment's commander, Colonel McMaster, warned the sheiks
>>at the close of the day-long conference that the insurgents cannot be
>>defeated unless the tribes work together better. "To an outsider, it
>>seems there is not a lot of power because there are divisions. That's
>>exactly what the terrorists want," he said.
>>
>>In an interview, the colonel said the violence "isn't intertribal" but
>>a mixture of foreign fighters, Zarqawi loyalists and others working
>>"to incite chaos, breed fear and set conditions for them to continue
>>to operate out of Tal Afar." With the regiment now in place, he added,
>>"Tal Afar is clearly contested, where before it wasn't."
>>
>>An Iraqi Fighting Force?
>>
>>One week ago Tuesday, 1,000 American soldiers and hundreds of Iraqi
>>troops swept into the insurgency's principal safe haven in Tal Afar,
>>the Sariya neighborhood, detaining 34 suspected insurgent leaders and
>>fighters and killing as many as 10 fighters.
>>
>>Relying on Iraqi troops proved a miserable failure 13 months ago in
>>Falluja, where Iraqis were put in charge only to see the city come
>>rapidly under the sway of a Taliban-style terrorist theocracy that had
>>to be rooted out six months later by the Marines. But American
>>commanders now maintain that in some places, like Haifa Street, a
>>former insurgent stronghold in the heart of Baghdad, Iraqi soldiers
>>are improving.
>>
>>In Tal Afar, commanders say the new Iraqi troops they work with - two
>>predominantly Kurdish battalions and one mainly of Shiites from Basra
>>- have helped immeasurably in identifying insurgents. Capt. Greg
>>Mitchell, a company commander with Sabre Squadron, said his troops
>>could not have apprehended so many suspects on Tuesday had Iraqis not
>>been involved. "They have a much more discerning eye" for clues about
>>suspicious Iraqis, he said.
>>
>>Yet American troops also remain wary of Iraqis' tendencies to respond
>>to an attack by shooting wildly in all directions - a "death blossom,"
>>as the troops here call it. "They keep their fingers on the trigger
>>and they'll just shoot without aiming," Command Sgt. Maj. Mark Horsley
>>warned during the operation Tuesday, as fire rang out.
>>
>>Last Tuesday, an insurgent gunman wounded an American officer as he
>>walked through an alley accompanied by Iraqi troops. When the shooting
>>started, the Iraqis ran back to the street as the gunman continued to
>>fire at the wounded officer, said Capt. Jesse Sellars, a company
>>commander here. An American sergeant had to cajole a handful of Iraqis
>>to return fire in an effort to rescue the officer, who later died.
>>
>>"They're new soldiers," Major Wilwerding, of Sabre Squadron, said of
>>the Iraqis who fled. "They're not conditioned yet. They'll get
>>better."
>>--------------
>>
>>Salud,
>>
>>Gregg
>>
>>
>>---------------
>>"This is an age of exhausted whoredom groping for its God."
>> (James Joyce, Ulisses p.280)
>>
>> http://www.geocities.com/airborne_col/America.html

---------------
"This is an age of exhausted whoredom groping for its God."
(James Joyce, Ulisses p.280)

http://www.geocities.com/airborne_col/America.html

Se dice con la más fea, Gregg. Caramba,. cómo se deteriora su lenguaje!

Cariños
Dorothy

GREGG . <-TheScatologist@hotmail.com-> escribió en el mensaje de noticias
6c44b1lds95stbhtie86g588uiq4hn34u6@4ax.com...
>

Xavier Llobet dixit:


> Puesto que los resistentes al ejercito aleman en la 2a guerra mundial
> entraban perfectamente en la definicion de terroristas (y asi eran
> calificados por los Gobiernos locales), debes considerar que las
> acciones de represalia que se llevaban a cabo contra ellos y contra la
> poblacion que los cobijaba, a veces a la fuerza, estaban perfectamente
> justificadas.

Vaya mierda de silogismo.

Que los nazis calificaran de "terroristas" a los resistentes no implica
que los americanos en Iraq sean a su vez "nazis", o los insurgentes
iraquies sean "resistentes".

Que tendra que ver el tocino con la velocidad?

Por cierto, acaso los americanos han realizado represalias en masa contra
la poblacion civil iraqui como consecuencia de las acciones de los
"resistentes"? Non. donc, tais-toi, connard!.



BOLUDOVSKY

In article ,
ARIEL BOLUDOVSKY wrote:

> Xavier Llobet dixit:
>
>
> > Puesto que los resistentes al ejercito aleman en la 2a guerra mundial
> > entraban perfectamente en la definicion de terroristas (y asi eran
> > calificados por los Gobiernos locales), debes considerar que las
> > acciones de represalia que se llevaban a cabo contra ellos y contra la
> > poblacion que los cobijaba, a veces a la fuerza, estaban perfectamente
> > justificadas.
>
> Vaya mierda de silogismo.
>
> Que los nazis calificaran de "terroristas" a los resistentes no implica
> que los americanos en Iraq sean a su vez "nazis", o los insurgentes
> iraquies sean "resistentes".

Los hay con la cola de paja..., y no he sido yo quien ha comparado a los
USAnos con los alemanes, y aún menos con los nazis. No he implicado
nada. Sólo hacía ver que el mero hecho de ser calificado de terrorista
no hace (o no debería hacer) perder todos los derechos humanos.

¿Y cuál es tu definición de "resistente"?

> Que tendra que ver el tocino con la velocidad?

No sé, eres tú quien confunde el culo con las témporas.

> Por cierto, acaso los americanos han realizado represalias en masa contra
> la poblacion civil iraqui como consecuencia de las acciones de los
> "resistentes"?

Para contestar tendría que saber el balance de víctimas de todas las
operaciones militares de los USAnos en Iraq (además de tu definición de
"represalia en masa": a partir de qué porcentaje, o de qué número
absoluto, de víctimas es "en masa" o sólo es "indiscriminada"): ¿me das
las estadísticas?

--
_xavier
--
Only one "o" in my e-mail address
--
A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text.
Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing?
A: Top-posting.
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