Burbuja.info - Foro de economía > > > Why Hugo Chávez is an illegitimate President?
Respuesta
 
Herramientas Desplegado
  #1  
Antiguo 15-jun-2005, 06:14
GREGG .
Guest
 
Mensajes: n/a
Why Hugo Chávez is an illegitimate President

By Gustavo Coronel

June 10, 2005 | Many world governments, even democratic ones, still
consider the Venezuelan regime of Hugo Chávez to be legitimate.
Although they are increasingly aware of the authoritarian and
repressive nature of the regime, they justify their diplomatic
accommodation by claiming that Chávez came into power through
elections. For too many years now, the definition of political
legitimacy has rested exclusively on the manner in which political
power was obtained. Transparent elections seem to be all that was
needed for a government to be classified as legitimate. Political
scientists now tell us that such a definition is highly inadequate.
Legitimacy requires much more than elections. A document published by
the United Nations Development Program ( Democracy in Latin America,
UNDP, 2004) argues that countries need to progress from electoral
democracy to a citizen’s democracy. The true democratic nature of a
government and its degree of legitimacy have to be tested against a
set of criteria, such as the ones listed by the United Nations
Commission of Human Rights in 1999, which include:


* Freedom of opinion, of expression and of association
* The rule of law, equal for all citizens
* Universal and equal suffrage
* Political participation, with equal opportunity for all
* Transparent and accountable government institutions
* Equal access to public services.


I have no doubt in my mind that the regime of Hugo Chávez fails this
test for legitimacy and should be classified as illegitimate by
international organizations such as the U.N. and the O.A.S.

This belief is based on my analysis of the Venezuelan situation during
the years under Chávez rule. It is, of course, a subjective analysis,
but is largely backed by facts. Let us take a look:


Sources of political legitimacy

1. Free and Fair Elections.

The Chávez regime came to power through free and reasonable
transparent elections. After his clear initial victory, Chávez went on
to control the electoral system, by placing his followers
(Carrasquero, Jorge Rodriguez) in the top positions of the National
Electoral Council. The cases of government intervention and
manipulation have been amply documented. The call for the presidential
recall referendum in 2004 generated a process characterized by open
abuse of power by this council. The results of the recall referendum
itself have been denounced as fraudulent and, as a result, an
important portion of the population has lost credibility in the
electoral system. This lack of trust will result in progressively
higher levels of absenteeism in future electoral events, weakening the
legitimacy of the regime. In spite of these irregularities, the
electoral origin of the Chávez regime remains as its main and
practically sole claim to political legitimacy.

2. Accountability.

A legitimate government has to be accountable to the people for their
actions and for the manner in which they utilize national assets and
resources. This is definitely not the case with the Chávez regime.
Citizens are largely kept in the dark regarding the utilization of
those assets and resources. There are no controls to the way Chávez
decides to use them. Three examples: (1) 90,000 barrels per day of oil
are going to Cuba at highly subsidized prices, partly bartered in
exchange for obsolete technologies and medical services of
questionable quality. Chávez went ahead with this agreement without
proper institutional approval and against the desires of the
Venezuelan people. Cuba already owes Venezuela over US$2 billion but
the mandatory steps to interrupt this unpaid supply have not been
taken by the negligent Venezuelan authorities. (2) The oil income, all
of which should go to the Venezuelan Central Bank is being illegally
diverted from the national treasury, to be used directly by Chávez
without any transparency or accountability. At this moment there are
over US$3 billion unaccounted for, a gigantic crime that the majority
of the people remain unaware of, due to its rather complex technical
nature, and (3) The attempt at handing over to China the patents to
manufacture Orimulsion, a Venezuelan technology to mix extra heavy
oils with water and emulsifiers (a transaction that was being done in
secret, without the knowledge of Venezuelans and without proper public
disclosure).

3. The Rule of Law.

The law is not being applied in an impartial manner. Members of the
opposition do not receive the proper protection of the law or of the
institutions that should protect them. In fact the Attorney General,
Isaias Rodriguez and the ombudsman, German Amundarain, have become the
main enemies of political dissenters: Journalists are being
persecuted, political prisoners are already counted by the dozens. The
Supreme tribunal of Justice is stacked with Chávez followers. Citizens
can no longer trust in the impartiality of the law.

4. Social Inclusion.

Chávez has built his following among the very poor. This certainly
would not be objectionable if it were not for the two following
reasons; (1) that most of the promises made by Chávez to the poor
remain tragically unfulfilled, to the extreme that poverty is now
greater than when Chávez arrived in power, and (2) that the money
being handed out to the poor in terms of subsidies and freebies does
not constitute a structural solution to poverty and is being done at
the expense of the impoverishment of the other half of the population:
the regular workers, the middle class and the private industrial
sector. What the regime understands as popular participation and
inclusion is simply participation by, and the inclusion of, his
followers, not over all inclusion and truly collective participation.
Today half the country is excluded from participating in the issues
that affect all Venezuelans. This is a fraud.

5. A Strong and Independent Media.

For some time after his electoral victory Chávez respected the freedom
of the media. During the last two to three years, however, this
freedom has been progressively restricted through the harassment, by
diverse agencies of the regime, of TV stations and newspapers that
oppose Chávez. The major blow to freedom of expression in Venezuela
has been the enacting of a Law that regulates the content of media
news. This law has been combined with changes in the Penal Code that
make it punishable by prison, of up to six years, any "disrespect" by
the media of Mr. Chávez and his relatives and inner circle,
"disrespect" defined by the regime itself. Obviously this has led to
major self-censorship among the media. As a result, much information
that should be known by Venezuelans is not reported upon, for fear of
retaliation based on the Gag Law and the revised penal code.

6. Existence of Institutional Checks and Balances.

A legitimate democracy requires checks and balances. No one should be
able to dictate his or her wishes to the rest of society without the
limitations imposed by the public good. Today Chávez is the law of the
land in Venezuela. What he says goes, without any opposition from the
institutions that should make sure that no one could become a
dictator. These institutions: the Attorney General, the Comptroller
General, the Ombudsman, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, the National
Assembly and the National Electoral Council are all in Chávez's
pockets, due to the invertebrate nature of the position holders. The
illegal use of public assets (airplanes and other state owned
equipment) and monies (billions of dollars diverted away from the
proper agencies) goes unchecked. The persecution and imprisonment of
dissenters go unchecked. Decisions of foreign policy (Cuban-Venezuelan
agreements, Orimulsion to the Chinese, alignment with Iran and other
States to build an anti-U.S. global coalition) which are highly
detrimental to our nation go unchecked and are taken without public
discussion or accountability. The abuse of State Television and the
imposition of TV and radio hookups to allow Chávez to give long and
irrelevant speeches go unchecked. There is no restraint of power,
there are no minority rights, there is no civilian control over the
military, and there is no independent Central Bank. The authoritarian
posture of Hugo Chávez is no longer a matter of biased perceptions by
the opposition but an integral component of an arrogant and disdainful
style of ruling. Chávez already considers himself to be above the law
and this is the main characteristic of dictators.

7. Economic and Political Stability.

A legitimate government has to provide a nation with reasonable
economic and political stability. This is not the case with the Chávez
regime. During his six and a half years in power Chávez has received
about US$130 billion from oil exports but this money is nowhere to be
seen, except as in the form of handouts. He has doubled the national
debt. He is attempting to grab a good portion of the international
reserves, a move that would greatly increase our country risk and keep
international investors away. He has imposed for years a rigid
exchange control that has been used as a political tool to punish
companies managed by dissenters ("not one single dollar for the
enemies of the revolution," he has said). Exchange controls have
forced the closing down of hundreds of businesses. While the
hemisphere has been enjoying an economic mini-boom, Venezuela has
remained as the almost only Latin American country with double-digit
inflation (25% plus) and extremely high unemployment (17% and higher).
Fiscal deficits remain enormous and it seems evident that oil income,
no matter how great, will not be enough to satisfy the thirst for
money Chávez has developed. Bureaucratic corruption levels are
extremely high due to the lack of controls and the ineptness of the
top members of the administration. Petróleos de Venezuela, the main
source of hard currency, is suffering great deterioration and is being
subject to partial liquidation of its assets (Orimulsion patents being
turned over to China, petrochemical assets being turned over to U.S.
companies, Citgo refineries on sale). Poverty is increasing although
money showering, in the form of handouts, is temporarily keeping the
poor reasonably hopeful that their lot will improve.

This bleak economic picture leads to an equally bleak political
situation and they feed on each other. The revolution is beginning to
show serious signs of internal fracturing, due to personal ambitions
among the revolutionary leadership and the desire of competing groups
(PPT, MVR, the military) to get their portion of the spoils. The Armed
Forces and the political parties that support the regime are at
increasing internal odds due to: (1) the creation by Chávez of a
popular, armed militia that will eventually serve to replace the
regular army, (2) the increasing alignment between Chávez and Castro's
Cuba that is rapidly converting Venezuela into a Cuban political
satellite and, (3) the desire by these groups to attain more political
power and financial rewards. The opposition, although still in
disarray, is ardently opposed to the violation of Chávez electoral
mandate to conduct democratic change and to his recent and arrogant
declaration of being a Socialist and leading a Socialist revolution,
something that even his followers did not have in mind when voting for
him. Venezuelans will not accept this attempted political rape without
a determined fight.

8. Equal Access to Public Services.

Today there are many second-class Venezuelan citizens who do not
receive proper attention from government agencies. They are the ones
who signed the petition for the presidential recall referendum. These
citizens are not given government jobs or have been dismissed from
their existing jobs, are not extended passports or identity cards.
These citizens are in a black list generated by a man called Luis
Tascón, under orders of Hugo Chávez. This list alone would suffice to
render the regime of Hugo Chávez illegitimate.


---o0o---

I think that these comments will show that there is a growing issue of
illegitimacy surrounding the Hugo Chávez presidency. But, even if this
were true, people might ask: "So what?" Who can remedy this situation?
Venezuelan society appears incapable of generating an internal protest
strong enough to force a change in this situation, at least in the
short term. Elections are a highly doubtful alternative, as Chávez
controls and manipulates electoral mechanisms. An armed rebellion,
such as the one Chávez staged in 1992, would either fail due to
incompetence of the leaders (as it happened with Chávez in 1992) or,
worse, would result in the replacement of Chávez by an armed gorilla,
someone even worse than Chávez, who would take us even farther back
into the 19th century.

Ousting Chávez will require a combination of strategies, including
domestic and international components. The starting point must be a
rational and unselfish commitment by the opposition to work towards a
unified leadership, a common political platform and a systematic
campaign to open the eyes of all Venezuelans to the national disaster
that Venezuela has become under the rule of Chávez. The main obstacle
to the short-term success of this strategy is the illusory feeling of
progress Chávez has been able to instill into the poor, due to his
expedient policy of handouts. Millions of my countrymen and women live
on a day-to-day survival mode. This is understandable but limits the
power of any message designed to make them see that this illusion of
progress is temporary, that it will end when the regime runs into
economic difficulties and that the true answers to their existential
problems are of a more structural nature. This limitation should not
stop the putting into effect of the strategies designed to stop the
Chávez crimes against the nation.

These strategies, in fact, should have started yesterday!

--------------

Gregg


---------------
"This is an age of exhausted whoredom groping for its God."
(James Joyce, Ulisses p.280)

http://www.geocities.com/airborne_col/America.html


Responder Citando
  #2  
Antiguo 15-jun-2005, 08:19
Miguelangel
Guest
 
Mensajes: n/a
Que cantidad de chorradas !!!!!!!!!!!!

Chavez, te guste o no, es tan legítimo como cualquier otro. Ha pasado
referendum tras referéndum en su pais.

Eso sí, no cede el control de su petróleo a USA y me temo que ALCA será
un fiambre en breve. Además, es amigo de Fidel, la bestia negra.

No, el problema no es Chavez. El problema, como siempre, es "el amigo
americano".

¿cuando veremos los gráficos de las armas de destrucción masiva en
camiones moviendose por todo Venezuela? ¿nos dirá el FBI que Chavez
tiene listas mil y una bombas atómicas apuntando al "mundo libre"?

Me temo que todo esto no tiene nada que ver con la "democracia", sino
con un simple control del petróleo y de la zona.

Porque, por otra parte, yo conozco ciertos presidentes de estados
"democráticos" que declaran invasiones a paises no-amenazantes bajo
excusas peregrinas (mentiras). Y conozco también algunos presidentes
cuyos hermanos se encargan de robar todos los votos necesarios para que
gane. Y conozco presidentes que tienen gulags en mitad del caribe. Y
algunos de estos presidentes se dicen democráticos y pretenden dar
lecciones y certificados de demócrata por el mundo adelante. Quizá les
valiera la pena rducir su déficit galopante y mejorar el nivel de vida
de sus ciudadanos.

Por cierto, ¿no sabes que es de muy mala educación el crossputeo? ¿será
que eres un posteante ilegítimo?

---

Miguelangel :: [email protected]


Corto el cross hacia e.c.p.misc y e.s.c.spain






GREGG . escribió:
> Why Hugo Chávez is an illegitimate President



Responder Citando
  #3  
Antiguo 15-jun-2005, 15:34
Lalo
Guest
 
Mensajes: n/a

"Miguelangel" <[email protected]> escribió en el mensaje
news:[email protected]
> Que cantidad de chorradas !!!!!!!!!!!!
>
> Chavez, te guste o no, es tan legítimo como cualquier otro. Ha pasado
> referendum tras referéndum en su pais.


Franco y Chávez tienen una cosa en común, 0% de aciertos en golpes de estado
( 0/1 )

>
> Eso sí, no cede el control de su petróleo a USA y me temo que ALCA será
> un fiambre en breve. Además, es amigo de Fidel, la bestia negra.


Juer, a ver cuando la progresía encuentra referentes más respetablas que la
momia del caribe a la hora de ejercer su "antiamericanismo"




Responder Citando
  #4  
Antiguo 16-jun-2005, 00:11
Guest
 
Mensajes: n/a
In scriptura diei Wed, 15 Jun 2005 04:14:45 GMT, GREGG . scripsit:

> Why Hugo Chávez is an illegitimate President
>


Porque no tiene ninguna intención de regalar a los yanquis todo el
petróleo, eso es el porqué. Me gustaría leer lo mismo por otros muy
"legítimos" líderes de otro paises de Sudamérica


Responder Citando
  #5  
Antiguo 16-jun-2005, 00:29
Chaflayo
Guest
 
Mensajes: n/a
No English amigo...you have to learn spanish to sell your shit....and
then..shit is shit is shit in any language.

Your pre invasion propaganda stinks




Responder Citando
  #6  
Antiguo 16-jun-2005, 01:48
r3°
Guest
 
Mensajes: n/a
After reading Coronel's article, it is evident,
obvious and crystal clear that the Venezuelan
President is far more legitimate than Dubya...

r3°
P.S.- It backfired, didn't it...

"GREGG ." <[email protected]> wrote in message
news:i2bva19s1i3ejib5354lvp7qv [email protected]
| Why Hugo Chávez is an illegitimate President
|
| By Gustavo Coronel
|
| June 10, 2005 | Many world governments, even democratic ones, still
| consider the Venezuelan regime of Hugo Chávez to be legitimate.
| Although they are increasingly aware of the authoritarian and
| repressive nature of the regime, they justify their diplomatic
| accommodation by claiming that Chávez came into power through
| elections. For too many years now, the definition of political
| legitimacy has rested exclusively on the manner in which political
| power was obtained. Transparent elections seem to be all that was
| needed for a government to be classified as legitimate. Political
| scientists now tell us that such a definition is highly inadequate.
| Legitimacy requires much more than elections. A document published by
| the United Nations Development Program ( Democracy in Latin America,
| UNDP, 2004) argues that countries need to progress from electoral
| democracy to a citizen's democracy. The true democratic nature of a
| government and its degree of legitimacy have to be tested against a
| set of criteria, such as the ones listed by the United Nations
| Commission of Human Rights in 1999, which include:
|
|
| * Freedom of opinion, of expression and of association
| * The rule of law, equal for all citizens
| * Universal and equal suffrage
| * Political participation, with equal opportunity for all
| * Transparent and accountable government institutions
| * Equal access to public services.
|
|
| I have no doubt in my mind that the regime of Hugo Chávez fails this
| test for legitimacy and should be classified as illegitimate by
| international organizations such as the U.N. and the O.A.S.
|
| This belief is based on my analysis of the Venezuelan situation during
| the years under Chávez rule. It is, of course, a subjective analysis,
| but is largely backed by facts. Let us take a look:
|
|
| Sources of political legitimacy
|
| 1. Free and Fair Elections.
|
| The Chávez regime came to power through free and reasonable
| transparent elections. After his clear initial victory, Chávez went on
| to control the electoral system, by placing his followers
| (Carrasquero, Jorge Rodriguez) in the top positions of the National
| Electoral Council. The cases of government intervention and
| manipulation have been amply documented. The call for the presidential
| recall referendum in 2004 generated a process characterized by open
| abuse of power by this council. The results of the recall referendum
| itself have been denounced as fraudulent and, as a result, an
| important portion of the population has lost credibility in the
| electoral system. This lack of trust will result in progressively
| higher levels of absenteeism in future electoral events, weakening the
| legitimacy of the regime. In spite of these irregularities, the
| electoral origin of the Chávez regime remains as its main and
| practically sole claim to political legitimacy.
|
| 2. Accountability.
|
| A legitimate government has to be accountable to the people for their
| actions and for the manner in which they utilize national assets and
| resources. This is definitely not the case with the Chávez regime.
| Citizens are largely kept in the dark regarding the utilization of
| those assets and resources. There are no controls to the way Chávez
| decides to use them. Three examples: (1) 90,000 barrels per day of oil
| are going to Cuba at highly subsidized prices, partly bartered in
| exchange for obsolete technologies and medical services of
| questionable quality. Chávez went ahead with this agreement without
| proper institutional approval and against the desires of the
| Venezuelan people. Cuba already owes Venezuela over US$2 billion but
| the mandatory steps to interrupt this unpaid supply have not been
| taken by the negligent Venezuelan authorities. (2) The oil income, all
| of which should go to the Venezuelan Central Bank is being illegally
| diverted from the national treasury, to be used directly by Chávez
| without any transparency or accountability. At this moment there are
| over US$3 billion unaccounted for, a gigantic crime that the majority
| of the people remain unaware of, due to its rather complex technical
| nature, and (3) The attempt at handing over to China the patents to
| manufacture Orimulsion, a Venezuelan technology to mix extra heavy
| oils with water and emulsifiers (a transaction that was being done in
| secret, without the knowledge of Venezuelans and without proper public
| disclosure).
|
| 3. The Rule of Law.
|
| The law is not being applied in an impartial manner. Members of the
| opposition do not receive the proper protection of the law or of the
| institutions that should protect them. In fact the Attorney General,
| Isaias Rodriguez and the ombudsman, German Amundarain, have become the
| main enemies of political dissenters: Journalists are being
| persecuted, political prisoners are already counted by the dozens. The
| Supreme tribunal of Justice is stacked with Chávez followers. Citizens
| can no longer trust in the impartiality of the law.
|
| 4. Social Inclusion.
|
| Chávez has built his following among the very poor. This certainly
| would not be objectionable if it were not for the two following
| reasons; (1) that most of the promises made by Chávez to the poor
| remain tragically unfulfilled, to the extreme that poverty is now
| greater than when Chávez arrived in power, and (2) that the money
| being handed out to the poor in terms of subsidies and freebies does
| not constitute a structural solution to poverty and is being done at
| the expense of the impoverishment of the other half of the population:
| the regular workers, the middle class and the private industrial
| sector. What the regime understands as popular participation and
| inclusion is simply participation by, and the inclusion of, his
| followers, not over all inclusion and truly collective participation.
| Today half the country is excluded from participating in the issues
| that affect all Venezuelans. This is a fraud.
|
| 5. A Strong and Independent Media.
|
| For some time after his electoral victory Chávez respected the freedom
| of the media. During the last two to three years, however, this
| freedom has been progressively restricted through the harassment, by
| diverse agencies of the regime, of TV stations and newspapers that
| oppose Chávez. The major blow to freedom of expression in Venezuela
| has been the enacting of a Law that regulates the content of media
| news. This law has been combined with changes in the Penal Code that
| make it punishable by prison, of up to six years, any "disrespect" by
| the media of Mr. Chávez and his relatives and inner circle,
| "disrespect" defined by the regime itself. Obviously this has led to
| major self-censorship among the media. As a result, much information
| that should be known by Venezuelans is not reported upon, for fear of
| retaliation based on the Gag Law and the revised penal code.
|
| 6. Existence of Institutional Checks and Balances.
|
| A legitimate democracy requires checks and balances. No one should be
| able to dictate his or her wishes to the rest of society without the
| limitations imposed by the public good. Today Chávez is the law of the
| land in Venezuela. What he says goes, without any opposition from the
| institutions that should make sure that no one could become a
| dictator. These institutions: the Attorney General, the Comptroller
| General, the Ombudsman, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, the National
| Assembly and the National Electoral Council are all in Chávez's
| pockets, due to the invertebrate nature of the position holders. The
| illegal use of public assets (airplanes and other state owned
| equipment) and monies (billions of dollars diverted away from the
| proper agencies) goes unchecked. The persecution and imprisonment of
| dissenters go unchecked. Decisions of foreign policy (Cuban-Venezuelan
| agreements, Orimulsion to the Chinese, alignment with Iran and other
| States to build an anti-U.S. global coalition) which are highly
| detrimental to our nation go unchecked and are taken without public
| discussion or accountability. The abuse of State Television and the
| imposition of TV and radio hookups to allow Chávez to give long and
| irrelevant speeches go unchecked. There is no restraint of power,
| there are no minority rights, there is no civilian control over the
| military, and there is no independent Central Bank. The authoritarian
| posture of Hugo Chávez is no longer a matter of biased perceptions by
| the opposition but an integral component of an arrogant and disdainful
| style of ruling. Chávez already considers himself to be above the law
| and this is the main characteristic of dictators.
|
| 7. Economic and Political Stability.
|
| A legitimate government has to provide a nation with reasonable
| economic and political stability. This is not the case with the Chávez
| regime. During his six and a half years in power Chávez has received
| about US$130 billion from oil exports but this money is nowhere to be
| seen, except as in the form of handouts. He has doubled the national
| debt. He is attempting to grab a good portion of the international
| reserves, a move that would greatly increase our country risk and keep
| international investors away. He has imposed for years a rigid
| exchange control that has been used as a political tool to punish
| companies managed by dissenters ("not one single dollar for the
| enemies of the revolution," he has said). Exchange controls have
| forced the closing down of hundreds of businesses. While the
| hemisphere has been enjoying an economic mini-boom, Venezuela has
| remained as the almost only Latin American country with double-digit
| inflation (25% plus) and extremely high unemployment (17% and higher).
| Fiscal deficits remain enormous and it seems evident that oil income,
| no matter how great, will not be enough to satisfy the thirst for
| money Chávez has developed. Bureaucratic corruption levels are
| extremely high due to the lack of controls and the ineptness of the
| top members of the administration. Petróleos de Venezuela, the main
| source of hard currency, is suffering great deterioration and is being
| subject to partial liquidation of its assets (Orimulsion patents being
| turned over to China, petrochemical assets being turned over to U.S.
| companies, Citgo refineries on sale). Poverty is increasing although
| money showering, in the form of handouts, is temporarily keeping the
| poor reasonably hopeful that their lot will improve.
|
| This bleak economic picture leads to an equally bleak political
| situation and they feed on each other. The revolution is beginning to
| show serious signs of internal fracturing, due to personal ambitions
| among the revolutionary leadership and the desire of competing groups
| (PPT, MVR, the military) to get their portion of the spoils. The Armed
| Forces and the political parties that support the regime are at
| increasing internal odds due to: (1) the creation by Chávez of a
| popular, armed militia that will eventually serve to replace the
| regular army, (2) the increasing alignment between Chávez and Castro's
| Cuba that is rapidly converting Venezuela into a Cuban political
| satellite and, (3) the desire by these groups to attain more political
| power and financial rewards. The opposition, although still in
| disarray, is ardently opposed to the violation of Chávez electoral
| mandate to conduct democratic change and to his recent and arrogant
| declaration of being a Socialist and leading a Socialist revolution,
| something that even his followers did not have in mind when voting for
| him. Venezuelans will not accept this attempted political rape without
| a determined fight.
|
| 8. Equal Access to Public Services.
|
| Today there are many second-class Venezuelan citizens who do not
| receive proper attention from government agencies. They are the ones
| who signed the petition for the presidential recall referendum. These
| citizens are not given government jobs or have been dismissed from
| their existing jobs, are not extended passports or identity cards.
| These citizens are in a black list generated by a man called Luis
| Tascón, under orders of Hugo Chávez. This list alone would suffice to
| render the regime of Hugo Chávez illegitimate.
|
|
| ---o0o---
|
| I think that these comments will show that there is a growing issue of
| illegitimacy surrounding the Hugo Chávez presidency. But, even if this
| were true, people might ask: "So what?" Who can remedy this situation?
| Venezuelan society appears incapable of generating an internal protest
| strong enough to force a change in this situation, at least in the
| short term. Elections are a highly doubtful alternative, as Chávez
| controls and manipulates electoral mechanisms. An armed rebellion,
| such as the one Chávez staged in 1992, would either fail due to
| incompetence of the leaders (as it happened with Chávez in 1992) or,
| worse, would result in the replacement of Chávez by an armed gorilla,
| someone even worse than Chávez, who would take us even farther back
| into the 19th century.
|
| Ousting Chávez will require a combination of strategies, including
| domestic and international components. The starting point must be a
| rational and unselfish commitment by the opposition to work towards a
| unified leadership, a common political platform and a systematic
| campaign to open the eyes of all Venezuelans to the national disaster
| that Venezuela has become under the rule of Chávez. The main obstacle
| to the short-term success of this strategy is the illusory feeling of
| progress Chávez has been able to instill into the poor, due to his
| expedient policy of handouts. Millions of my countrymen and women live
| on a day-to-day survival mode. This is understandable but limits the
| power of any message designed to make them see that this illusion of
| progress is temporary, that it will end when the regime runs into
| economic difficulties and that the true answers to their existential
| problems are of a more structural nature. This limitation should not
| stop the putting into effect of the strategies designed to stop the
| Chávez crimes against the nation.
|
| These strategies, in fact, should have started yesterday!
|
| --------------
|
| Gregg
|
|
| ---------------
| "This is an age of exhausted whoredom groping for its God."
| (James Joyce, Ulisses p.280)
|
| http://www.geocities.com/airborne_col/America.html




Responder Citando
  #7  
Antiguo 16-jun-2005, 04:07
GREGG .
Guest
 
Mensajes: n/a
On Thu, 16 Jun 2005 09:414 +1000, "r3°" <[email protected]>
wrote:

>After reading Coronel's article, it is evident,
>obvious and crystal clear that the Venezuelan
>President is far more legitimate than Dubya...
>
>r3°
>P.S.- It backfired, didn't it...


Je,je,je,je,je,je... just testing the waters.

Gregg

>
>"GREGG ." <[email protected]> wrote in message
>news:i2bva19s1i3ejib5354lvp7q [email protected]
>| Why Hugo Chávez is an illegitimate President
>|
>| By Gustavo Coronel
>|
>| June 10, 2005 | Many world governments, even democratic ones, still
>| consider the Venezuelan regime of Hugo Chávez to be legitimate.
>| Although they are increasingly aware of the authoritarian and
>| repressive nature of the regime, they justify their diplomatic
>| accommodation by claiming that Chávez came into power through
>| elections. For too many years now, the definition of political
>| legitimacy has rested exclusively on the manner in which political
>| power was obtained. Transparent elections seem to be all that was
>| needed for a government to be classified as legitimate. Political
>| scientists now tell us that such a definition is highly inadequate.
>| Legitimacy requires much more than elections. A document published by
>| the United Nations Development Program ( Democracy in Latin America,
>| UNDP, 2004) argues that countries need to progress from electoral
>| democracy to a citizen's democracy. The true democratic nature of a
>| government and its degree of legitimacy have to be tested against a
>| set of criteria, such as the ones listed by the United Nations
>| Commission of Human Rights in 1999, which include:
>|
>|
>| * Freedom of opinion, of expression and of association
>| * The rule of law, equal for all citizens
>| * Universal and equal suffrage
>| * Political participation, with equal opportunity for all
>| * Transparent and accountable government institutions
>| * Equal access to public services.
>|
>|
>| I have no doubt in my mind that the regime of Hugo Chávez fails this
>| test for legitimacy and should be classified as illegitimate by
>| international organizations such as the U.N. and the O.A.S.
>|
>| This belief is based on my analysis of the Venezuelan situation during
>| the years under Chávez rule. It is, of course, a subjective analysis,
>| but is largely backed by facts. Let us take a look:
>|
>|
>| Sources of political legitimacy
>|
>| 1. Free and Fair Elections.
>|
>| The Chávez regime came to power through free and reasonable
>| transparent elections. After his clear initial victory, Chávez went on
>| to control the electoral system, by placing his followers
>| (Carrasquero, Jorge Rodriguez) in the top positions of the National
>| Electoral Council. The cases of government intervention and
>| manipulation have been amply documented. The call for the presidential
>| recall referendum in 2004 generated a process characterized by open
>| abuse of power by this council. The results of the recall referendum
>| itself have been denounced as fraudulent and, as a result, an
>| important portion of the population has lost credibility in the
>| electoral system. This lack of trust will result in progressively
>| higher levels of absenteeism in future electoral events, weakening the
>| legitimacy of the regime. In spite of these irregularities, the
>| electoral origin of the Chávez regime remains as its main and
>| practically sole claim to political legitimacy.
>|
>| 2. Accountability.
>|
>| A legitimate government has to be accountable to the people for their
>| actions and for the manner in which they utilize national assets and
>| resources. This is definitely not the case with the Chávez regime.
>| Citizens are largely kept in the dark regarding the utilization of
>| those assets and resources. There are no controls to the way Chávez
>| decides to use them. Three examples: (1) 90,000 barrels per day of oil
>| are going to Cuba at highly subsidized prices, partly bartered in
>| exchange for obsolete technologies and medical services of
>| questionable quality. Chávez went ahead with this agreement without
>| proper institutional approval and against the desires of the
>| Venezuelan people. Cuba already owes Venezuela over US$2 billion but
>| the mandatory steps to interrupt this unpaid supply have not been
>| taken by the negligent Venezuelan authorities. (2) The oil income, all
>| of which should go to the Venezuelan Central Bank is being illegally
>| diverted from the national treasury, to be used directly by Chávez
>| without any transparency or accountability. At this moment there are
>| over US$3 billion unaccounted for, a gigantic crime that the majority
>| of the people remain unaware of, due to its rather complex technical
>| nature, and (3) The attempt at handing over to China the patents to
>| manufacture Orimulsion, a Venezuelan technology to mix extra heavy
>| oils with water and emulsifiers (a transaction that was being done in
>| secret, without the knowledge of Venezuelans and without proper public
>| disclosure).
>|
>| 3. The Rule of Law.
>|
>| The law is not being applied in an impartial manner. Members of the
>| opposition do not receive the proper protection of the law or of the
>| institutions that should protect them. In fact the Attorney General,
>| Isaias Rodriguez and the ombudsman, German Amundarain, have become the
>| main enemies of political dissenters: Journalists are being
>| persecuted, political prisoners are already counted by the dozens. The
>| Supreme tribunal of Justice is stacked with Chávez followers. Citizens
>| can no longer trust in the impartiality of the law.
>|
>| 4. Social Inclusion.
>|
>| Chávez has built his following among the very poor. This certainly
>| would not be objectionable if it were not for the two following
>| reasons; (1) that most of the promises made by Chávez to the poor
>| remain tragically unfulfilled, to the extreme that poverty is now
>| greater than when Chávez arrived in power, and (2) that the money
>| being handed out to the poor in terms of subsidies and freebies does
>| not constitute a structural solution to poverty and is being done at
>| the expense of the impoverishment of the other half of the population:
>| the regular workers, the middle class and the private industrial
>| sector. What the regime understands as popular participation and
>| inclusion is simply participation by, and the inclusion of, his
>| followers, not over all inclusion and truly collective participation.
>| Today half the country is excluded from participating in the issues
>| that affect all Venezuelans. This is a fraud.
>|
>| 5. A Strong and Independent Media.
>|
>| For some time after his electoral victory Chávez respected the freedom
>| of the media. During the last two to three years, however, this
>| freedom has been progressively restricted through the harassment, by
>| diverse agencies of the regime, of TV stations and newspapers that
>| oppose Chávez. The major blow to freedom of expression in Venezuela
>| has been the enacting of a Law that regulates the content of media
>| news. This law has been combined with changes in the Penal Code that
>| make it punishable by prison, of up to six years, any "disrespect" by
>| the media of Mr. Chávez and his relatives and inner circle,
>| "disrespect" defined by the regime itself. Obviously this has led to
>| major self-censorship among the media. As a result, much information
>| that should be known by Venezuelans is not reported upon, for fear of
>| retaliation based on the Gag Law and the revised penal code.
>|
>| 6. Existence of Institutional Checks and Balances.
>|
>| A legitimate democracy requires checks and balances. No one should be
>| able to dictate his or her wishes to the rest of society without the
>| limitations imposed by the public good. Today Chávez is the law of the
>| land in Venezuela. What he says goes, without any opposition from the
>| institutions that should make sure that no one could become a
>| dictator. These institutions: the Attorney General, the Comptroller
>| General, the Ombudsman, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, the National
>| Assembly and the National Electoral Council are all in Chávez's
>| pockets, due to the invertebrate nature of the position holders. The
>| illegal use of public assets (airplanes and other state owned
>| equipment) and monies (billions of dollars diverted away from the
>| proper agencies) goes unchecked. The persecution and imprisonment of
>| dissenters go unchecked. Decisions of foreign policy (Cuban-Venezuelan
>| agreements, Orimulsion to the Chinese, alignment with Iran and other
>| States to build an anti-U.S. global coalition) which are highly
>| detrimental to our nation go unchecked and are taken without public
>| discussion or accountability. The abuse of State Television and the
>| imposition of TV and radio hookups to allow Chávez to give long and
>| irrelevant speeches go unchecked. There is no restraint of power,
>| there are no minority rights, there is no civilian control over the
>| military, and there is no independent Central Bank. The authoritarian
>| posture of Hugo Chávez is no longer a matter of biased perceptions by
>| the opposition but an integral component of an arrogant and disdainful
>| style of ruling. Chávez already considers himself to be above the law
>| and this is the main characteristic of dictators.
>|
>| 7. Economic and Political Stability.
>|
>| A legitimate government has to provide a nation with reasonable
>| economic and political stability. This is not the case with the Chávez
>| regime. During his six and a half years in power Chávez has received
>| about US$130 billion from oil exports but this money is nowhere to be
>| seen, except as in the form of handouts. He has doubled the national
>| debt. He is attempting to grab a good portion of the international
>| reserves, a move that would greatly increase our country risk and keep
>| international investors away. He has imposed for years a rigid
>| exchange control that has been used as a political tool to punish
>| companies managed by dissenters ("not one single dollar for the
>| enemies of the revolution," he has said). Exchange controls have
>| forced the closing down of hundreds of businesses. While the
>| hemisphere has been enjoying an economic mini-boom, Venezuela has
>| remained as the almost only Latin American country with double-digit
>| inflation (25% plus) and extremely high unemployment (17% and higher).
>| Fiscal deficits remain enormous and it seems evident that oil income,
>| no matter how great, will not be enough to satisfy the thirst for
>| money Chávez has developed. Bureaucratic corruption levels are
>| extremely high due to the lack of controls and the ineptness of the
>| top members of the administration. Petróleos de Venezuela, the main
>| source of hard currency, is suffering great deterioration and is being
>| subject to partial liquidation of its assets (Orimulsion patents being
>| turned over to China, petrochemical assets being turned over to U.S.
>| companies, Citgo refineries on sale). Poverty is increasing although
>| money showering, in the form of handouts, is temporarily keeping the
>| poor reasonably hopeful that their lot will improve.
>|
>| This bleak economic picture leads to an equally bleak political
>| situation and they feed on each other. The revolution is beginning to
>| show serious signs of internal fracturing, due to personal ambitions
>| among the revolutionary leadership and the desire of competing groups
>| (PPT, MVR, the military) to get their portion of the spoils. The Armed
>| Forces and the political parties that support the regime are at
>| increasing internal odds due to: (1) the creation by Chávez of a
>| popular, armed militia that will eventually serve to replace the
>| regular army, (2) the increasing alignment between Chávez and Castro's
>| Cuba that is rapidly converting Venezuela into a Cuban political
>| satellite and, (3) the desire by these groups to attain more political
>| power and financial rewards. The opposition, although still in
>| disarray, is ardently opposed to the violation of Chávez electoral
>| mandate to conduct democratic change and to his recent and arrogant
>| declaration of being a Socialist and leading a Socialist revolution,
>| something that even his followers did not have in mind when voting for
>| him. Venezuelans will not accept this attempted political rape without
>| a determined fight.
>|
>| 8. Equal Access to Public Services.
>|
>| Today there are many second-class Venezuelan citizens who do not
>| receive proper attention from government agencies. They are the ones
>| who signed the petition for the presidential recall referendum. These
>| citizens are not given government jobs or have been dismissed from
>| their existing jobs, are not extended passports or identity cards.
>| These citizens are in a black list generated by a man called Luis
>| Tascón, under orders of Hugo Chávez. This list alone would suffice to
>| render the regime of Hugo Chávez illegitimate.
>|
>|
>| ---o0o---
>|
>| I think that these comments will show that there is a growing issue of
>| illegitimacy surrounding the Hugo Chávez presidency. But, even if this
>| were true, people might ask: "So what?" Who can remedy this situation?
>| Venezuelan society appears incapable of generating an internal protest
>| strong enough to force a change in this situation, at least in the
>| short term. Elections are a highly doubtful alternative, as Chávez
>| controls and manipulates electoral mechanisms. An armed rebellion,
>| such as the one Chávez staged in 1992, would either fail due to
>| incompetence of the leaders (as it happened with Chávez in 1992) or,
>| worse, would result in the replacement of Chávez by an armed gorilla,
>| someone even worse than Chávez, who would take us even farther back
>| into the 19th century.
>|
>| Ousting Chávez will require a combination of strategies, including
>| domestic and international components. The starting point must be a
>| rational and unselfish commitment by the opposition to work towards a
>| unified leadership, a common political platform and a systematic
>| campaign to open the eyes of all Venezuelans to the national disaster
>| that Venezuela has become under the rule of Chávez. The main obstacle
>| to the short-term success of this strategy is the illusory feeling of
>| progress Chávez has been able to instill into the poor, due to his
>| expedient policy of handouts. Millions of my countrymen and women live
>| on a day-to-day survival mode. This is understandable but limits the
>| power of any message designed to make them see that this illusion of
>| progress is temporary, that it will end when the regime runs into
>| economic difficulties and that the true answers to their existential
>| problems are of a more structural nature. This limitation should not
>| stop the putting into effect of the strategies designed to stop the
>| Chávez crimes against the nation.
>|
>| These strategies, in fact, should have started yesterday!
>|
>| --------------
>|
>| Gregg
>|
>|
>| ---------------
>| "This is an age of exhausted whoredom groping for its God."
>| (James Joyce, Ulisses p.280)
>|
>| http://www.geocities.com/airborne_col/America.html
>


---------------
"This is an age of exhausted whoredom groping for its God."
(James Joyce, Ulisses p.280)

http://www.geocities.com/airborne_col/America.html


Responder Citando
  #8  
Antiguo 16-jun-2005, 04:14
GREGG .
Guest
 
Mensajes: n/a
On Wed, 15 Jun 2005 22:29:05 GMT, "Chaflayo" <[email protected]> wrote:

>No English amigo...you have to learn spanish to sell your shit....and
>then..shit is shit is shit in any language.


Miro, aqui, yo hablo Spanish, muchas mejores que usted habla
el Ingles. Asi que senor Chiflado, no venga a mi, a tratar de
dar consejos en esto, que yo ha leido El Quijote de cubiertas
a cubiertas y no he entendido nada. Lei Cien Anios de Soledad
de Garcia Marques, y quedo llorando por el suelo de tristeza
con semejanto relata.
>
>Your pre invasion propaganda stinks
>

No se preocupa usted, cuando invasion termine, usted habra
creido que recien estara por empezar.

Americanos somos muy picaros!

Gregg


---------------
"This is an age of exhausted whoredom groping for its God."
(James Joyce, Ulisses p.280)

http://www.geocities.com/airborne_col/America.html


Responder Citando
  #9  
Antiguo 16-jun-2005, 04:22
Begoluna
Guest
 
Mensajes: n/a
GREGG . <[email protected]> wrote in
> On Wed, 15 Jun 2005 22:29:05 GMT, "Chaflayo" <[email protected]> wrote:


>>No English amigo...you have to learn spanish to sell your shit....and
>>then..shit is shit is shit in any language.


Yo nisiquiera la vendo (¿para qué la quiero vendada?): ¡la regalo! 8-)P

> Miro, aqui, yo hablo Spanish, muchas mejores que usted habla


Gregg habla Argentenglish y yo, Utahputinglish. :-D

> a cubiertas y no he entendido nada. Lei Cien Anios de Soledad


Se escribe, permíteme corregirte un poco, "Los Cien Anos de Soledad". :-)

>>Your pre invasion propaganda stinks


Esto de hablar de mierda, de anos y de pre-invasiones... ¡ah, ya entiendo!!
Disimularé...

> No se preocupa usted, cuando invasion termine, usted habra
> creido que recien estara por empezar.


> Americanos somos muy picaros!


Y las de Utah somos muy p... ppp... ¡pícaras! ;-)

> Gregg


PD: ¿Quién es Hugo Chávez? :-? ¿Un nuevo contertulio?

--
@}-->------
Begg
------<--{@


Responder Citando
  #10  
Antiguo 16-jun-2005, 05:24
GREGG .
Guest
 
Mensajes: n/a
On Wed, 15 Jun 2005 21:22:50 -0500, Begoluna <[email protected]> wrote:

>GREGG . <[email protected]> wrote in
>> On Wed, 15 Jun 2005 22:29:05 GMT, "Chaflayo" <[email protected]> wrote:

>
>>>No English amigo...you have to learn spanish to sell your shit....and
>>>then..shit is shit is shit in any language.

>
>Yo nisiquiera la vendo (¿para qué la quiero vendada?): ¡la regalo! 8-)P
>
>> Miro, aqui, yo hablo Spanish, muchas mejores que usted habla

>
>Gregg habla Argentenglish y yo, Utahputinglish. :-D


Ho,ho,ho,ho,ho,ho,ho!!! Tu muy funny girl!!! jo,jo,jo,jo,jo..., como
reirme! Casi trago pipa cof, cof!
>
>> a cubiertas y no he entendido nada. Lei Cien Anios de Soledad

>
>Se escribe, permíteme corregirte un poco, "Los Cien Anos de Soledad". :-)


Ya parecia que habia gato suelto... o era encerrado? Con precio del
book tan cheapo... le faltabamos unos letras a los titulos! Muchas
Grecias, seniorita Bego, por su correcionamiento tan correcto... poco
a poco vera usted que buena Espaniolo va a hablar me, con practico
y mucha esfuerzos.
>
>>>Your pre invasion propaganda stinks

>
>Esto de hablar de mierda, de anos y de pre-invasiones... ¡ah, ya entiendo!!
>Disimularé...


Palabra intersante! Disimularé! Algo que ver con, Dice Mula que Haré?
Palabro compuesto? Me love Spanish!
>
>> No se preocupa usted, cuando invasion termine, usted habra
>> creido que recien estara por empezar.

>
>> Americanos somos muy picaros!

>
>Y las de Utah somos muy p... ppp... ¡pícaras! ;-)


Muchachitas Uthanianas rapidas como mono para pulgos...
>
>> Gregg

>
>PD: ¿Quién es Hugo Chávez? :-? ¿Un nuevo contertulio?


Hugo Chavez, es uno boy scout de Venezuela, que cree
ser mucho macho. Llamarse Leon Bolivariano..., pero olvidar
que los leones se terminar, cuando invertarse la pólvora.

Saludos Bego.

Gregg


---------------
"This is an age of exhausted whoredom groping for its God."
(James Joyce, Ulisses p.280)

http://www.geocities.com/airborne_col/America.html


Responder Citando
Respuesta

Herramientas
Desplegado


Temas Similares
Tema Autor Foro Respuestas Último mensaje
Hugo Chávez y el golf Scardanelli Política 18 23-mar-2011 01:48
Carta de Fidel Castro a Hugo Chávez tula Burbuja Inmobiliaria 0 04-ago-2009 13:32
Reforma Consticional de Venezuela by Hugo Chávez. Calagamberro Guardería 20 15-nov-2007 14:05
El heroe de los norteamericanos: Hugo Chavez HOOOR Guardería 14 22-jun-2007 14:20
Discurso de Hugo Chávez en la ONU Buki* Burbuja Inmobiliaria 14 17-sep-2005 18:18


La franja horaria es GMT +1. Ahora son las 22:45.